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 This work recasts the world of the North American Southeast during the Seven 
Years’ War by examining the intersecting stories of British soldiers, colonists, Indians, 
and enslaved and free Africans. Populated with diverse Indians, Europeans, and enslaved 
and free Africans, the Southeast remained a vibrant and fiercely contested space that can 
be viewed as a slice of the Atlantic world in which the larger, external forces of 
imperialism and market capitalism collided throughout the eighteenth century. 
It also argues that the political, social, and intercultural dimensions of the Seven 
Years’ War relations between British soldiers and colonists cannot be fully understood 
without examining the experiences of Indians and enslaved Africans—especially in the 
Southeast. While British soldiers often judged the inhabitants of the Southeast based on 
their notions of race, class, and gender to maintain their identity as King’s Troops, these 
differences did not preclude them from pursuing economic interests with the local 
planters or share social, physical spaces together with the Indians and enslaved Africans. 
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CHAPTER I 
BRITISH TROOPS AND SOUTHEASTERN NORTH AMERICA IN THE SEVEN 
YEARS’ WAR 
 
“There is no Danger that we shall fall in Love wth. South Carolina, if we had any Inclination 
that Way, their genteel Proceeding with us would soon cure us of it.”1 
— Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, 1757 
 
No British officer castigated South Carolina more than Colonel Henry Bouquet. 
His bitter disputes with the colonists over the quartering of his troops have led scholars 
to characterize relations between the British army and South Carolina’s Anglo-American 
civilian populations as confrontational and antagonistic. This is a grossly incomplete 
picture, however. British troops daily engaged in various exchanges with the diverse 
inhabitants of the Southeast—colonists, Indians, as well as both free and enslaved 
Africans—and collaborated with them to pursue common economic interests despite 
some frictions. Such interactions provide us a unique window to examine how British 
troops understood indigenous and creolized inhabitants of the British Colonial Southeast 
and to see in new ways how these various local populations dealt with one another in a 
wartime context and in the presence of British troops. 
The emergence of Atlantic World studies has stressed the importance of peoples’ 
mobility over the oceans and the resulting connections that enmeshed of peoples from 
                                                
1 Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, October 27, 1757. The Papers of Henry Bouquet Vol. 1, S.K. 
Stevens, Donald H, Kent, and Autumn L. Leonard, (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, 1972), p.231 
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the Americas, Africa, and Europe. While most of the works dealing with intercultural 
relations consider how colonists or European creoles interacted with Indians and 
enslaved Africans, the European subjects of those studies tend to be traders or elites in 
government. Some of these colonists acted as soldiers in wartime, but unlike Britain, 
France, or Spain North American colonies had no professional soldiers. Although 
soldiers receive mention when intercultural relations are concerned, they are rarely seen 
as the role of intercultural agents. Rather, they appear as tools of war, bent on 
slaughtering slaves in arms and exterminating Indians. While such violence and cruelty 
frequently occurred wherever colonial or British troops were present, it does not provide 
the entire picture of actions on the ground when these soldiers shared colonial space with 
its varied occupants. 
Scholars have not offered analysis of the socio-cultural experiences of British 
troops in the Southeast despite narrating the chain of events leading to war and the 
complex peace treaty negotiation processes in detail. They have customarily included the 
Anglo-Cherokee Wars of 1760-61 in their works about the Seven Years’ War but not 
many have assessed it from the perspective of everyday informal and formal exchanges 
between the British troops and the Indian warriors and enslaved Africans who played 
vital roles. From Lawrence Henry Gipson to Fred Anderson to Daniel Baugh, the 
  3 
conflict in the southern theater served as a brief episodic diversion to the main drama 
and battles unfolding in the Ohio Country and Canada or in the Indian subcontinent.2 
Historians of the British empire have studied British troops’ involvement in the 
Seven Years’ War within the frame of the empire’s projection of power to its overseas 
possessions and the war’s impact on “making and unmaking” of empires, invariably 
casting their gaze toward the War of American Independence. For instance, Peter 
Marshall asserts that the Seven Years’ War “did much to bring about close integration 
between Britain and its Atlantic colonies,” citing as evidence the expansion of trade, 
surging interests in land grants and public office positions in the colonies, and an influx 
of new migrants who were often ex-soldiers.3 Marshall might be correct in his holistic 
observation of the effect of the Seven Years’ War on the British empire, but he conflates 
British troops’ experience in the Atlantic colonies with the war efforts in New England, 
New York, and Pennsylvania to draw his conclusions. Moreover, Marshall and other 
British imperial historians frame the British army’s relations with the American colonists 
primarily as a tension between military power and civil power, emphasizing 
disagreements over financing military logistics such as raising men, quartering troops, 
procuring provisions, and maintaining forts in frontiers. Such a frame focuses 
exclusively on the imperial-colonial relations through the lens of the British army’s high 
command and elite colonial officials while overlooking British troops’ daily social 
                                                
2 Lawrence H. Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the Enlarged Empire, 
1763-1766 (New York: Knopf, 1968); Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, (New York: Vintage Books, 
2000); Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763 (New York: Longman, 2011) 
3 Peter Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p.117 
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engagements with ethnically diverse colonists, American Indians and people of African 
descent.4 
As a result, these grand syntheses have chosen to describe the war in terms of 
skirmishes, body counts, destruction wrought on the Cherokees by the British army, and 
the negotiation of the peace treaty. The emergence of social history of the British army 
and British colonies in wartime since the 1970s brought out the aspects of military 
                                                
4 Notable academic works covering the British troops’ activities in the Southeast during the Seven 
Years’ War are: Lawrence H. Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the Enlarged 
Empire, 1763-1766 (New York: Knopf, 1968) J.R. Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier 
(New York: Gordian Press, 1966), David Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-62 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), Stanley Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968; first print, 1933) Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, 
Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: Norton, 1988) Tom Hatley, The 
Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution (New York : Oxford 
University Press, 1993), Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), Robin Fabel, Colonial Challenges : Britons, Native Americans, and Caribs, 1759-
1775 (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 2000), Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 
D.E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 1607-1763 
(New York: MacMillan, 1973), Paul David Nelson, General James Grant: Scottish Soldier and Governor 
of East Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), Walter Stitt Robinson, The Southern 
Colonial Frontier 1607-1763 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), Steve Bruce, “The 
Cherokee Wars 1759 to 1761,” Miniature War Games 140 and 141 (1995), Michael James Foret, “On the 
Marchlands of Empire: Trade, Diplomacy, and War on the Southeastern Frontier, 1733-1763” (Ph.D. diss., 
College of William and Mary, 1990) For contemporary accounts of the Cherokee expedition, see 
Christopher Gadsden [Pseudonym: Philopatrios], Some Observations of the Two Campaigns against the 
Cherokee Indians. (Charles-Town [S.C.]: Printed and sold by Peter Timothy, MDCCLXII. 1762) Evans 
Digital Edition, Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800, #9242, #9243, George Milligen 
Johnston, A Short Description of the Province of South-Carolina. (London: Printed for John Hinton, 1770) 
Huntington Library, Sabin Collection, Unit 283: Range 53,859-53,860, James Adair, History of the 
American Indians. (London: 1775) ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, c2005), William De Brahm, De Brahm’s Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of 
North America, ed. Louis De Vorsey, Jr. (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, 1971) On 
colonial South Carolina during the Seven Years’ War, see Jack Greene and J.R. Pole, Colonial British 
America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 
1984), Michael Morris, “The High Price of Trade: Anglo-Indian Trade Mistakes and the Fort Loudoun 
Disaster,” Journal of Cherokee Studies 17 (1996). For latest collections of essays on the Seven Years’ 
War, see Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer, The Seven Years War: A transatlantic history (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
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history outside the battlefield and logistics.5 Although many social histories of the 
British army and soldiers unearthed previously neglected aspects of the history in terms 
of their experiences in the Americas and exchanges with the inhabitants, the focal point 
of relations were limited to those between British troops and colonial troops and colonial 
civilians.6 
Although “New Indian” historians recently have done a better job in 
complicating the picture, their discussions of interactions between British soldiers and 
American Indians still tend to focus on military operations (understandably due to the 
nature of sources) with exceptions in the rare cases of Indian captives sprinkled over the 
larger narratives of the war. The neglect of the Southeast among scholars of white-Indian 
relations in North America is particularly noticeable. Richard White’s paradigm-shifting 
Middle Grounds recast the scholarship on white-Indian relations; Collin Calloway’s 
prolific works examining the social and cultural exchanges between Indians and Euro-
                                                
5 On social histories of the British army and recent scholarship on “War and Society,” see John Shy, 
A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American independence (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts soldiers and 
society in the Seven Years' War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), Sylvia Frey, The 
British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), Glenn Steppler, The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III, 1760-
1793 (PhD. disst.: University of Oxford, 1984), Michael McConnell, Army and Empire: British soldiers 
on the American frontier, 1758-1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). Daniel Krebs, A 
Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American Revolution 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013) On the impact of the Seven Years’ War on Britain, see 
Stephen Conway, War, State, and Society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland (Oxford; New 
York : Oxford University Press, 2006) 
6 Several historians have highlighted the frictions between British and American soldiers during the 
Seven Years’ War. See, Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 
1755-1763, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Leach, Roots of Conflict, chaps. 5-6. British 
imperial historians reject this interpretation. See Stephen Conway, “From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners: 
British Perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739-1783,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 
41, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 80-81. “The ill-effects should be not be exaggerated, however; much of the 
frictions was based on perceived military disparities.” 
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Americans or Britons; Daniel Richter’s examination of European colonization from the 
perspective of Indians; Peter Silver’s study of how Indian wars shaped American 
colonists’ psyche and identity; and Eric Hinderaker’s portrayal of Indians occupying the 
space on the edge of the British empire and later the United States are only a small 
sample of the literature that largely ignores the Southeast from their studies.7 
Several historians have written about southeastern Indians and their relations 
with colonists, but these works have often lacked the Atlantic perspective of white-
Indian relations in the Southeast. For instance, James Axtell’s The Indians’ New South, 
James Merrell’s The Indians’ New World, and John Juricek’s Colonial Georgia and the 
Creeks more or less tell their stories from regional perspectives without the context of 
the British Atlantic World where people constantly traversed across the Atlantic Ocean 
carrying news and information to the British metropole and other peripheries of the 
empire.8 British troops represented an ideal example of transient actors in the Atlantic 
World who constantly moved wherever they needed to in wartime. After the Seven 
Years’ War, some of them settled permanently in the British colonies while others went 
                                                
7 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Collin Calloway, New Worlds for 
All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2001), Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian 
War Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: 
Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) 
8 James Axtell, The Indians’ New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1997), James Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their 
Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1989), John Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
2010) 
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home and then returned to America once again to fight colonists who turned into rebels. 
While British imperial historians have examined the British imaginings of America due 
to the increasing accessibility of the printing press and Britons’ growing interest in its 
overseas colonies, studying British troops’ direct encounters and exchanges with the 
inhabitants of the Southeast shows us a different picture compared to Britons’ popular 
imaginations based on secondary accounts in the British Isles.9 
This study will examine British troops’ verbal and ritual exchanges with 
American Indians and diverse colonial occupants of the Southeast in the woods, forts, 
and colonial towns where their paths frequently converged.10 If colonial or creole 
                                                
9 On American Indians in a transatlantic cultural context, see Troy Bickham, Savages within the 
Empire: Representations of American Indians in eighteenth-century Britain (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), Tim Fulford and Kevin Hutchings, Native Americans and Anglo-American 
Culture, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Tim Fulford, Romantic Indians: 
Native Americans, British Literature, and Transatlantic Culture, 1756-1830 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). Alden Vaughan, Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-
1776. For a contemporary work, see Henry Timberlake, The Memoirs of Lt. Henry Timberlake: the Story 
of a Soldier, Adventurer, and Emissary to the Cherokees, 1756-1765 (Original print, London: 1765), ed. 
Duane H. King, (Cherokee, N.C.: Museum of the Cherokee Indian Press, 2007) 
10 Douglas Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 
1607-1763 (New York: MacMillan, 1973), John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in 
the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), Colin 
Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); British imperial historians have produced works on British soldiers in North 
America than Early Americanists but they tend to focus on the questions on the identity of “British-ness” 
and “Britons” and “Americans” emerged as the British subjects across the Atlantic experienced the Seven 
Years’ War and the War of American Independence by looking at the British officers in North America. 
These works, however, pay less attention to the actual interactions between the British troops and the 
inhabitants of America on the ground than focusing on Britons’ emerging perception of “Americans” by 
consuming mass print materials at home. In addition, scholars have paid more attention to the American 
War of Independence than the Seven Years’ War as they wanted answer question on the British empire’s 
tenacity in the American colonies in the aftermaths of revolutionary era. See Stephen Conway, “From 
Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners: British Perceptions of the Americans, circa 1739-1783,” William and 
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 265-276; “British Army Officers and the 
American War for Independence,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 1984): 
265-276; Ed. Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway, Britain and America go to War: the Impact of War and 
Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), Peter Marshall, 
The Making and Unmaking of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Eliga H. Gould, The 
Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of American Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
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soldiers had infamous reputations for committing horrendous violence and cruelty 
(which they certainly did) resulting from the seizure of Indian land, sexual assaults, or 
drunken killings, they also daily interacted with Indians in more mundane ways—
hunting, participating in rituals together, conversing, or simply sharing physical spaces. 
Such proximity could elicit unspoken responses and observations that later surfaced in 
writing or speech. Despite the rich sources, British troops—officers and rank-and-file—
have received relatively little attention from Early American scholars other than military 
historians investigating the British army in the Seven Years’ War and the Revolutionary 
War. 
Previous studies on British troops in the Southeast have focused on two key 
events: Henry Bouquet’s quartering in Charles Town in 1757 and the Cherokee 
expeditions of 1760-61. As for Bouquet’s short-lived stay in South Carolina, scholars 
have exclusively written about financial and constitutional disputes involving Bouquet 
and the Commons House of South Carolina.11 Stanley Pargellis and Jack Greene agree 
that Bouquet’s quartering dispute exposed the problem of legal authority of the British 
commander-in-chief in North America over exercising the Mutiny Acts that included 
clauses on quartering troops. These clauses neither clarified specifics on how to proceed 
                                                                                                                                           
University of North Carolina Press, c2000), Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); On works on the British army that extensively covers the Seven 
Years’ Wars, see J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981); Stephen Brumwelll Redcoats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (New York : Pantheon Books, 2002)  
11 Stanley Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America; Jack P. Greene, “The South Carolina 
Quartering Dispute, 1757-1758,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 60 (1959): 193-204 
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with procuring quarters nor who should bear its expenses in the American colonies.12  
Consequently, Bouquet’s quartering dispute set a precedent for future controversy over 
the Quartering Act of 1765 when the South Carolina’s assembly defied Bouquet’s 
request to quarter the troops at the private homes of inhabitants. In other words, the 
incident served as yet another example of the growing rift between the British imperial 
authorities and the colonial assemblies in North America as the Seven Years’ War 
exacted a staggering financial burden. These narratives that focus on the conflict have 
failed to see that the stories involving British troops quartered at various locations of 
Charles Town often described their everyday social interactions with the town’s 
inhabitants and have a great deal to tell us about how race, class, gender, and ethnicity 
operated.13 
Surprisingly, scholars of Cherokee history also have not examined the Anglo-
Cherokee War in depth, as they tend to take a long-term view of the Cherokee-British 
relations or examine the cultural changes within the Cherokee society from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Consequently, the conflict is interpreted as the 
continuation of white-Indian relations fraught with violence, lies, and greed.14 John 
                                                
12 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empire, p.103 
13 On the quartering disputes in Anglo-America before revolutionary era, see Allen Rogers,  
“Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the French and Indian War,” Military Affairs 34 
(1970): 7-11, Douglas Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-
1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), John Shy. Toward Lexington, (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) 
14 David Corkran’s The Cherokee Frontier provided a comprehensive overview of the conflict based 
on long-term relations between the South Carolinians and the Cherokees from the first encounter of the 
British and the Cherokees and the political factions within the Cherokee Nation. For Hatley, the Anglo-
Cherokee wars reflected one of the many themes among the Cherokee-Carolinian relations forged in the 
common interests of trade that did not last long but diverged, resulting in the contraction of Cherokee 
power in the region. 
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Oliphant’s latest work on the Cherokee-British conflict more or less follows the tradition 
of his predecessors with a heavy emphasis on the shrewd or poor statesmanship of the 
prominent actors involved in the conflict.15 It is essentially a political and diplomatic 
history on the origins and resolutions of the Cherokee-British conflict showing the 
problems of British Indian policies and their actual applications and bending the rules for 
practical reasons on the ground by the key individuals. 
This study examines the social and military affairs in South Carolina during the 
Seven Years’ War as a part of larger spatial unit (“Southeastern North America”) within 
the Atlantic world. Populated with diverse Indians, Europeans, and enslaved and free 
men and women of African descent, the southeast remained a vibrant and fiercely 
contested space that can be viewed as a miniature of the Atlantic world in which the 
larger, external forces of imperialism and market capitalism collided throughout the 
eighteenth century. I hope to demonstrate that the concept of “occupied space”—in 
which interactions occurred between occupying soldiers and occupied civilians—serves 
as a useful interpretive framework to reevaluate the impact of British troops on colonial 
frontiers and cities where their everyday interactions with Euro-Americans, Indians, and 
enslaved and free Africans shaped their daily lives. The crux of my research interest lies 
with investigating these moments of encounter along the lines of race, ethnicity, gender, 
and class, to demonstrate that daily interactions played a crucial role in carving out so-
                                                
15 John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2001) 
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called “zone of exchanges” within the Atlantic world.16 The sources generated by the 
presence of British troops permit us to see into these interactions and can show us what 
happened when the troops’ occupation destabilized the social relations that preceded the 
army’s arrival. 
Envisioning the colonial southeast as an integral building block of the Atlantic 
world, I examine British officers and rank-and-file soldiers as conduits of information 
who, as they sailed across the oceans and coasts in an effort to expand and defend the 
interests of British empire, linked the different regions of the Atlantic world. These 
British soldiers—of diverse ethnic backgrounds including Scots, Swiss, Irish, and 
German—did not merely fight against enemies in skirmishes. They spent a significant 
portion of their time in the New World engaging in local affairs with colonial and 
indigenous inhabitants. They also travelled great distances, especially in wartime. My 
                                                
16 This dissertation is heavily influenced by Gary Nash’s seminal work interweaving the experiences 
of three peoples of Native Americans, Europeans, and Africans in North America. British Colonial 
Southeast is an ideal zone of the Atlantic World to study interactions between the three peoples. See Gary 
Nash, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1982) For examples of scholarship adopting Nash’s approach, see Daniel Usner, Jr., American 
Indians in the lower Mississippi Valley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), Robert Paulett, An 
Empire of Small Places: Mapping the Southeastern Anglo-Indian trade, 1732-1795 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2012), Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and 
Slaves and the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). For 
scholarship on the American Revolution and its implication for the three peoples, see Jim Piecuch, Three 
peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2008) or Woody Holton, Forced Founders (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1999) Placing the British Colonial Southeast in the framework of the Atlantic World 
is one of the objectives of this study. For major works on Atlantic World studies, see Nicholas Canny, 
“Writing Atlantic History; or, Reconfiguring the History of Colonial British America,” The Journal of 
American History 86 (1999): 1093-1114, Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), Jack Greene and Philip Morgan, Atlantic History: A 
Critical Appraisal (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), David Armitage and Michael 
Braddick, The British Atlantic World, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), John Elliott, 
Empires of the Atlantic World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006). On Colonial Southeast 
and the Atlantic World, see James Carson, Making an Atlantic World: Circles, Paths, and Stories from the 
Colonial South (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007) 
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dissertation demonstrates that relations between British soldiers and colonists cannot be 
fully understood without examining British troops’ perceptions of and interactions with 
Indians and enslaved Africans—especially in the southeast where their dominating 
presence permeated the fabric of colonial society that British troops temporarily 
occupied. I argue that the British troops’ daily social interactions with Indians and 
enslaved Africans shaped the British officers’ attitudes toward the Southeast’s colonists, 
the existing relations between British subjects across the Atlantic, and the direction of 
British imperial policies in the Southeast. 
Contrary to the image of British troops isolating themselves away in forts and 
barracks from the colonial populations, they actually engaged in numerous exchanges 
with peoples of all sorts as they shared space and lived together with the diverse 
inhabitants of the Southeast during the Seven Years War. Although temporary in nature, 
the sudden influx of a sizeable number of British troops disrupted a peculiar colonial 
society founded on plantation economy and racial slavery; in turn, the British troops 
quickly adapted to colonial practices and norms in their dealings with colonists, Indians, 
and enslaved and free Africans. Some even assimilated into the society. 
To understand the world that British troops encountered, Chapter Two outlines a 
brief history of colonial South Carolina as the heart of the British “southern frontier” in 
North America, its geopolitical status in the Atlantic World, and the British strategy in 
the region from the first half of the eighteenth century to the commencement of the 
Seven Years’ War. In the early eighteenth century, South Carolinians repeatedly 
petitioned the Board of Trade and Plantations and King George I that the mother country 
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take care of George’s subjects of the “southern province.” The call for protection of 
South Carolina (and subsequently Georgia) stemmed from the traumatic experience of 
the Yamassee War in 1715, prompting colonists to demand immediate attention from the 
British government that had left matters of defense largely up to local militia. Not only 
did colonists fear the Spanish and French and their Indian allies, but they also demanded 
direct royal intervention to rescind the charter from the proprietorship and bolster the 
colony’s defense. In 1719, the colonists succeeded in toppling the Proprietors. 
Consequently, the transition from the proprietorship to a crown colony signaled the 
reshaping of southeastern North America into a hotly contested borderland, as British 
imperialists and colonists alike pursued an expansionist strategy to check French 
Louisiana and Spanish Florida. Hence, when the Seven Years’ War began in earnest in 
North America in 1755 with Edward Braddock’s disastrous defeat by the French at 
Monongahela, it did not take long for the British troops to be deployed to the “southern 
frontier.”17  
Chapter Three explores how the arrival of ethnically heterogeneous British 
troops—composed mainly of German-speaking Royal Americans (mostly recruited from 
the Dutch Pennsylvania region under the command of Swiss officers) and Scottish 
Highlanders—propelled all sorts of political, social, and economic exchanges, both 
informal and formal, with local inhabitants. Looking at the writings and activities of 
British soldiers in Charles Town reveals that the traditional understanding of the 
                                                
17 Vernon Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1928; 
reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956) Vernon Crane popularized the concept of 
“southern frontier” but scholars have rejected his concept since then. 
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quartering dispute as primarily a legal and fiscal battle misses how race and ethnicity 
worked the behind the scene. The inhabitants of Charles Town resented the presence of 
predominately German-speaking Royal Americans who vandalized public properties, 
swore and (sexually) assaulted residents; in contrast, they appear to have turned a blind 
eye to the Highlanders and even voluntarily provided quarters to them at their private 
homes. In addition, Bouquet’s private purchase of a plantation and “negro” slaves earned 
the ire of South Carolinian elites, further aggravating the ongoing quartering dispute. 
Beneath these publicized frictions, however, British troops contributed significantly to 
the local economy, as the demand for provisions and quarters meant that landlords, 
tavernkeepers, and artisans found an expanded market for their goods and services. 
The British army also exchanged intelligence and forged military alliances with 
the Indian nations of the Southeast during the Seven Years’ War in order to fight against 
their common enemies. Although the Fort Duquesne expedition took place outside the 
geographical boundaries of the Southeast, Chapter Four examines how British officers 
dealt with Cherokees and Catawbas in the context of the mission. Miscommunication, 
misunderstanding, and cultural incompatibility over the meanings of gift giving and 
alliance troubled the Cherokee-British relations from beginning to end. As Gregory 
Dowd has shown, British officers John Forbes and Henry Bouquet regarded the 
Cherokee allies as no more than mercenaries who owed valuable military services to the 
British in exchange for their pay.18 In contrast, the Cherokee warriors who agreed to join 
                                                
18 Gregory Dowd, “Gift Giving and the Cherokee-British Alliance,” in Contact Points ed. Andrew 
R.L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) 
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the expedition wanted relations on an equal footing with the British and viewed the 
terms of the agreement as negotiable over time. By examining how the British officers 
perceived the words and actions of the Cherokee warriors, this chapter suggests how 
simple but misinterpreted communications led to a series of unfounded suspicions and 
frustrations on both sides and ultimately a failed alliance. 
Chapter Five examines James Grant’s expedition against the Cherokees in 1761, 
paying special attention to the first three months the British troops’ stay in Charles 
Town. From January to March of 1761, soldiers and officers occupied various public 
spaces of Charles Town as a de facto garrison force and interacted extensively with 
white and black townspeople and Indian visitors. They involved themselves in the 
town’s market economy, recruited African pioneers, robbed Creek Indian visitors, 
attended Sunday services at local churches, and participated in a massive public 
ceremony to hail the ascension of George III, ate and drank in taverns, and formed 
liaison with local women. Thus, the occupied space of Charles Town facilitated the 
extensive everyday informal and formal exchanges between British troops and Charles 
Town’s free and enslaved women and men and the Indians. 
Chapter Six follows up everyday interactions but shifts the focus deep into 
Cherokee country. Instead of investigating the details of military operations and logistics 
and the settlement of peace terms between the Cherokee and British leaders, this chapter 
focuses on various incidents involving British troops, allied Indian warriors (mostly 
Senecas, Catawbas, and Chickasaws), and Cherokee prisoners. In the early phase of the 
expedition, Indian warriors acted independently rather than working together with 
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British troops, as hunting accidents and a violent murder involving the Seneca revealed. 
British officers also viewed the accompanying Indian warriors in a scornful manner. By 
the end of four months of campaigning, however, they might have become more 
integrated as a fighting unit and appreciated each other. These vigorous informal and 
formal exchanges defined the British troops’ experiences in Charles Town and in the 
colonial Southeast as much as did the warfare against the French and the Indians, 
heretofore emphasized in scholarship on the era.  
These interactions sometimes brought tensions to colonial politics and social 
order as both the British officers and rank-and-file soldiers pursued their own interests in 
the Southeast, which often conflicted with the colonists. As much as the presence of 
British troops might have temporarily changed the colonial Southeast, the powerful 
economic force of rice and indigo plantations run by slave labor also drew in some 
British officers who possessed the social and economic means to take advantage of 
economic opportunities they saw in South Carolina. Although Henry Bouquet and James 
Grant complained constantly of the colonists’ shortcomings and insolence, they quickly 
invested their capital in plantations and slaves, hoping to increase their wealth while they 
continued to carry out military duties elsewhere. 
After the Seven Years’ War effectively terminated in the Southeast with the 
signing of the peace treaty between the Cherokees and the South Carolinians in 1761, 
Bouquet and Grant maintained their social ties and networks with the elites of South 
Carolina. James Grant, who later became East Florida Governor, undertook the task of 
transforming Florida into a plantation economy modeled after South Carolina as he 
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collaborated with South Carolinian merchants and planters to expand the British empire 
before he returned to Scotland.19 Similarly, Henry Bouquet also invested in plantations 
and slaves in South Carolina before his incompetent manager accumulated debts that 
forced him to liquidate the property while Bouquet fought in the Ohio country and at 
Fort Pitt.20 
The study of British troops in the Southeast benefits from the fortuitous 
preservation of British officers’ papers preserved in private and public archives. In 
addition to official records and correspondence housed in the National Archives at Kew, 
James Grant’s Papers (also known as Ballindalloch Muniments) and the papers of Henry 
Bouquet (a compilation from the larger portfolio of the Frederick Haldimand Papers), in 
particular, constitute invaluable sources that provide British perspectives on the societies 
they encountered in southeastern North America. Fascinating court martial records 
preserved in War Office 71 (housed in the National Archives at Kew) and officers’ 
orderly books also provide a glimpse of how the British rank-and-file interacted with 
various South Carolina inhabitants. Colonial sources written by colonial officers, 
newspaper editors, planters, merchants, missionaries, travellers, and colonial women 
reveal that the British troops visiting the Southeast were never isolated from the local 
                                                
19 For James Grant’s career as the Governor of East Florida, see Paul David Nelson, General James 
Grant: Scottish Soldier and Governor of East Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993) 
20 As one historian of the British army noted, British officers’ involvement in colonial affairs might 
have been extensive but British rank-and-files also attempted to make sense of the New World as they 
interacted with colonists, Indians, and enslaved Africans. William A. Foote, “The Army in the Eighteenth 
Century” in A Guide to the Sources of British Military History ed., Robin Higham, (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p.131, “There was almost certainly a parallel Plantations 
Commission Register, now lost or strayed, which possibly may slumber peacefully unrecognized in some 
collection. This ledger, if found, will shed significant light on the participation of army officers in local 
colonial affairs. While no such ledger has been found, my work shows that other extant sources allow us to 
explore such issues. 
  18 
population but constantly engaged in exchanges with the peoples around them, mediated 
by their race, class, and gender. 
In the Southeast, Indian affairs proved a divisive subject between British troops 
and colonists, fracturing the imperial-colonial relations as demonstrated in the Fort 
Duquesne expedition and the Anglo-Cherokee War. Although certain British officers 
exhibited strong anti-Indian sentiment against the Cherokees in the Fort Duquesne 
episode, the Anglo-Cherokee War demonstrated British troops’ extensive everyday 
interactions with Indian warriors and accompanying the Cherokee expedition brought 
them closer together. On the other hand, British officers denigrated the South 
Carolinians for causing an unnecessary conflict that drained the resources of the British 
army to such a degree that some questioned the necessity of fighting against the 
Cherokees. 
These differences, however, tended to dissipate submerge while British troops 
were quartered in Charles Town. Despite a vocal dispute between Bouquet and the 
Commons House of South Carolina and the townspeople’s ethnic animosity toward the 
Royal Americans in 1757, British troops and Charles Town’s inhabitants came closer 
together as they engaged in daily social, economic exchanges. While British soldiers 
often judged the inhabitants of the Southeast based on their notions of race, class, and 
gender, and with an eye to maintaining their identity as the King’s Troops, these 
differences did not preclude their pursuit of personal economic interests within the local 
plantation economy or the sharing of social and physical spaces with Indian warriors and 
people of African descent. Thus, unlike in the northern colonies where the British 
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subjects’ shared war effort and euphoria of victory against the common foes united 
them, everyday social and economic exchanges bridged differences between British 
troops and the diverse inhabitants of the Southern provinces over the course of the Seven 
Years’ War. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SOUTHEAST AND SOLDIERS 
 
As this study demonstrates, we still do not know a lot about British troops’ 
experience in North America, especially their informal and formal exchanges with the 
inhabitants.21 Southeastern North America deserves a separate study of British troops’ 
experience and exchanges with its peoples despite Fred Anderson’s magisterial synthesis 
of the Seven Years’ War and John Shy’s longue durée approach to British troops in 
British North America.22 Although the Seven Years’ War and British troops in North 
America have received plenty of attention, we still know little about what social and 
cultural roles British troops assumed in the region. Frequently told narratives of British 
soldiers engaging in unconventional warfare with Indians, garrisoning forts in frontiers, 
and cooped up in the barracks of colonial cities conjure an image of soldiers isolated 
from other inhabitants of North America. Although historians have written extensively 
about British officers’ disdain and condescension toward the colonial militia or 
                                                
21 By “British troops,” I mean rank-and-file and officers recruited from either in Britain or Europe 
belonging to Regiments of Foot with numeric numbers (from 1st to 115th) and nicknames assigned to them 
such as 17th Forbes, 21st Royal North British Fusileers, and 77th Montgomery’s Highlanders. By “colonial 
troops,” I mean locally raised troops in the English colonies of North America known as Provincial 
regiment (Virginian regiment, Pennsylvania regiment, South Carolina regiment, etc.) and Independent 
Companies of South Carolina and New York. See, J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the 
British Army, 1715-1795 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)  
22 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); John Shy, Toward Lexington: 
The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1965) 
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authorities, social interactions and intercultural relations between the British troops and 
the peoples of America have been overlooked.23 
 
British Colonial Southeast as a Historical and Geographical Unit 
For the purpose of this study, I use the term “Southeast” in relation to the center 
of the North American continent. Neither the colonists nor the Britons used the term to 
describe their geographical position; they simply used terms such as “southern frontier” 
or “southern provinces” to designate South Carolina and Georgia. For Native Americans, 
such European spatial conceptualizations were irrelevant. As Indians became enmeshed 
in the networks of trade with French and English, however, they increasingly understood 
their place relative to European trading partners.24 
The topographical features as well as the geopolitical circumstances in the 
Southeast resulted in a variety of settings that encouraged informal and formal 
                                                
23 See Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Leach, Roots of Conflict, chaps. 5-6 
24 On the discussion of the transformation of southeastern Indian culture through European contact, 
see Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-century North 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Robert Paulett An Empire of Small Places (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2012). Robbie Ethridge and Charles Hudson, Charles. The Transformation of 
the Southeastern Indians, 1540-1760. (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2002) Robbie 
Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2003), pp.22-32. John Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 2010). James Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European 
Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Tom Hatley, 
The Dividing Paths, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Gregory A. Waselkov and Peter H. 
Wood and M. Thomas Hatley. Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, Revised and 
Expanded Edition. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006)  See also D.W. Meinig , The 
Shaping of America: Atlantic America, 1492-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Meinig 
clusters “Carolina and the Carolinas” separate from French Louisiana and Spanish Florida to highlight the 
different settlement types, domain, and development. But, in this study, I include Louisiana and Florida to 
show how British colonists frequently referenced their rival European settlements in the discussion of 
defense. 
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exchanges between British troops, European colonists, Indians, and enslaved or free 
Africans. For example, informal bartering of goods and services between British troops 
and local inhabitants occurred at European forts, towns, military encampments, 
waterways, roads, and plantations, where colonial authority exerted limited control.25 
South Carolina’s extensive networks of creeks, streams, and rivers running over swampy 
lands in the low country and the western interior’s hilly terrain allowed the movement of 
Indians and colonial traders. In the larger geo-political framework of the Atlantic World, 
the Southeast was connected to Spanish Florida, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
French Louisiana via rivers and coastal lines. These geographical features and the 
imperial boundaries of the Southeast resulted in diverse political, social, demographic, 
economic, and cultural patterns that rendered the experience of British troops in the 
Southeast fundamentally different from those in the Middle Colonies or New England. 
In short, paying special attention to geographical perspectives of the Southeast has the 
potential to recast the narrative and analysis of the Seven Years’ War along the southern 
frontiers. 
The South Carolinians themselves clearly understood the placement of South 
Carolina in the realm of the Atlantic World in connection with the Caribbean Islands, 
French Louisiana, Africa, and Europe. An anonymous report (presumably written 
sometime in the 1740s) boasted Port Royal in Charles Town as “the most commodious 
for the Rendezvous of the King’s Ships” in “all places in British America" where “they 
                                                
25 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, “The Land and Water Communication Systems of the Southeastern 
Indians,” in Gregory A. Waselkov and Peter H. Wood and M. Thomas Hatley. Powhatan's Mantle: 
Indians in the Colonial Southeast, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), pp.27-42 
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can have frequent and almost constant advices from all the Governmts on the Continent,” 
including Jamaica, Havana, and Providence all within ten days. In addition, the author 
asserted that the ships stationed in Port Royal, “can sooner relieve any of the Windward 
Islands than from Jamaica, and be vastly more convenient to protect our own and annoy 
the Enemies Colonies in America than at any other place in the British Dominions.”26 
Similarly, when the Cherokee War raged in South Carolina in 1760, Lieutenant 
Governor William Bull described South Carolina’s geographic location to the Board of 
Trade as having, “an easy communication with old France, and their West Indies, 
adjacent to Louisiana, and accommodated with good Harbours on the Atlantic Ocean.” 
These remarks indicated that contemporaries understood their place in the Atlantic 
World as a strategic North Caribbean commercial outpost.27 
The Colonial Southeast was a borderland where three European powers 
competed for hegemony as they expanded their territory and trading posts into the Indian 
countries. Hence, Spanish Florida, British South Carolina, and French Louisiana created 
a complex web of competition for trade and alliances with various Indian nations to 
balance the power in the region.28 Unlike the Spanish or French, the British colonists 
aggressively contested boundaries with Indians nearby by purchasing land, condoning 
                                                
26 Miscellaneous Papers relating to America; 1739-1772, “Reasons humbly offer’d for fortifying 
Port Royal harbor in So Carolina & for erecting an Hospital & store houses there” Add. Ms. 22680, 
f.12 , [unknown date; presumably in the 1740s) (London; British Library) 
27 Records of the Colonial Office, America and West Indies, CO 5/376, William Bull to Board of 
Trade, July 12, 1760 (London: National Archives at Kew) 
28 William S. Coker, and Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish 
Borderlands (Gainesville, FL : University Presses of Florida ; Pensacola : University of West Florida 
Press, c1986), David Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven : Yale University Press, 
c1992) 
  24 
illegal encroachments, and seizing territory either by war or peace treaty. European 
presence in the Southeast (particularly the French and British) gradually expanded after 
initial phases of starvation, unsustainable economy, or near the annihilation by Indian 
attack. But the Creeks and the Cherokees also expanded their power (after surviving 
smallpox epidemics) as they struck lucrative trade agreements and military alliances 
with the Europeans to weaken or annihilate their traditional enemies.29 
Southeastern Indians’ growing dependence on European trade accelerated the 
existing intertribal warfare as Indians competed to gain the favor of their European trade 
partners.30 Indians frequently launched raids on remote European settlements on behalf 
of the British, French, or Spanish in order to receive presents and negotiate favorable 
trade terms with them. Deerskins, bounty scalps and enslaved Indians made up the 
commodities of trade. Indians frequently dictated terms of war and trade, refusing to 
acquiesce to the demands of European neighbors. In addition, longstanding rivalries or 
spontaneous killings based on revenge and blood law sparked conflict between 
southeastern Indians could embroil their European allies as well. 
Although southeastern Indians suffered from the Old World diseases, frequent 
wars, and rapid cultural change after European contact, they continued to make their 
presence known in the region. Their populations regenerated as they incorporated 
European tools and weapons to their advantage. Rivalries between the French and 
English in North America also gave Indians geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis Europeans 
                                                
29 See James Axtell, The Indians’ New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast, John 
Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks, Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths  
30 James Merrell, The Indians’ New World; Kathryn Braund, Deerskins and Duffels (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 
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until the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War. However, Spanish Florida gave the 
Southeast a crucial distinction compared to the Northeast or the Great Lakes region. 
Although the Spanish presidio of St. Augustine failed to exert much influence over 
southeastern Indians through trade, it added another variable to the geopolitics of the 
region, creating a web of Spanish-French-Anglo relations and their respective relations 
with numerous southeastern Indians.31 
By the commencement of the Seven Years’ War, the major powers of 
southeastern Indians either allied or maintained relationships with British traders who 
offered quality goods at competitive rates. The British openly boasted of their supremacy 
in trade with Indians and how they commanded the Indians under their influence by 
making them dependent on trade with the British.32 Catawbas and Cherokees in 
particular enjoyed even better prices when Virginia and South Carolina traders competed 
against each other. While the relationship based on trade lasted, from the Indian 
perspective, deerskin trade with European colonists allowed the Cherokees, Creeks, and 
Catawbas to expand their power and provided less powerful nations a means of survival 
in the eighteenth-century Southeast. 
                                                
31 On Spanish Florida, see Amy Bushnell, The King's Coffer: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida 
Treasury, 1565-1702 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981); Jane Landers, Black Society in 
Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999). On French Louisiana, Shannon Lee Dawdy, 
Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
Ed. Bradley G. Bond, French Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
University Press, 2005), See also, Daniel Usner, American Indians in the lower Mississippi Valley: social 
and economic histories (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998) 
32 For instance, see Kathryn Braund and James Merrell. Scholars of colonial southeast seem to agree 
on one thing: the English thoroughly dominated Indian trade with their cunning, with Scottish traders’ 
marriages into Indian societies, and with cheaper prices and superior quality European manufactured 
goods, and the abundance of rum provided by the English, which gradually made the southeastern Indians 
addicted and dependent on trade with the English. 
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South Carolina and Charles Town 
South Carolina began humbly as “a colony of a colony,” with Barbadians 
immigrating to a small, narrow peninsula that became Charles Town in 1660. After the 
early phase of a subsistence economy based on domestic consumption of food and goods 
by immigrants, South Carolina’s export trade relied on “shipping provisions and timber 
products to Barbados for slaves, sugar, bills of exchange, and European goods.”33 In the 
early eighteenth century, the deer skin trade with Indians provided a significant source of 
income for Carolinians. As McCusker and Menard note, the colonists exported deerskins 
to London valuing £35,000 in the late 1740s and £55,000 around 1770.34 Indian slave 
trade also constituted a major component of the economy in South Carolina until the 
declining Indian population, the waning demand for Indian slaves from neighboring 
colonists, and the Yamasee War killed the trade around 1720.35 
Charles Town expanded rapidly after 1730 and increasingly assumed its role as 
the center of a region encompassing North Carolina founded 1691 and eventually 
Georgia founded 1733.36 As a seasonal home to planter-merchant elites as well as an 
urban town with “middling sorts,” half of the population consisted of enslaved Africans 
                                                
33 Peter Wood, Black Majority; John McCusker and Russell Menards, The Economy of British 
America (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University 
of North Carolina, 1985), p.171 
34 John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British America (Chapel Hill: Published for 
the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina, 1985), p.173 
35 On Indian slave trade, see Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: the Rise of the English Empire in 
the American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Robbie Ethridge, ed. Mapping 
the Mississippian Shatter Zone: the Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American 
South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009) See also Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010) 
36 Emma Hart, Building Charleston (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010), p.2 
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who predominated in public spaces such as markets and shops.37 But, as Emma Hart 
argues, Charles Town remained quintessentially “a British Atlantic town” in the British 
Atlantic World connected through its port.38 Merchants residing in Charles Town waited 
for traders to bring in deerskins so that they could export to the Atlantic trade networks 
within the British Empire. 
In the Southeast, Charles Town quickly assumed its role within the British 
Atlantic as a shipping center for exporting deerskin, rice, and indigo to supply trade 
within the British Empire. Initially exporting deerskins, Carolinians experimented with 
several crops to find suitable agricultural exports to the market economy of the British 
Atlantic World. Subsequently, rice and indigo proved the most suitable crops for South 
Carolina’s climate and soil.39 Thus, the population growth of whites and their insatiable 
demand for land and labor fueled the import of African slaves and established brutal 
racial slavery, firmly entrenched by the 1750s.40 Despite a massive slave insurrection at 
Stono in 1739, white colonists continued to import African slaves while imposing more 
stringent slave codes. The number of blacks surpassed whites in South Carolina in the 
first half of eighteenth century, creating a “black majority.” Also, Indian delegations 
regularly visited Charles Town to negotiate, protest, and forge diplomatic relations with 
                                                
37 Ibid., p.2 
38 Ibid., p.6 
39 For development colonial plantation economy and African slavery in Carolinas, see S. Max 
Edelson, Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2006); Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and 
Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Judith Carney, Black Rice 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Peter Wood, Black Majority (1974, reprint New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1996) 
40 For a development of South Carolina’s economy, “Chapter 8: The Lower South” in John 
McCusker and Russell Menards, The Economy of British America (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute 
of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina, 1985), pp.169-188 
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colonists.41 Thus, Charles Town took its place among the British colonial towns where 
enslaved and free Africans, Indian visitors, and white colonists shared public spaces. 
 
Forts and Garrison Forces 
Before the arrival of over one thousand British troops in the Southeast in 1757, 
forts represented a predominate site of social and economic exchanges between a mix of 
British and colonial soldiers and Indians in the eighteenth century. In the course of the 
Seven Years’ War, these outposts far removed from major colonial towns on the eastern 
coastlines continued to be focal points of British troops’ interactions with others in North 
America. The Cherokee expeditions led by Archibald Montgomery and James Grant in 
1760-61 encamped near Fort Prince George and Fort Ninety Six (also known as Fort 
Keowee) before they retreated to Charles Town. British troops later occupied these small 
structures erected in the middle of Indian country and interacted with them. 
No manmade structures on land better expressed European colonial ambition and 
expansionist impulse than forts. Among the numerous English-built forts in South 
Carolina and Georgia, Fort Ninety Six, Fort Prince George, Fort Loudoun, Fort Moore, 
and Fort Augusta acted as both trade and military outposts.42 (See Figure 3) Bartering of 
deerskins, scalps, Indian or African slaves, and European goods (gun and gunpowder in 
particular) frequently occurred. Cultural and social exchanges also took places at these 
                                                
41 Vernon W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1929), p.108 “Charles Town in the eighteenth century was the one port-town of the South…For Charles 
Town was also the metropolis of the whole southern Indian country, and it was there that traders from the 
mountains and the Gulf plains paid their annual visits to civilization.” 
42 See Larry E. Ivers, Colonial Forts of South Carolina, 1670-1775 (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1970)  
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forts: Indians and colonists held diplomatic meetings, colonial traders and Indian women 
met and married one another, travelers lodged and quizzed Indians for ethnographic 
information, and visiting missionaries proselytized.43 
The origins of British forts in the Southeast go back as early as the 1700s as 
colonial authorities pursued permanent trade and military posts which could replace 
traders’ huts within Indian countries. The plans for building forts and garrisoning 
Carolina in 1720 reveal that the English colonists conceptualized “the Southwest 
Frontier” as a buffer zone separating them from French Louisiana. The looming French 
presence—for instance, Fort Toulouse on Alabama River—and the possibility of the 
French-Indian alliance presented a worst-case scenario for the Carolinians. “It is well 
known the English have Extirpated or driven Natives back into the Land and are 
scattered along the Sea Coast of North America,” one memorandum warned, “Now the 
French Incorporates themselves with the Indians by Intermarraiges [sic] and placing 
Popish Missionarys among them who endeavour to breed in them an incurable aversion 
to the English.” The specter of coordinated French-Indian attacks from “the SouthWest 
Frontier,” the author argued, warranted making a monetary investment immediately: “a 
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peny now layd out may Save pounds hereafter and enable us in Times of war even to 
dispossess the French.”44 
These European-made structures represented a symbol of European expansion 
and an indication of future permanent settlement. An anonymous memorandum titled 
Land set aside crops next to fort proposed that “the Land adjacent thereto be 
appropriated for the Use of the Garrison, both in respect to the Officers & Soldiers” so 
that they could use for “a Garden and Orchard Plat” and raise “Horses Sheep and Hogs” 
as well as “Indian corn” and “Wheat, Rice, Pease, Oats &ca.“ It also suggested that this 
policy would make soldiers’ “Familes with which and their Pay they may live 
comfortably and pleasantly, and may be a great Encouragemt for them to live there and 
defend the Place.” The author also encouraged “both for Traders & Planters” to settle 
around fort “to assi[s]t in Defending the Fort when it shall be attack” and to “bring 
People to settle there and their own Interest as well as the publicks will oblige them to 
perform the several conditions.”45 In reality, however, garrison soldiers at these forts 
could only survive because of food provided by Indian women or supplies brought from 
Charles-Town. If Indians cut off food and supply routes from Charles Town, those 
residing inside forts would die from starvation. In fact, the Cherokees held Fort Loudoun 
under siege until its starving soldiers surrendered in 1760. 
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These forts also served as a means to gather intelligence concerning both Indians 
and the French. In 1756, South Carolina Governor James Glen reported to the Board of 
Trade “the necessity of a Fort in the Upper Cherokee Country” in order to exclude “the 
French and their Indians whom I found ever busy and insinuating in that Nation.”46 In 
short, English colonists erected forts to check the expansion of French and Spanish 
traders to the Indians neighboring the English settlements, despite the enormous of 
expense of construction and maintenance. Inadequately garrisoned and poorly fortified 
to withstand full-scale assault, these forts nonetheless served to delineate the English 
borders of influence as the Spanish, French, and English vied for dominance and sought 
opportunities to undermine each other’s footholds in the region. 
British forts in the Southeast spread out across the region. Among these forts, 
Fort Prince George, built in 1753, and located right across the Cherokee village of 
Keowee, gained prominence for its bustling commercial activity. (See Figure 4) A mile 
above Keowee stood Cunnasagee or “Sugar Town,” which acted as a gateway to the 
larger Upper, Middle, and Lower Cherokee settlements along the Blue Ridge Mountains; 
Fort Congaree was located at an intersection of dividing paths to the Catawbas and the 
Cherokees via Ninety-Six; Fort Moore and Fort Augusta, on each side of the Savannah 
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River, guarded the inland passage to Georgia and Florida. Small garrisons of fewer than 
30 men each occupied these forts after their construction in the early eighteenth 
century.47 
Indian nations willing to trade with the French or British allowed the Europeans 
to build forts near or inside their boundaries despite their apprehension of armed soldiers 
occupying these structures.48 The Cherokees only allowed the construction of a fort in 
the Overhill Country after the assurance from Raymond Demere, the commander of Fort 
Loudoun, that the soldiers would not molest the Cherokee people. While the Cherokees 
acted with a suspicion and alarm over the arrival of colonial troops, they clearly saw 
economic opportunity and the advantage of having a nearby station where they could 
trade scalps and deerskins for guns, gunpowder, and other items. Some Indian nations 
requested that a fort to be built near them, believing that the presence of colonial soldiers 
in their territory would deter enemy invasions. For instance, the Catawbas pleaded with 
the governors North Carolina and South Carolina to build a fort in their land and 
continued to support the British war effort during the Seven Years’ War. 
As was the case with many European forts built in North America, supposedly 
defensive military structures served primarily as trading centers and storehouses. Most 
of these structures were poorly built and could barely sustain themselves under hot and 
inclement seasonal weather without constant repairs and landscaping efforts. A report of 
the conditions of military defense of South Carolina described forts in South Carolina as 
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“few in number, and some of them gone decay.”49 Dismal conditions at these structures 
continued throughout the Seven Years’ War as the commanders of Fort Loudoun and 
Fort Prince George constantly requested new materials to repair the forts’ rotting wood 
and falling fences. Henry Bouquet, a Swiss Colonel who stayed in Charles Town from 
1757 to 1758, drew a bleak picture of Fort Prince George: “The Ramprts daily falling, 
the Ditch capable of being leap’d over, even by the Indian Children, who with ease also 
climb the Rampart at any part.”50 
As much as colonial forts served as structural nexuses binding Indians and 
colonists in exchanges of goods, food, deerskins, slaves, and scalps, these sites also 
became fraught with violence. Cherokees responded to such events in two ways: they 
swiftly avenged these deaths by killing the murderers and they petitioned fort 
commanders to relay their remonstrance to the governor in Charles Town. If the 
colonists ignored their grievances, Indians attacked the fort as it became easy target 
situated in their own countries. For instance, in 1758, the Lower and Middle Cherokees 
threatened to attack and destroy Fort Prince George when Virginians indiscriminately 
killed Cherokee warriors travelling through Bedford County to assist the Fort Duquesne 
expedition. Likewise, the Overhill Cherokees attacked Fort Loudoun in 1760 signaling 
the beginning of the Anglo-Cherokee Wars. 
                                                
49 British Public Record Office, South Carolina, Board of Trade, Vol.28, P.175, Dunk Halifax, T. 
Oswald, Andrew Stone, and W.G. Hamilton to William Pitt, Whitehall, December 24, 1756 
50 Bouquet Papers, Bouquet to Napeir, July 13, 1757; White Outbridge to Loudoun, June 13, 1756, 
LO 1220 (San Marino: Huntington Library) Similarly, at Fort Moore, a commanding officer reported that 
some parts of the fort “to fall every Day” in “a very ruinous Condition.” 
  34 
If garrison soldiers aggravated Indians through their violent acts, traders fared no 
better in maintaining good relations with Indians.51 Colonial traders’ greed and 
dishonesty constantly garnered complaints from Indians. Typical fraudulent dealings 
involved using false scales in measuring weights and selling rum illegally. These 
exchanges based on suspicion and distrust soured white-Indian relations and provoked 
violent incidents that escalated into a full-scale war with the Yamasees in 1715 and with 
the Cherokees in 1760. Despite the colonial authorities’ attempts to regulate trade in the 
wake of the Yamasee War, these iniquities continued to plague white-Indian relations in 
the southeast. In 1757, Paul Demere at Fort Loudoun noted of one trader John Elliott that 
“I am most sure he don’t use the Indians very well, they complain to me very much 
about him, when he Sells them Rum it is half water, and his Goods very Dear.”52 
Though everyday interactions occurred at these forts in the Southeast, and aside 
from a few individuals married to Indian women, such as Lachlan McIntosh and James 
Beamer, the relations between garrison soldiers, colonial traders, and Indians remained 
volatile. Years of daily exchanges did not necessarily bring resident colonists at forts and 
Indians closer and suspicions against each other escalated as the Seven Years’ War 
commenced. Garrison soldiers frequently interrogated the Cherokees to see if the French 
had contacted them to attack the forts and resident colonists; traders continued to 
swindle Cherokees through dishonest transactions. These mounting tensions at the forts 
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burst into violence that eventually led British troops to intervene in the Anglo-Cherokee 
Wars. 
 
The Emergence of British Defense Strategy of the Southeast 
Prior to the arrival of the British Royal Americans from Philadelphia and the 
Scottish Highlanders from Cork, Ireland, in 1757, the southern British colonies relied on 
locally raised militias to defend themselves. James Oglethorpe’s expedition to Georgia 
created a sizeable number of troops paid for by the British Crown and known as 
Independent Companies. Like New York, South suffered defensively because their 
colonial land policies granted large blocks of lands to entice immigrants and because 
colonial assemblies hesitated to impose military service on the settlers for fear that they 
might migrate to Pennsylvania where no military law existed.53 Hence, South Carolina 
experienced a chronic shortage of manpower and defensive capacities because of “the 
poverty and the sparseness of population” that precluded “the development of an 
effective militia.”54 
The large black majority population could have served as a main source of 
military manpower for Carolina. In fact, in the Yamasee War of 1715, black slaves 
fought alongside their white masters. But the Stono Rebellion of 1739 rattled the 
confidence of the masters and led the colony to outlaw the arming of slaves and instead 
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focus on mandating white slave patrols.55 In addition, slaves who fled from Carolina to 
Spanish Florida embarrassed Carolina slave owners.56 Naturally, the colonists frequently 
disparaged St. Augustine as “a wretched garrison town defended by negroes.” Even 
Indians seemed to have been aware of the Carolinians’ apprehension over the Spanish 
using runaway slaves against them. In 1757, Georgia Lieutenant Governor Charles 
reported that the Creek Indians offered him that they would attack the Spanish fort of St. 
Illy nearby St. Augustine “garrisoned by Negroes whom they hope to bring away, in 
order that they may dispose of them to the English as Slaves.”57  
From the viewpoint of strategic value, however, the southern provinces remained 
outside the attention of London until the Yamasee War jolted the Carolinians, prompting 
them to demand immediate attention from the British government.58 After the end of the 
Yamassee War, planters and merchants of South Carolina revolted against the Lord 
Proprietors of Carolina in 1715, accusing them of willful negligence. The Commons 
House of South Carolina, in alliance with the assembly’s new agents Joseph Boone and 
Richard Berresford, waged a series of campaigns for half a decade to petition the royal 
government to better defend the colony. After a couple of bumbling attempts from Sir 
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Robert Montgomery of Skelmorly to publicize the dire situation of South Carolina, the 
colonists toppled the Proprietors in 1719.59 
In that momentous year when the Crown took direct control over South Carolina, 
John Barnwell, the assertive South Carolina planter, answered a series of queries from 
the Board to highlight the issues of defense in the southern colony to the Board of Trade 
and Plantation. He portrayed South Carolina as “the frontier” endangered by the Spanish 
and French and their Indian allies.60 Barnwell also revealed the population of Charles 
Town and South Carolina in the early eighteenth century and their militias answering 
that among 9000 white inhabitants, 2000 men could serve as militiamen. He then 
proceeded to compare South Carolina’s population with that of French Louisiana, 
Spanish Florida, and major Indian Nations in the Southeast to make an impression that 
potential enemies surrounded the southern British colony. 
On the Indian neighbors, Barnwell’s response revealed his belief that the French 
continuously undermined the British position in the region by making relentless 
overtures to the Indian Nations on the Southeast. First, Barnwell described the Catawbas 
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as “intirely in the English Interests and by their Situation will be so long as Carolina is a 
Barrier between them and the Incroachments of the French.” As for the Cherokees, 
however, Barnwell reported, “at present [they] are intirely in the English Interest” but 
the French constantly schemed to bring the Cherokees on their side. To counter the 
French initiative toward the Cherokees, the Carolinians had to spend a large sum of 
money “in making presents to their chiefs” and warned that “this Colony will be reduced 
to the last Extremety” if the French finally succeed in persuading the Cherokees to ally 
with them. Similarly, the French have “intirely bought over” the Choctaws and “Secured 
their Interest among them by building forts & placing Garrisons and carry on their 
Trade.” Although the Choctaws remained at peace with South Carolina, Barnwell 
predicted that the French-Choctaw alliance would “make an Intire Conquest of this 
province.” The only factor that deterred the Choctaws from immediately doing so was 
the ongoing war between them and the Cherokees.61 
The growing presence of French settlements in Louisiana and Alabama along the 
Mississippi River and Gulf Coast also posed “the southwestern” problem for the English 
colonists. The French fort built at Mobile in 1700 unnerved Carolinians as they accused 
the French of inciting “the Albama Indians to murder our Traders” and set up a new 
settlement named New Toulouse. The Carolinians also resented the French incursion 
because they lost the trade relations with “Chickesaws, Albamas, Taliboose and Abicaws 
and other nations” with whom they had traded “for above thirty yeares.” Those Indians’ 
                                                
61 Board of Commissioners Collection, William R. Coe Papers, (Typescript: Charleston, S.C.: South 
Carolina Historical Society) In the copy dated August 8, 1720, the same query is answered with the 
following variation about the troops that they are “little inferior to disciplined troops.” 
  39 
shift to French trade deprived South Carolina of income from tributes, commissions, and 
trade amounting to £6000. In 1719, the French also took Pensacola from the Spanish and 
founded New Orleans with 4,000 settlers. As a result, the French built another fort at 
“the mouth of Catahoochee River,” allowing the Ochesee Nation to withdraw “their 
Dependance upon [from] the English.”62 
Although Barnwell made his points to the Board of Trade and Plantations, the 
plan to bolster the defense in the Southeast never materialized. In 1721, only one 
fledgling company of British regulars arrived in the southern colony, and it consisted 
largely of “invalids”—pensioners discharged from active duty because of age or 
infirmity. The colonists did not take these soldiers seriously and consequently they had a 
dismal experience in the colony because of disease, spoiled provisions, and neglect.63 
Thus, the southern colonies continued to rely on locally raised troops under the title of 
Independent Companies. Although a plan of sending British regulars to the southern 
colonies resurfaced prior to James Oglethorpe’s expedition to Georgia in 1737, it never 
materialized and no additional British reinforcement arrived in South Carolina until 
Henry Bouquet’s Royal Americans and Archibald Montgomery’s Scottish Highlanders 
arrived in Charles Town in 1757.64 
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In Georgia, the Anglo-Spanish dispute over British colonization of Savannah in 
1733 and the ensuing War of Jenkins’ Ear led to James Oglethorpe raising a mixed force 
of British regulars, colonial militia, and Indian warriors to launch a preemptive attack on 
Florida in 1740. Although Oglethorpe’s siege of St. Augustine failed, his army 
successfully defended Georgia against Spanish invasion in 1742. With the end of the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear, the army was disbanded, once again leaving the Colonial Southeast 
without the protection of British troops, except for a handful of soldiers in the outpost 
forts.  
Spanish Florida proved a lesser threat than French Louisiana but remained a 
great annoyance to the Carolinians because the Spanish provided a safe haven for 
runaway slaves and encouraged the Indians of the Savannah region to attack English 
settlements.65 The Carolinians’ hatred toward Spanish Florida was reflected in 
Barnwell’s disparagement of St. Augustine as “a Garrison containing 300. sory Soldiers 
being mostly Banditti and undisciplined” who subsisted by making “some pitch & Tarr 
with the help of the negro Slaves plundered by their Indians from our Frontier 
Settlements.” He also claimed that the English colonists near the Spanish border “are 
now always murdered & eaten by the Savages living on the Coasts of that Country” and 
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that “the Spaniards” also harbored “Re[b]ells ffelons Debtors Servants & Slaves that 
escape thither from this Settlement.”66 
Barnwell’s proposed solution to the Spanish problem was simple, if unrealistic. 
He recommended that the British seize St. Augustine and add to its empire, describing 
Florida as “a pleasant Country and Capable if in English hands of very great 
Improvements.”67 After boasting how Colonel James Moore sacked the Indian 
settlements around St. Augustine in 1702, Barnwell argued “It would be of great 
advantage not only to this province but to the rest of the English empire in America to 
have St. Augustine taken from ye Spaniards for it would make a notable barrier to his 
Maj[es]ties Dominions upon the main.”68 While Whitehall ignored Barnwell’s overly 
aggressive proposals in 1719, James Oglethorpe’s colonization of Georgia in 1735 and 
his subsequent failed preemptive invasion to St. Augustine in War of the Jenkins’ Ear 
demonstrated the colonists’ insecurity over their Spanish neighbor.69 With the Treaty of 
Madrid, Spain recognized Britain’s dominion over Georgia. The Anglo-Spanish tension, 
however, continued throughout the Seven Years’ War though Spain remained neutral in 
the conflict.70 
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In addition to these longstanding fears against the foreign and domestic threats, 
the arrival of deported French Acadians to Charles Town in 1756 created a new anxiety 
among the South Carolinians. Governor James Glen reported “many People apprehend” 
the Acadians “may watch opportunitys and join with the Negroes” and “set fire to it in 
several places at once” to burn down Charles Town.71 The presence of 1,200 French 
Acadians--“400 of whom are men, and many more daily expected from Georgia, and one 
hundred French Prisoners”—put Glen and the inhabitants under new pressure over their 
security which extended beyond the city limits of Charles Town. Glen worried the 
colonists not only had to remain constantly vigilant toward the French Acadian “whose 
principles and inclination prompt them to do us all the mischief in their power” as well 
as keep a watchful eye on “4000 negroes…in weak settled Countrys.”72 
*** 
From the perspective of the colonists, the British Southeast (South Carolina and 
Georgia) needed the protection of King’s Troops because of geopolitical position in 
relation to French Louisiana and Spanish Florida. Uprisings like the Stono Rebellion and 
the Yamasee War had made the South Carolinians live with constant paranoia and fear. 
With the commencement of the Seven Years’ War in North America, seemingly 
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suspicious Cherokees activities implicating the French also increased tensions at the 
remote forts in Indian country. Lastly, troublesome French Acadians dumped in Charles 
Town against the wishes of South Carolinians provided further reason to welcome and 
support the arrival of British troops.73 Once Bouquet arrived in Charles Town with the 
Royal American troops in 1757, however, he encountered colonists who would not 
support the King’s Troops and, shockingly, treated them, to his mind, worse than their 
“negro slaves.” 
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CHAPTER III 
ROYAL AMERICANS AND SCOTTISH HIGHLANDERS IN CHARLES TOWN, 
1757-1758 
 
In 1757, Colonel Henry Bouquet sent a long letter to his superior Lord Loudon in 
New York after having quartered in Charles Town for three months. The letter contained 
numerous details about South Carolina’s defensive capabilities against the potential 
French coastal attacks and how the town’s inhabitants treated his British troops. Among 
Bouquet’s laborious list of reports, he singled out the colonists’ disrespect toward the 
King’s Troops: “they’re extremely pleased to have soldiers to protect their Plantations, 
but will feel no inconveniences from making no great difference between a soldier & a 
Negro.”74 His flummoxed comment reveals that race and class added an important 
dimension to the quartering dispute. 
Bouquet emphatically declared that “settling the Quarters in Town” amounted to 
“the eternal Struggle in America,” blaming the South Carolinians for “the Men lost by 
Death or Desertion.”75 Historians have argued that Bouquet’s disregard for proper 
procedures in dealing with the Commons House of Assembly, along with arrogance and 
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splenetic temper, only provoked the colonial legislature to refuse defiantly to quarter the 
soldiers. In short, the liberty loving colonists, unapologetic in their defense of the rights 
of Englishmen, scored a victory against the overbearing, arrogant British officer.76 
Moreover, scholars have studied the case in Charles Town in anticipation of the 
Quartering Acts of 1765 and 1774.77 
This telelogical approach of looking at the Seven Years’ War as a prelude of the 
American Revolutionary War has been dismissed by some more recent historians, but 
they have still highlighted the event in the frame of civilian-soldier frictions and 
overlooked vibrant, mundane everyday interactions that took place between the British 
soldiers and the denizens of quartered in colonial towns. Charles Town, in particular, 
rarely received attention compared to Philadelphia, New York City, or Boston, partly 
because of the relatively small number of troops making temporary quarter, as opposed 
to those colonial cities where a large number and more permanent presence of British 
soldiers provide easier cases for historians to study. But the British army’s stays in 
Charles Town in 1757 and 1761 provide us with an instructive counterpoint to the 
northern examples. 
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By the virtue of Charles Town being a southern colony built on a plantation 
economy and slavery, it put the British soldiers in a different setting than the northern 
colonial towns.78 In addition, the composition of the “British” troops in Charles Town in 
1757 was mostly Dutch Pennsylvanians and Scottish Highlanders, added ethnic 
dimensions to the quartering dispute.79 What transpired in Charles Town between the 
British troops and colonial inhabitants – social, economic, and cultural exchanges–
reveals enriching stories apart from the constitutional contest over imperial authority. In 
short, we need to look beyond the verbal exchanges between the British commanders—
Lord Loudoun (the commander-in-chief of the British army in North America) and 
Bouquet—and the Commons House of Assembly to understand the daily experiences of 
British troops in Charles Town. The everyday interactions between Royal Americans, 
Highlanders, Virginians, Dutch Pennsylvanians, and the town’s free and enslaved 
inhabitants show that the economic interests and cultural connections between British, 
Scottish, and Virginian soldiers and the inhabitants of Charles Town both bound them 
together and tore them apart from each other. 
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Insecurity and Fear 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Bouquet’s Royal Americans arrived in a 
time of heightened fear among the colonists of Charles Town. In addition to existing 
fears of external invasions and domestic slave insurrections, the arrival of deported 
French Acadians in Charles Town in 1756 had propelled the anxiety of Carolinians to a 
new level.80 Suspicious of the French origins and possible subversive plots, the white 
residents of Charles Town feared that the Acadians “may watch opportunitys and join 
with the Negroes” and “set fire to it in several places at once,” burning many wooden 
buildings of the town.81 James Glen worriedly reported to the Board of Trade and 
Plantation that “we have upward of 1200 French Acadians in this little Town, 400 of 
whom are men…and one hundred French Prisoners whose principles and inclination 
prompt them to do us all the mischief in their power,” in addition to “4000 negroes who 
must always be looked upon” vigilantly in the remote settlements.82 Given that the white 
colonists of Charles Town numbered only about 4,000 people, they had good reason to 
fear the latest situation and clamor for troop protection. 
The fear of slave uprising was all too real in the minds of white South 
Carolinians. George Milligen’s short essay on South Carolina published in 1763 
described the enslaved Africans as necessary “in this Climate” but also as “very 
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dangerous Domestics” because “their Number so much exceeding the Whites.” He 
conjectured that Indians and Africans have “a natural Dislike and Antipathy” to each 
other that proved “a very lucky Circumstance” for whites. The colonists should use the 
natural animosity between the two peoples to their advantage, Milligen argued, and thus 
it would be unwise to either “extirpate” the Indian neighbors or “force them [away] from 
their Lands” because “runaway Negroes” might overtake the Indian land and “quickly 
become more formidable Enemies than Indians can ever be, as they speak our Language, 
and would never be a Loss for intelligence.”83  
Given the neurotic state of mind among the colonists, Loudoun’s decision to 
move British troops to Charles Town took the black majority in South Carolina into 
account. When Governor Lyttelton informed Loudoun that raising additional provincial 
men and sending them to the frontier would prove difficult because “the Number of 
Negroes in this Province which greatly overbalances that of the Whites” who “might 
prove an Intestine Enemy,” Loudoun wasted no time in replying to the newly appointed 
governor that he understood the danger of “the great Number of Blacks” in the province 
as well as the colonists’ apprehensions of slave uprising if South Carolina’s colonial 
troops moved out and left Charles Town unguarded. Loudoun swiftly assured Lyttelton 
that, with the expected arrival of the Royal Americans under Col. Bouquet’s command, 
“that objection is now removed, as the additional Force sent is sufficient to keep them in 
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awe.”84 However, by sending Bouquet to South Carolina, Loudoun also intended the 
troops to defend “the most exposed” colony of Georgia.85 Thus, Fred Anderson’s 
description of Bouquet’s mission in Charles Town “in effect, to deter slave insurrection” 
is not entirely accurate.86 Loudoun deployed the Royal Americans to Charles Town 
primarily to raise more provincial troops and deter French-Indian attacks but, since the 
South Carolinians shirked his order to raise more men because the fear of slave 
insurrections, the British troops were sent to “remove” the colonists’ excuse. 
 
Henry Bouquet in Charles Town 
Colonel Henry Bouquet, better known for his illustrious military career in 
western Pennsylvania and the Ohio Country and his victory at Bushy Run, had enduring 
ties to Charles Town till his death in 1764. Born in Rolle, Switzerland, in 1719, young 
Bouquet enlisted in a Swiss professional regiment, following Swiss and family traditions 
of becoming a mercenary soldier. Before entering the British army, he had served in the 
Dutch Republic and later for the King of Sardina. He rose to the rank of a lieutenant 
colonel in his own Swiss Guards at the Hague. When he arrived in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1756, Bouquet found the city very much to his liking because of its scientific 
community.87 “I am far from being Indifferent to what happens in your Province,” 
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Bouquet confided to a friend while quartered in Charles Town, “I look upon it as my 
mother Country in America, and feel myself Still prejudiced in its favour.”88 His affinity 
for Pennsylvania, however, influenced his negative perception of South Carolina as he 
constantly compared his experiences in Philadelphia to the vexing affairs in Charles 
Town. 
In the British army, Bouquet served alongside another prominent Swiss officer 
named Frederick Haldimand. These mercenary officers’ contributions to the British 
army proved immensely valuable for their expertise in military engineering and 
fortifications. The British North American commander-in-chief of John Campbell, Lord 
Loudoun, possessed so few cultural sensibilities that he called Bouquet “bucket,” 
Loudoun trusted Bouquet’s skill set and ability to carry out critical missions for the 
British army.89 Bouquet had already spent nearly two years in North America in New 
York and Philadelphia. His earliest correspondence through 1755 and the first half of 
1757 shows that he had already experienced some frustration with quartering men and 
questioned the discipline of provincial soldiers. However, he did not resort to strong 
criticism of colonists’ refusal to provide quarters until his nine-month stint in Charles 
Town from 1757 and 1758. 
In April of 1757, Loudoun ordered Bouquet to take “the Five Companies of the 
First Battalion of the Royal American Regiment” and sail to Charles Town in order to 
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assume the command of military men in the southeast. His primary mission was to raise 
more provincial troops to bolster defense of the southern colonies. In a meeting with the 
governors of the southern provinces—Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and 
Georgia—at Philadelphia, Loudoun reacted to rumors of potential attacks on South 
Carolina by sea from Santo Domingo or by land from the Creek Indians’ “Albama” Fort, 
“on the Head of the Mobile.”90 Thus, Loudon thought it proper that two thousand men 
should be sent to protect “that Valuable Province of South Carolina” in addition to 
Georgia. His plan required that a total of two thousand men were to be raised eventually 
in addition to the troops sent it from Virginia and Bouquet’s Five Companies of the 
“Royal American Regiment.”91 
Bouquet’s mission to Charles Town faced problems from the start. First, he could 
not recruit 200 men from Pennsylvania as Loudoun had instructed. In the end, he arrived 
in Charles Town with 600 men—5 Companies of the Royal American Regiment and the 
Companies of Provincial Troops of Virginia. After an outbreak of small pox on board 
the ship, Bouquet’s troops landed in Charles Town on June 15, 1757, without a 
welcoming party as the town’s inhabitants feared the spread of small pox amongst 
them.92 The lack of a warm reception from the inhabitants of Charles Town marked a 
troubled beginning for Bouquet and his Royal American soldiers. 
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Quartering Dispute: Bouquet’s Prejudice and Paranoia 
It took less than two months for Bouquet to complain about the inhabitants of 
South Carolina and their ungrateful attitudes towards the King’s Troops. Quartering 
troops and paying for their expenses, indeed, proved a main point of dispute between 
Bouquet and the Commons House of South Carolina. This storyline common in 
scholarly account, however, misses other developments that unfolded in Charles Town 
as a mix of Bouquet’s Royal Americans and Montgomery’s Scottish Highlanders spent 
more than six months among the inhabitants. 
The essence of the quartering dispute between Bouquet and South Carolina’s 
lower legislature was simple; the surrounding social, economic, and cultural contexts 
related to the quartering dispute, however, were far more complex than the narratives 
found in earlier scholarship.93 Bouquet primarily fought over securing quarters, various 
provisions, and money to cover the expenses. Unfortunately, Charles Town had no 
proper barracks ready to quarter the troops and Bouquet had no choice but to accept the 
adverse circumstance; on the other hand, he expected that the colonists would bear the 
expenses of quartering, such as providing utensils and firewood. In their correspondence, 
Loudoun and Bouquet both stressed that “the rich, flourishing, Province of South 
Carolina,” to whom troops had ben sent on the colonists’ “own Sollicitation for their 
Defence” should willingly supply provisions for the troops. Whether they truly 
perceived the southern colony as a bountiful land or came up with a pretext to extract 
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support from the colony is uncertain.94 Regardless, South Carolina’s lower house 
assembly’s inaction and delay over approving the money for quartering frustrated 
Bouquet. He constantly applied pressure on the lower house to take swift action by 
referring to the King’s authority and Loudoun’s power as the commander-in-chief in 
North America. Loudoun also pressed Governor Lyttelton for his failure to convince the 
colonial legislature of “the Right…the King and the Mother country have to Quarters, 
with proper Conveniences for their Troops, at all Times, and more particularly for those 
now sent for the Defence of His Majesty’s colony”95 
This bitter standoff between Bouquet and the Commons House of South 
Carolina, however, was not as one-dimensional as it has been depicted. Initially, the 
members of the Commons House welcomed His Majesty’s Troops, as their presence 
provided much needed security from “the Neighbouring Indians” and the French who 
“devote themselves to the Ruin & Destruction of all Interior Parts of the Province.”96 
The message from the Commons House suggests that South Carolina elites 
fundamentally desired British troops primarily to protect Indian traders who provided an 
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important source of income. Although the colonists made no explicit mention of slave 
patrol, they intended to make use of Bouquet’s British troops to replace provincial 
soldiers sent off to the Cherokee Country. Lyttelton also provided assistants to the 
British commanders as he pressured the Commons House, delivering a message that 
“your own property & that of every Individual you represent is rendered more valuable 
by the Security derived to it from such a Body of Troops being posted in this 
Province.”97 Indeed, the Royal American officers had expertise in fortification work that 
proved extremely valuable for the defense of Charles Town. Even before Bouquet and 
his Royal American officers arrived, a German engineer in his forces already worked in 
the fortification of Fort Johnson at Charles Town.98 Not surprisingly, the Commons 
House swiftly approved Bouquet’s plan to repair and fortify Fort Johnson and 
encouraged Lieutenant Hesse of the Royal Americans, who supervised the fortification, 
to stay in the town by approving a handsome salary.99 
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Private correspondence and local newspaper reports also reveal a quite different 
picture from the narrative of friction between British troops and local civilians or 
colonial troops. A local Scottish merchant John Murray wrote to his family member in 
Scotland that the Royal Americans contributed putting Charles Town in “a better State 
than might have been Expected.”100 George Mercer, a colonial officer leading the 
Virginian companies that accompanied Bouquet’s Royal Americans, reported to George 
Washington that he himself had good relations “a Set of very genteel pretty Officers here 
of the Royals” and “Harmony & Unanimity prevail greatly among Us…”101 Bouquet 
also believed that the inhabitants welcomed the British troops, reporting to Loudoun that 
the colonists were “well disposed for the common Defence of the Country...” Bouquet, 
however, added a caveat by underlining and putting parenthesis on the phrase: “(as far as 
it does not interfere with their private Interest or Conveniences.)”102 
These initial words appreciation from both sides, however, quickly dissipated as 
Bouquet became impatient with the progress of quartering. Bouquet invoked Loudoun’s 
authority and pressed Lyttelton, arguing that he could not allow his soldiers to “camp out 
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in the rainy seasons” and insisted that they needed “suitable quarters.”103 His prodding, 
however, failed to expedite the process as the Commons House postponed the vote on 
bills related to quartering for another month. Consequently, Bouquet’s attitude toward 
the South Carolinians decisively turned both sour and paranoid. He lashed out against 
the gentry and commoners of Charles Town alike: “The Lawyers, Justices of the Peace, 
& in general the whole people are eternally against us…”104 In December of 1757, the 
Commons House continued to offend Bouquet when they refused to provide quarters 
and provisions for subaltern officers (ranks lower than captain). He protested the 
decision and demanded that subaltern officers be quartered in private homes, arguing 
that all the officers had “an equal Right to their Quarters” and rejected “the Distinction 
that the Assembly was pleased to make…”105 A month later, when Bouquet learned that 
the Commons House had decided to impose duties on provisions which British troops 
consumed, he exploded and submitted a petition to the Assembly demanding that they 
rescind the duties.106 Two months later, Bouquet had had enough of what he perceived to 
be colonists’ insults. When Bouquet heard of that Commons House had finally approved 
the construction of new barracks for British troops which would be ready in a months’ 
time, he withheld gratitude, writing to a fellow British officer that the colonists’ decision 
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“has been done with such Symptoms of Disaffection for the Troops, that we think 
ourselves very Little obliged to them.”107 
The acrimony Bouquet expressed to his fellow British officers, to Loudoun, and 
to Governor Lyttelton regarding the members of the Commons House of South Carolina, 
however, reveals only a partial picture. Various activities of British officers (including 
Bouquet himself) and rank-and-file soldiers that took place in Charles Town among the 
British troops and its inhabitants behind the scenes influenced the course of the 
quartering dispute. The lower house’s opposition to Bouquet stemmed from ethnic 
animosity toward the Royal Americans and Bouquet’s purchase of a plantation. 
Similarly, Bouquet’s scathing criticisms of the denizens and the environment of South 
Carolina contradicted his apparent social and economic activities in Charles Town. 
 
The Impact on Local Economy and Labor 
The arrival of Bouquet’s Royal Americans in Charles Town had an unforeseen 
effect on local artisans relying on the labor of indentured servants. Only nine days after 
Bouquet and the British troops arrived in Charles Town, the Commons House received a 
petition from an urban resident of “Charles-Town Neck” regarding runaway indentured 
servants enlisting with Bouquet’s Royal Americans. William Lawrence complained that 
his “two German Servants, one named Matthias Streinweyer, the other John Peter Fry 
had run away,” which cost him a total of £162.10. Lawrence then applied for financial 
compensation from the Commons House for his loss of income and labor. He allegedly 
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asked “the Commanding Officer” to return his servants, but he was denied this request. 
Lawrence appealed to the Commons House that he had “no other Way to support 
himself, his Wife, & two Children, but by making of Hay” and expressed concern that 
“the inlisting the Servants of the Inhabitants of this Province to serve as Soldiers” 
constituted “a Matter of general Concern.”108 This petition suggests that the presence of 
Bouquet’s Royal Americans had a disruptive impact on the local labor market. No doubt 
other young white males of German background seized the unusual opportunity to 
escape their servitude to join the German-speaking soldiers of Bouquet’s Royal 
Americans. 
One of the biggest economic transactions involving the British troops was 
lodging. Charles Town’s inhabitants applied for public credit to the Commons House for 
lodging the British troops. These bills reveal some of the economic and social 
dimensions of quartering soldiers in the urban spaces of Charles Town. For example, 
Isabella Robertson asked £33:3:8 for “Rent of Rooms for the Highland Battalion” and 
Elizabeth Richardson charged a hefty sum of £216:5 for “the Lodging of several of the 
officers of the Royal American Regiment.”109 Lodging British troops sometimes 
damaged landlords’ properties which prompted them to request compensation from the 
Commons House.110  The Committee usually rejected these claims. For instance, 
Jonathan Scotts rented his house to “the Highland Soldiers from the first of September to 
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the first of this Month March amounting to £120” but was disallowed for “a Charge of 
£45 Damages” and only received “the Remainder £75.”111 Some officers could afford an 
extra room for private quarters from the house owners. An overwhelming number of the 
bills submitted to the House confirm that most of the officers quartered in private or 
public homes in Charles Town were Highlanders, suggesting connections between 
residents with the Scottish background and the soldiers. 
A sudden spike in Charles Town’s population thanks to Bouquet’s Royal 
Americans and Montgomery’s Highlanders, however, presented an enormous 
opportunity, particularly to local merchants and manufacturers.  The soldiers also 
brought dependents, including women and children, therefore increasing the number of 
people needing to purchase food and other items. The scope of economic exchanges in 
Charles Town mostly involved supplying or selling provisions and items soldiers 
consumed such as utensils, fuel, and bedding.112 Inhabitants not only rented rooms and 
houses to soldiers but they also charged for storing soldiers’ baggage and renting 
furniture to them. Daniel Bourgett requested £48 for “House Rent, being for Lodging 
and Baggage for the Highland Soldiers.”113 Hugh Anderson charged £72 for “Bed Steads 
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& Tables for the Highland Officers.”114 For the inhabitants employed producing or 
selling necessary items for troops, the contracts with the British army meant a lucrative 
business. James Henderson, probably the sole supplier of candles for the troops because 
only his name shows up in the bills, charged a hefty sum of £900.115 Most inhabitants 
made more modest sums doing business with the quartered troops supplying hay, 
bedding, and spices.116 
These requests for public credit often reveal the locations of the private homes in 
which officers lodged. Many officers lodged in well-furnished homes, rather than in 
miserable barracks with the rank-and-file. Despite his vitriol towards the people of 
Charles Town, Bouquet himself lodged at Thomas Walker’s house for £206:15, for 
which the Committee recommended “50/ per Week to be allowed to the 30th November 
which Amounts to £55.”117 Sarah Clifford lodged “an Highland officer and the Chaplain 
to the regiment at 50/ per Week £25,” the same rate as for Col. Bouquet. Susannah 
Walker (presumably the wife of Thomas Walker) lodged “Mr. Rae, Doctors mate, & 
Lieutenant Sutherland at 50/ per Week £40.” Major Tulliken, Bouquet’s subordinate 
officer, paid the lavish rate of £5 per week to Ann Watson for the total of £95, as he 
stayed for 19 weeks.118 These officers presumably took quarters in “some very good 
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Houses” as a Virginian Provincial officer George Mercer described.119 The 187 
Highlander officers found quarters in relatively comfortable private homes of the 
inhabitants who may have shared Scottish background.120 The rest of the Highlanders 
sought spaces “in a half finished Church without windows, in damp Store houses upon 
the Quay, and in empty houses, where most of the Men were obliged to ly upon the 
Ground without Straw or any sort of covering.”121 Some stayed in an unfinished barracks 
where they shared space with the French Acadian prisoners. 
Some house owners and innkeepers failed to get a full reimbursement because of 
the time limit imposed by the House to permit credit for quartering British soldiers. For 
instance, Henry Kennan lodged “Lieutn. Monro, a Highland Officer” for whom he 
charged the House of Commons £36:8:6 for “4 weeks & 3 days” which the Committee 
found “beyond the Time Limitted by a Resolution of the House.” On the other hand, 
Kennan only received a partial amount of £25:7:1 for the effective days. In these 
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profitable business relations, some locals appear to have overcharged British and 
Scottish soldiers to make extra profits, as the influx of a large number of Highlanders 
proved a boon for property owners. Elizabeth Richardson submitted a bill of £216:5 that 
included “a Charge of £42:10 for a Dining room,” which the Committee thought 
“Unreasonable.”122 Similarly, the Committee concluded that Robert Fairweather charged 
£62:5 for “Lodging Capts. Hardin & Monro. In which there is an Overcharge of 2 
Rooms £31:2:6 to be allowed.”123 
As the colonists and British troops engaged in transactions involving provisions, 
charges of alleged fraud and dishonest practices occurred. A scandal discussed in the 
Commons House involving one of the officers of the Highland Battalion, Alexander 
Montgomery, might have further eroded any support for paying for British troops amidst 
the quartering dispute. Three or four days after the first arrival of the Highlanders, 
Montgomery allegedly told a Mr. Doyley to supply more firewood than needed for the 
troops so that he and Doyley “would devide the Profits arising from the overplus.”124 
Mr. Marlow testified to the Committee that Montgomery, the Quarter Master of the 
Highland Regiment, “demanded 177 Cords of wood per Week from him.” When 
Marlow told Montgomery that it was impossible to procure the said amount, 
Montgomery reduced the amount to 80, which Marlow again said was too much. Finally, 
Montgomery allegedly answered Marlow that “35 or 40 or 50 at most will do but you & 
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I will Settle that.” Based on Marlow’s testimony alone, the Committee concluded that 
“there was a Fraud intended upon the Public by the said Alexander Montgomery, 
Quarter Master of [the] Highland Regiment.”125 Consequently, this incident resulted in a 
tightening supply of wood to British troops, which enraged Bouquet furthermore, 
igniting his invectives against the Commons House.126 
Despite the scandal involving the Quarter Master of the Highland regiment, the 
evidence related to British troops’ economic exchanges and activities in Charles Town 
show a wide range of interactions. While they feuded over the precedents, legalities, and 
financial obligations of quartering troops, British officers—particularly those belonging 
to Montgomery’s Highland regiment—stayed in residential houses and the owners 
seemed happy to make profits from lodging them. Artisans also made considerable 
profits supplying provisions to the troops quartered in the town. The only victims of the 
quartering dispute were the rank-and-file soldiers who had neither social status nor the 
economic means to share residential space with the upper or middling denizens of 
Charles Town. 
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Rank-and-File 
Bouquet’s most common comments on the rank-and-file can be summarized into 
three points: poor quarters, pervasive drunkenness, and mass desertion. Although 
Bouquet constantly reminded the South Carolinians that the King’s Troops deserved 
better quarters and greater respect than did enslaved Africans, his words on the rank-
and-file barely resembled any hint of respect for them. His descriptions of his soldiers’ 
poor living conditions did not contradict other accounts from Archibald Montgomery 
and the Virginian officers George Mercer and William Byrd. First, South Carolina’s hot 
climate had a crippling effect on the British troops. “The Therm: from 86° the whole 
summer is fallen down to 61°,” Bouquet wrote in October to a friend in Philadelphia, 
“Our men die very fast, and we have lost more in one month, than in the whole Winter at 
Philada.” The soldiers probably suffered from mosquito and water borne illnesses.127 The 
absence of furniture also particularly distressed the troops as Montgomery clamored for 
“Bedding, Blankets, and Necessary Barracks Utensils,” fearing that would otherwise 
have “to recourse to the bedding on board our Transports.”128 Poor quarters also made 
the troops more susceptible to sanitation issues and diseases as Bouquet imputed 
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sickness among his troops to “owing in part to the bad Accommodations given us.”129 
By the end of September, Bouquet reported over 400 Highlanders being sick.130 
Drunkenness pervaded the rank-and-file in Charles Town. Bouquet reported that 
his subordinate Major Tullekin “takes all possible Pains to Keep our Men in order & to 
prevent the sad Effects of Rum” and condemned these soldiers as such “drunken dirty 
fellows that we shall never make anything of them.”131 In the court martial of soldier 
John Campbell, accused of desertion, witnesses reported that they “saw the Prisoner 
drinking in a Tavern.”132 Another deserter defended himself that “he was in liquor, and 
imagined he had suffered some fatigue in the Camp which was the Cause of his 
Desertion,” suggesting that miserable quartering conditions exacerbated the propensity 
to drink.133 
Although Bouquet constantly lamented his troops deserting, the actual figures of 
those who were caught and brought to trial showed eight court martials, six of which 
resulted in convictions for desertion. Two “conspiring” deserters were acquitted.134 The 
reasons for desertion varied. Drunkenness was a common excuse and defense cited 
among the soldiers, but locally recruited soldiers assigned to the Royal American 
Regiment sometimes deserted for other reasons. James Smith pleaded that “he was an 
Overseer to a Plantation when he enlisted, and did not receive his Wages from his 
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Master when he came away, and that he went away with a view to get his Money and to 
inquire after a horse belonging” to him.135 Another deserter who joined Bouquet’s Royal 
American Regiment deserted to tend “a Crop of Corn and Potatoes at the time he 
enlisted” for which he had been unable to obtain a leave of absence.136 
 
Slavery, Race, Class and British Soldiers 
 As someone who considered Pennsylvania as his “mother Country in North 
America,” Bouquet instantly noticed the very different demography of South Carolina, 
noting that “This Town is large & not much crowded with white people.”137 In Charles 
Town alone, nearly four thousand enslaved and free Africans inhabited the town—about 
the same as the number of white inhabitants according to one contemporary’s 
estimate.138 Bouquet did not write any personal musings on Africans in racial terms as he 
usually did with American Indians, but he clearly understood the social hierarchy, seeing 
Africans in the Southeast as both laborers and property: he himself bought slaves and a 
plantation and hired managers to increase his private wealth. 
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Although Bouquet probably agreed with colonists about how Africans should be 
treated and kept under chattel slavery, he nevertheless clashed with the local planters 
over securing enough laborers for the fortification projects in Charles Town. To finish 
the fortification of Port Royal quickly, Bouquet expected resident slaves would prove a 
useful, cheap source of labor, but the planters withheld their slaves in order to run their 
plantations without disruption instead of assisting Bouquet. “It has never been possible 
to get a Sufficient Number of Negroes upon the Works,” Bouquet rued, “Private Interest 
is always the first point here and public Spirit is no more the Second.”139 Consequently, 
he ordered the British troops to work and paid them at the same rate as the black 
laborers.140 
Another incident that enraged Bouquet came from the lower house’s decision to 
distribute one blanket for two soldiers instead of one for each man. This act particularly 
offended Bouquet’s sensibility because he felt the social standing of British troops fared 
worse than the slaves. In addition, Bouquet found the colonists insufficiently grateful to 
the King’s Troops for providing protection from a potential slave insurrection. He 
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reported to Loudoun that “these People being very saving, tho the Province is rich & 
able to bear that Expence, they’re extremely pleased to have soldiers to protect their 
Plantations, but will feel no inconveniences from making no great difference between a 
soldier & a Negro.”141 When Bouquet learned of the Commons House decision to 
provide one blanket for every two soldiers, he objected that even “the most covetous 
Planter finds it his Interest to allow One to the most despicable Slave.”142 His outraged 
accusation that South Carolina elites treated British soldiers worse than they did their 
slaves reflected slavery’s power to inflect all human relationships as well as 
exacerbating the quartering controversy. Race, then, played an undeniable role in the 
standoff between Bouquet and the Commons House of South Carolina. 
 
Ethnic Dimensions 
Ethnicity added another layer of complexity to the quartering dispute. Bouquet’s 
Swiss background and the predominantly German speaking makeup of the Royal 
Americans also played a role in the quartering dispute, albeit in a clandestine manner. 
While residing in Charles Town, the coterie of Swiss officers including Bouquet, Col. 
James Prevost, and Col. Frederick Haldimand purchased a plantation of over one 
thousand acres consisting of three tracts of land under the management of a fellow Swiss 
man Andrew Fesch and his wife Sophia.143 Bouquet’s purchase of a plantation, however, 
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alarmed the members of the Commons House and the Council, who had Scottish 
background. Although Bouquet made a perfectly legal transaction, the South Carolina 
elites exploited it as a political pretext to oust Bouquet from Charles Town when an 
opportunity opened for them to conspire against the testy Swiss officer. 
The decisive moment came in the winter of 1757. Bouquet issued an order to 
remove the Scottish Highlanders to Savannah to relieve the quartering situation in 
Charles Town. But the decision to continue to quarter the predominately German Royal 
Americans in Charles Town while removing the Scottish Highlanders drew a 
xenophobic response from Lyttelton and the members of the Commons House. Lyttelton 
hastily sent a private letter to Loudoun, alleging Bouquet had an ambition to be “in 
Command in this Province, where he is endeavouring to acquire Property.”144 Upon 
receiving Lyttelton’s private letter, Loudoun accepted Lyttelton’s allegation without 
objection, perhaps, in order to avoid any prolonged correspondence with the governor 
since Loudoun needed Bouquet as a second-in-command for the Fort Duquesne 
expedition anyway. Loudoun promised he would recall Bouquet from Charles Town but 
made it clear that he first suggested the idea of removing the Highlanders, implicitly 
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dismissing Lyttelton’s accusation.145  In response to Loudoun’s message, Lyttelton once 
more directly expressed his discomfort at the Swiss officer and his friends buying large 
properties in South Carolina. “He is engaged with Colonel Prevost, Colonel Haldiman & 
some other foreign Officers to purchase Lands in this Province,” Lyttelton noted, “Some 
Plantations they have already bought & have given out that they can draw for very large 
Sums.”146  Although Bouquet’s economic activities did not establish an ambition to 
become the supreme commander of South Carolina, Lyttelton construed Bouquet’s 
purchases as “interest in a Special manner to be establish’d, if possible, in the Command 
of the Forces here.”147 
Lyttelton made clear to the commander-in-chief of the British army in North 
America that these opinions were not only his but reflected a general sentiment of the 
Scottish elites in Charles Town. Lyttelton wrote that there were “very many Scotch 
Gentlemen of much consideration here, several of whom are in the Council & Assembly 
are pleas’d to see so many of their Countrymen engaged in the protection of this 
Colony,” and they wanted the Highlanders to become naturalized inhabitants because 
that would be “most substantial & lasting benefit to these Parts that want very much an 
Addition of white Inhabitants.”148 These words suggest that Charles Town’s elites of 
Scottish background welcomed Montgomery’s Highlanders because they could become 
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a valuable source of white immigrants to mitigate their concerns about the dangers 
presented by black majority. As one British imperial historian notes, the British army 
served as “an important channel for emigration, especially to the North American 
colonies” and many officers and soldiers received land grants after the Seven Years’ 
War.149 Perhaps tired and frustrated with Bouquet’s repeated demands to the South 
Carolinians that seemed go nowhere, Lyttelton sided with the colonists and endorsed the 
proposal to remove Bouquet from Charles Town. He concluded his reply to Loudoun 
writing that the Swiss officer had “been Squared & measured upon all Occasions by his 
views of establishing himself here & have seen so much of Duplicity & indirection in his 
behavior.”150  
Charles Town’s elites, however, did not want just any whites to become 
immigrants. They despised the Royal Americans led by Bouquet mainly consisting of 
Pennsylvania Dutch. When the Commissioners of Fortification investigated vandalism 
and pillaging of the fortification materials, they singled out “a party of the Royal 
Americans” as the culprits responsible for destroying “Barrows & Fascines,” stripping 
part of a wooden shed, and burning “some of the Cedar Posts four of which is equal in 
Value to a Cord of Wood.” The commission also accused a “lately inlisted” Dutch man, 
Jacob Miller, for threatening to burn the shed and “the adjoining Store if Wood is deny’d 
or not found them.”151 Two court martials were held to try Miller and the accused Royal 
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American soldiers but the court acquitted them because “the Witnesses could not prove 
the fact.” 
These incidents suggest that the ethnicity of British troops mattered in the 
quartering disputes, as Charles Town’s Scottish elites’ strong preference for the 
Highlanders directly conflicted with Bouquet’s strategic decision. Bouquet’s relentless 
demand for quarters, his purchase of personal properties, and his decision to remove the 
Highlanders made both Lyttelton and the Scottish elites of South Carolina appeal to 
Loudoun to remove Bouquet from his command. Bouquet’s decision to relocate the 
Highlanders became an unexpected source of friction between him and the influential 
elites of South Carolina as they construed Bouquet’s plan as a conspiracy to remove the 
Highlanders who would make an attractive addition to the white population of the 
colony dominated by a black majority. The Scottish connection between the elites or the 
middling sorts of Charles Town and the Highlanders also explains why those 187 
Highlanders could find their quarters in private homes in September of 1757. 
This ethnic animosity toward Bouquet from the South Carolinians contrasted 
starkly with Virginia officer George Mercer’s opinion of the Swiss colonel. Mercer 
displayed a deferential attitude toward Bouquet and praised his fair treatment of 
provincial troops. He wrote to George Washington that Bouquet was “a good natured 
sensible Man” and “the only one of the Foreigners I am told on whom his Lordship 
much depends.” Mercer especially appreciated Bouquet’s respect for colonial officers, 
unlike what the Virginians had experienced under General Edward Braddock. “We are 
looked upon in quite another Light by all the Officers than we were by Genl Braddock or 
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Mr Orme,” Mercer reported, “and do our Duty equally without any Partiality or 
particular Notice taken of one more than the other.”152 
 
British Soldiers’ Interactions with Women 
The first evidence of interaction between British troops and colonial women in 
Charles Town appeared during Bouquet’s unhappy quartering in Charles Town in 1757. 
Only a few months after his arrival, Bouquet expressed a concern toward one of his 
captains, Francis Lander of the Royal Americans, to Loudoun. In his long report on the 
miserable quartering condition of Charles Town and complaining about the 
unaccommodating colonists, Bouquet closed the letter with a simple postscript: “P S: 
Captain Lander hath married today Miss Simson, reckoned the prettiest Girl in 
Town.”153 It is unclear why Bouquet added this information after a long letter without 
any elaboration. To Colonel John Stanwix, however, Bouquet also shared the same 
information but this time he expressed a concern with Francis Lander’s marriage to the 
local woman adding, “I hope it will spread no farther as there is no great Temptation.”154 
Perhaps Bouquet feared his field officers might attempt to sell their commissions en 
masse to get out of the army. In fact, Lander tried to sell his commission amidst the Fort 
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Duquesne expedition and eventually got himself out of the army, presumably to settle 
down in Charles Town as a full-fledged immigrant.155 
Bouquet’s last comment to Stanwix also suggested that, among the circles of the 
British high command, the officers shunned the prospect of marrying local women in 
America. For instance, John Calcraft, an English politician and purchasing agent for the 
British army, sardonically advised Montgomery not to “get Married in America, but 
come home & follow yor. Old Wicked Course of Life here.”156 Despite the British 
officers’ cautious attitude toward marriage in America, colonial elites brought up the 
subject to them. While visiting Charles Town in 1758, Virginian Colonel William Byrd 
casually relayed the message from the wife of James Glen, the former Governor South 
Carolina. “Mrs. Glen has ask’d me ten thousand Questions about you, & amongst others 
if ‘twas likely you would Marry in America” Byrd wrote, “I told her I imagin’d you 
woud when the warm Weather set in.”157 
A couple of high profile British officers married colonial women during the 
Seven Years’ War. Brigadier-General Thomas Gage married Margaret Kemble, a 
wealthy New Jersey woman related to the Delanceys in 1758 and Susannah Johnson, a 
young lady with “a large fortune,” married Col. John Read of the Royal Highland 
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regiment.158 These cases were exceptional, however, because the colonial women 
belonged to the elite class of colonial society. Considering Landers’s rank as a captain 
and the fact that Bouquet only described Simson as “the prettiest girl,” Bouquet might 
have viewed this union as undesirable.159 
Beyond these few documented unions, it is unclear how British officers viewed 
colonial women of Charles Town. Virginia officer George Mercer spilled a great deal of 
ink describing local white women’s lack of pulchritude, entwining gender and class to 
describe the degenerate conditions of South Carolina, but this does not mean British 
officers shared Mercer’s view.160 On the contrary, Bouquet, Montgomery, and Grant all 
dined with the colonial women of Charles Town during their stay. For instance, Bouquet 
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159 Peter Way, “Venus and Mars: Women and the British Army in the Seven Years’ War,” in Britain 
and America go to War: the Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815, ed. Julie Flavell 
and Stephen Conway, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), pp.41-68. Peter Way argues that 
the army was essentially a patriarchal institution and an extension of family in which “the elite officer 
class exercised patriarchal authority,” exerting its control over rank-and-file’s sexual activities. The army 
culture also harbored “militaristic misogyny” as evinced in officers’ attempts to exclude women’s 
presence from the army because they were thought to have corrupting influence on soldiers’ discipline. 
160 George Mercer to George Washington, August 17, 1757, The Papers of George Washington, 
Colonial Series 4, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), p.370. “Youl be surprised I have 
not yet mentioned the fair Ones I wish I cou’d call Them so, I assure you they are very far inferior to the 
Beauties of our own Country…A great Imperfection here too is the bad Shape of the Ladies, many of 
Them are crooked & have a very bad Air & not those enticing heaving throbbing alluring Letch exciting 
plump Breasts common with our Northern Belles—I am afraid I have tired your Patience & doubt not but 
you are as much disappointed at reading This, as I was at having an Opportunity of writing it to you.” 
George Milligen, later writing a short publicity piece to promote South Carolina to outsiders, disagreed 
with the Virginian’s unflattering assessment. “Their personal Qualities of the Ladies are much to their 
Credit and Advantage; they are generally of a middling Stature, genteel and slender; they have fair 
Complexions, without the Help of Art. and regular Features; their Air is easy and natural; their Manner 
free and unaffected; their Eyes sparking, penetrating, and inchantingly sweet: They are fond of Dancing, 
an Exercise they perform very gracefully; and many sing well, and play upon the Harpshichord and Guitar 
with great Skill; nor are they less remarkable for Goodness of Heart, Sweetness of Disposition, and that 
charming Modesty and Diffidence, which command Respect whilst they invite Love, and distinguish and 
adorn the Sex------In short, all, who have the Happiness of their Acquaintance, will acquit me of Partiality, 
when I say they are excelled by none in the Practice of all the social Virtues, necessary for the Happiness 
of the other Sex, as Daughters, Wives, or Mothers.” George Millgien, A Short Description, pp.24-25 
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dined with Anne Manigault, wife of Gabriel Manigault, at the house of a wealthy 
merchant.161 Montgomery and Grant also dined with Bouquet’s plantation manager’s 
wife Sophia Fesch.162 It is likely that the 187 Highlander officers lodged in private 
homes must have had similar social interactions since women took charge of providing 
accommodations as revealed in the list of people who applied for public credit for 
quartering the soldiers.163 
While British officers socialized with the town’s women and with those who had 
space to rent, the rank-and-file might have harassed local women. Terence Ryley, 
belonging to Major Tullenken’s Company, was charged of “making a disturbance in 
Town” that involved an alleged sexual solicitation and assault toward a local woman 
named Sarah Beckett. Beckett alleged that while she went to Mr. Hopton’s Tan yard 
house to fetch water, Ryley approached her and “kissed her, and insisted upon her going 
in with him to a little Brick House and wanted to Have to say to her, telling her that If 
she would not by fair she would by foul.”164 Ryley also allegedly “offered to make her a 
Present of Money or Handcurcheff” while he took her to the house. 
Ryley’s attempt on Sarah Beckett was interrupted when her brother-in-law John 
Wilson appeared at the scene and the two men traded blows against each other. Wilson’s 
wife Mary also showed up, and “prevailed upon them” to stop their grappling and 
                                                
161 “Extracts from the Journal of Mrs. Ann Manigault, 1754-1781,” (With notes by Mabel. L. 
Webber) South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, Vol, 20 (1920), p. 129. On July 28, Ann 
Manigault recorded “A visit from Col. Bocquet.” 
162 Sophia Fesch to Bouquet, Sophy Hall, May [?], 1758 [B.M. Add. MSS 21643, f.84, L.] 
163 The following names appear in the record who “Lodged a Highlander Officer”: Jane Boone, 
Rebecca Bennett, Sarah Baker, Isabella Robinson, Mary Cranmer, Magdelen Prioleau, and Elizabeth 
Richardson. Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, January 26, 1758 
164 WO 71/130, December 12, 1757 
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brawling. Ryley retreated from the fight but then returned with three more soldiers and 
pursued Wilson. Fearing for his life, Wilson “fetched out a Loaded Gun, and swore that 
the first man that came, to Attack him, he would blow his brains out.” In response to this 
threat, however, Ryley went away again and then returned with nine more soldiers 
“some of them armed with Firelocks.” Seeing a greater number of soldiers with arms, 
Wilson locked the door and hid himself. The soldiers allegedly threatened to break the 
door open, swearing that Wilson “was a damn’d fool not go on and ask’d him what he 
had brought them therefore.” Mary yelled to the soldiers outside to drop the threat to 
which Ryley threatened that he would “knock her Brains out, with a Cow’s horne and a 
piece of head to it, which he had in his hand.” The soldiers persuaded Ryley to forget it 
and they went away, but Ryley persisted and broke the door’s “Iron Staple and Wooden 
bolt,” entered the house and searched for Wilson “holding his Thumb all the while on 
the dogshead of the Firelock, Cock’d.” When Ryley could not find Wilson hiding, he 
allegedly took Wilson’s Firelock and then went away. 
If the colonists’ accusation sounded convincingly damning, Ryley had his own 
version of the story in which he alleged that Sarah Beckett stole money from him. Ryley 
engaged in a verbal dispute demanding that Beckett return his money. When Ryley 
backed out from Wilson’s threat to shoot anyone who entered the house, his “Comrades 
told him he was a fool not to get his money from the Whore” which made Ryley go back 
again “with a View to carry her to the Workhouse.” Ryley stated that he stole Wilson’s 
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gun because he “might come for it, and that so he should find out the Man who had 
rescued the Woman from him.”165 
This standoff between British soldiers and a colonial man suggests that a contest 
for masculinity colored tension between the soldiers of the Royal American Regiment 
and the inhabitants of Charles Town as the quartered soldiers imperiled colonial men’s 
masculinity by intruding into their private homes and threatening their female family 
members. Peter Way’s study of the army’s attitude toward women suggest that the guilty 
party of soldiers appearing in court martials often cast the woman as the villain or the 
evil temptress who caused them to get drunk, desert, or act violently, but Sarah Beckett 
may well have taken money from Ryley.166 Regardless of what actually happened, 
Ryley’s case illustrates the extent of informal interactions that took place between 
Bouquet’s quartered soldiers and Charles Town’s women.167 
*** 
Closer examination of British troops’ activities in Charles Town during their 
nine-month stay shows wide ranging economic exchanges and cultural contacts between 
the British soldiers and the inhabitants that went well beyond a quartering dispute that is 
often simplified as a back-and-forth argument between Bouquet and the Commons 
House of Assembly. The actual, every day exchanges that occurred at various urban 
                                                
165 Ibid. 
166 Peter Way, “Venus and Mars: Women and the British Army in the Seven Years’ War,” in Britain 
and America go to War: the Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815, ed. Julie Flavell 
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167 On women of other colonial cities and their social or sexual relations with British soldiers, see 
Karin Wulf, Not All Wives: Women of Colonial Philadelphia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
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places among the middling inhabitants of Charles Town (including women) and British 
troops suggests a different picture than the bickering words of Bouquet and the 
Commons House. 
The quartering dispute in Charles Town needs a wider context accounting for 
race, ethnicity, economy, gender, and especially the presence of enslaved Africans and 
Indians in the Southeast. The remote locations and hot climate of the southeast as well as 
its distance from the British army headquarters in New York made Charles Town an 
undesirable destination for British officers and rank and file alike. A plantation-driven 
economy that neglected service sectors meant higher prices for provisions and a lack of 
wealth concentrated in the urban center, which resulted in poor and inadequate housing 
for British troops; the presence of enslaved Africans also contributed to Bouquet’s 
increasingly hostile perception of how the elites and planter class of South Carolina 
treated British troops in relation to their slaves. His investment in plantation and slaves 
for profit further exacerbated tensions with the South Carolinian elites. Lastly, the 
ethnicity of Bouquet, the Royal Americans, and the Highlanders played a crucial role in 
complicating the tension between the Commons House and Bouquet. As a result, while 
Virginia officer George Mercer could not wait to meet and socialize with South Carolina 
planters, the Scottish Highlander Archibald Montgomery complained to Loudoun that “I 
wish we were free of those [dis?]honest Planters, which will soon happen of [if] your 
Lop is as willing to have us as we are Desirous to be near you.”168 William Byrd, who 
                                                
168 LO 4689, Loudoun Papers (Huntington Library: San Marino, CA). William Byrd arrived in 
Charles Town in late March of 1758 and recommended Loudoun the British troops to be relocated. 
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arrived in Charles Town in March 1758, immediately sympathized with Montgomery, 
reporting to John Forbes preparing the Fort Duquesne expedition that “That Gentleman 
& all his officers are heartily tir’d of this Place & sincerely wish to be removed to the 
Northward.”169 Thankfully, it did not take too long for Montgomery and his Highlanders 
to be recalled to Philadelphia to join the forces assembled to launch the expedition to 
Fort Duquesne. 
  
                                                                                                                                           
Headquarters Papers related to John Forbes’s Expedition to Fort Duquesne, William Byrd to John 
Forbes, March 21, 1758 (Small Collections, University of Virginia). “I sat down with great Pleasure to 
obey your Command, & to return you my thanks for your Letter of Recommendation to Coll. 
Montgomery, who has shewn me very great Civilities. That Gentleman & all his officers are heartily tir’d 
of this Place & sincerely wish to be removed to the Northward. I think ‘tis pitty so fine a Battalion shoud 
lay the Summer in Garrison here, for its realy the finest I ever saw, but the hot weather disagrees very 
much with them. Coll. Montgomery will give you an Account of his Dipsutes with the Town’s People 
about Quarters, I fear he will have but an uncumfortable time with them.” 
169 Headquarters Papers related to John Forbes’s Expedition to Fort Duquesne, William Byrd to 
John Forbes, March 21, 1758 (Small Collections, University of Virginia) 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CHOICES OF CHEROKEES IN THE FORT DUQUESNE EXPEDITION, 1758 
 
“…I have no mortal about me that understands Indian affairs or their Genius…how Grosly they 
had abused and imposed upon us for so many months, and now to leave us at the only they 
could be of any service to us…170 
—John Forbes to James Abercromby, August 11, 1758 
 
Fort Duquesne Expedition, Cherokees, and Catawbas 
In July 1758, a British-led coalition of British troops, Cherokee warriors, and a 
mix of provincial militia assembled in western Pennsylvania and set off to take Fort 
Duquesne and avenge the humiliating, crushing defeat suffered in the last attempt led by 
Edward Braddock. Much had changed during the intervening three years, but much also 
remained the same. John Forbes’s expedition secured some five hundred Cherokee 
warriors in addition to about fifty men consisting of Catawbas and Tuscaroras in contrast 
to Braddock’s failure to garner the support of Indians; however, much like the previous 
disastrous attempt, the British officers’ ignorance and arrogance cost them dearly when 
they ended up losing most of the Cherokees and Catawbas from the expedition 
prematurely. Although the British finally took possession of the burnt remains of the fort 
and renamed it Fort Pitt, they earned the resentment of the Cherokees, which 
strengthened the position of hawkish Cherokee headmen to go to war against South 
Carolina two years later. 
                                                
170 John Forbes, Writings of General John Forbes ed. Alfred Proctor James (Menasha, WI.: 
Collegiate Press, 1938; reprint: Arno Press, 1971), pp.174-175, Forbes to Abercromby, August 11, 1758 
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This chapter focuses on how British officers and colonial messengers acting on 
behalf of the British army quickly destroyed a fragile alliance through their verbal, ritual, 
and physical actions with regard to gift-giving and by turning supposedly generous acts 
of gift-giving into confrontations. While many scholars have acknowledged Cherokee 
participation in the Fort Duquesne expedition, they have sidestepped the complex and 
often confusing accounts of the Cherokees in favor of a simpler narrative leading up to 
the Anglo-Cherokee War. One historian of the Fort Duquesne expedition underplayed 
the role of Cherokees by writing that because of “a lack of written accounts by their own 
hands they must remain silent participants in the campaign.”171 More surprisingly, the 
Catawbas’ participation rarely receives notable attention; even James Merrell’s 
celebrated study of the Catawbas, does not discuss the Fort Duquesne expedition and its 
relevance to the Catawba-British relations.172 
Only recently have historians begun to reassess the role of Cherokees in 
analyzing why the alliance failed. Paul Kelton argues that the Cherokees played a greater 
role in “hidden diplomacy,” bringing the Six Nations Iroquois to the British side and 
thereby pressuring the Ohioans allied with the French to come to the peace table.173  
                                                
171 Douglas R. Cubbison, The British Defeat of the French in Pennsylvania, 1758 (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 2010), p.84  
172 Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); John Oliphant, 
Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press : a Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001); David Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 
1740-62 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962). Surprisingly scholars have often overlooked the 
Cherokee and Catawba participation in the Fort Duquesne expedition, including eminent scholars of 
white-Indian relations. They often focused on Indian traders and interpreters as the agents of “go-
betweens” and cultural exchanges rather than British soldiers. 
173 On the latest summary account of the Cherokee towns’ reaction to the Fort Duquesne expedition, 
see Paul Kelton, “The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North America,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 69 (2012): 763-792 Tyler Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War on 
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Kelton argues that the Cherokees “undermined France’s alliances and paved the way for 
the ultimate British victory,” and that their military support to the British proved vital.174 
Kelton’s rehabilitation of the Cherokees’ role in the Fort Duquesne expedition is a 
welcoming revision to Forbes’s accusation of “total defection & desertion.” This study 
goes beyond such strictly military or diplomatic concerns to examine the exchanges 
between the British troops, the Cherokees, and the Catawbas on their road together to 
Fort Duquesne. These daily interactions often aggravated an already difficult alliance. 
The Fort Duquesne expedition also represented a continuation of British troops’ 
experience with the inhabitants of the Southeast, even as they physically traveled out of 
the region together. It thus provides a bridge from the 1757 Charles Town occupation to 
the Anglo-Cherokee Wars of 1760-61. 
Several scholars have noted that the Cherokee-British relations formed and fell 
apart during the Fort Duquesne expedition over gift-giving practices. Historians have 
debated the symbolism and meaning of gift-giving and how it actually worked in the 
context of white-Indian relations in North America. Wilbur Jacobs noted that the “old 
Indian custom of giving and receiving presents,” a symbolic language of rituals that 
interwove social relations, status, and gender in Indian society, played a critical role in 
                                                                                                                                           
the Cherokee Nation,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 5.2 (2007) 395-426. 
Boulware, Tyler. Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-
Century Cherokees  (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011). See also, Matthew C. Ward, 
Breaking the Backcountry: the Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003) 
174 Paul Kelton, “The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North 
America,” William and Mary Quarterly 69 (2012): 763-792, 795 
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forging diplomacy between Europeans and Indians.175 More recent studies suggest that 
differences existed between gift-giving for diplomatic purposes and trading to exchange 
goods and (military) services.176 By the Seven Years’ War, however, the long-standing 
diplomatic ritual of gift-giving had already been transformed, as the intense competition 
between French and British traders to court Indians changed formerly symbolic rituals 
into a fundamentally market-driven bargaining process.177 Although there might have 
been regional variances within the gift-giving practices or exchanges with the 
Europeans, scholars of southeastern Indians agree with the broader thesis that 
fundamentally incompatible notions such as diplomacy and contractual agreement 
                                                
175 Wilbur Jacobs, Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts, 1748-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1950); For the importance of gift giving in treaty makings after 1761, see also Dorothy V. Jones, 
License for Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 
176 For an overview of white-Indian diplomacy and recent studies, see the chapter five of Collin 
Calloway, New Worlds For All (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), Richard White, The 
Middle Ground (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Kathryn Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p.27 As Kathryn Braund notes, “Trade, the exchange of 
one commodity for another, was entirely another matter, aimed at the redistribution of scarce resources 
among various peoples.” Richard White, The Middle Ground  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p.95 As Richard White summed up the substantivist position on trade between Europeans Indians, 
“gifts were not merely bribes or wages; allies were not simply mercenaries…Life was not a business, and 
such simplifications only distort the past.” See also Daniel K. Richter for a discussion to interpret Indian 
history from the perspective market economy in “Whose Indian History?” WMQ 50:2 (1993): 379-393 
177 Hatley, Dividing Paths, p.48 “Euroamerican concepts of profit, credit, and debt were also 
gradually accommodated to Cherokee ideas of commerce. In a society in which accumulation of wealth 
was overridden by routines of gift-giving, and in which consumption was more important than 
accumulation, the notion of profit was difficult translate.”; Richard White, The Middle Ground ((New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.95 “Tied to the world market and embedded in the large 
world of the alliance, the fur trade became part of the middle ground.” Also, as White notes, Indians “had 
indeed become part of a world market that then stretched across the Atlantic to Europe. When they 
accepted European goods and gave furs in return, a still emerging market system in Europe.” Citing his 
case of Algonquian-French fur trade relations, White argues that “the fur trade could not be completely 
separated from the relationship of French fathers to their Algonquian children, that is, from relations of 
political and military alliance, a straightforward domination of the local Algonquian village by the market 
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surrounded the act of gift-giving.178 On the other hand, in his study of the Cherokee-
British relations centered on the cultural meanings associated with gift-giving, Gregory 
Dowd argues that both sides completely understood what to expect from each other but 
that it was “the definition of the bond embodied by the gift that differed widely.”179 
The joint Cherokee-British military venture to Fort Duquesne provides an 
opportunity to examine daily relations between the southeastern Indians and British 
troops. The British intention to recruit Indian warriors requires no elaborate explanation. 
They regarded Indians as better woodsmen and nimbler scouts in the American woods 
against the French who also employed a legion of Indian warriors.180 When the 
Cherokee warriors did not follow as the British instructed, however, Forbes and Bouquet 
both questioned the efficacy of having Indian warriors and scouts in the expedition. The 
more Forbes and Bouquet dealt with the Cherokees, the more frustrated they became. To 
put it another way, the presence of the Cherokee warriors caused disagreements and 
divide between the British and provincial officers over how to deal with them. While 
most Indian agents and colonial officers advocated retaining the Cherokee warriors at 
                                                
178 John Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 
pp.5-6 Juricek writes, “for Europeans, diplomacy was conceived as an ongoing conversation, a private 
dialogue between kings or other sovereign authorities about weighty matters of common concern.” 
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179 Gregory Dowd, “Gift Giving and the Cherokee-British Alliance,” in Contact Points ed. Andrew 
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any cost, the British officers complained about the expenses of “Indian presents.” In 
addition, the spoiled relations between the Cherokees and British also spilled over to the 
Catawbas. Despite the Catawba warriors’ contribution to the British war effort in the 
Fort Duquesne expedition, they did not earn gratitude from the British officers because 
Forbes and Bouquet viewed the Catawbas no differently from the Cherokees the moment 
they abandoned the expedition and went home. 
 
Cherokee Decisions to Join the Expedition 
Since Fort Prince George and Fort Loudoun were built in the 1750s, Anglo-
Cherokee relations were only tenuously maintained through trade and presents. As Tom 
Hatley notes, “By the end of the 1750s, the Cherokees were becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied” with the British presence and the disorders they brought to Cherokee 
society.181 Fort Loudoun and Fort Prince George became the focal points of trouble and 
trade since they were built. The Cherokees had also launched numerous raids on behalf 
of the British. One recent scholar estimates that the Cherokees made “at least seventeen 
raids on Fort Duquesne from Britain’s mid-Atlantic forts between April and August” in 
1758.182 Whether the Cherokees would assist a prolonged British military expedition 
over a full winter hunting season, however, was an entirely different matter. The British 
had to impress the Cherokees and make an offer they could not refuse with an 
extravagant amount of gifts. The British did not. 
                                                
181 Hatley, The Dividing Paths, p.99 
182 Paul Kelton, “The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North 
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One incident that clearly demonstrated that the Cherokees’ expectation of proper 
presents occurred in 1757 when the Lower Cherokees violently confronted the 
Virginians for failing to reward them for the military service they had provided. Lower 
Cherokee leader Wauhatchee and a group of Cherokees visited Williamsburg to receive 
the promised presents but Virginia Governor Dinwiddie did not have the goods ready. 
Enraged at Dinwiddie’s hapless reply, Wauhatchee and his men allegedly went 
“plundering the plantations & fighting the Inhabitants from their house,” acting like 
“free booters in an Enemys Country.”183 The Lower Cherokees became angry because 
“the Govr knew not how to treat Indians” whereas “the French treated them always like 
Children, gave them what Goods they wanted.”184 Listening to the Cherokees’ 
complaints, Captain George Mercer (who later accompanied Bouquet’s Royal 
Americans to Charles Town) concluded, “the chief thing is A PRESENT and they expect 
a very good one.”185 
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As the Lower Cherokees’ response to the Virginians demonstrated, the 
Cherokees made it no secret that they could always work for the French if the British 
failed to offer better quality and more presents. The British colonists knew more than 
anyone that the French and their Indian allies, notably the Shawnees, constantly courted 
the Cherokees in an effort to thwart the British strategies in the Southeast and war efforts 
in the Ohio Country. The Overhill Cherokees, in particular, kept open their diplomatic 
channels with the French via the Shawnees living among their villages who acted as the 
messengers propagating the pro-French position among the Cherokees.186 They had 
every reason to accommodate the Shawnees and hear what the French had to offer in 
order to make a better deal for themselves out of the Anglo-French rivalry in North 
America. Moreover, empty promises, trade embargoes, and other numerous offenses by 
the British traders and soldiers encouraged the Overhill Cherokees to seek other 
options.187 Newly arrived British officers in North America in general, however, 
appeared to have little understanding of the importance of presents or naively assumed 
the Cherokees could be easily bought and may have presumed political homogeneity. 
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Loudoun’s ambitious plan to recruit five hundred Cherokee warriors for the Fort 
Duquesne expedition failed to take into account recent Cherokee dissatisfaction with the 
British. For such a perilous and long-term engagement, Cherokee leader had to contend 
with many problems. In the Cherokee warriors’ absence for many months, the Creeks 
could raid the Cherokee settlements. Even Atkin predicted that the French “will surely 
leave no Stone unturned at this Juncture” to “kindle a Flame” between the Cherokees 
and the Creeks.188 In addition, the French and their allies—including the Choctaws, 
Illinois, Miamis, Ottawas, and Shawnees could raid the undefended Overhills 
settlements.189 Given these circumstances and the pro-British figure Cherokee leader 
Attakullakulla had to walk a tight rope between accommodating British interests and 
those of his people. 
 
William Byrd Meets Attakullakulla 
When Virginian Colonel William Byrd visited Keowee in the spring of 1758 to 
recruit Cherokee warriors as Loudoun instructed, he had no idea he would encounter 
difficulties completing the assigned task. At the first meeting with Attakullakulla, Byrd 
explained the British plan to attack Fort Duquesne and promised gifts in return for the 
Cherokees’ military aid, but the Cherokee leader replied “the Men were all out of the 
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Nation” and “it would be in vain for him or me to attempt to raise any Number.”190 
Besides Attakullakulla had another agenda to address before he would consider the 
British plan to invade Fort Duquesne. The British had not rewarded him for the 
expedition against the Savannahs and the French several months before, when he and the 
Great Warrior of Chota ventured down the Tennessee River in July 1757. Byrd 
attempted to inveigle Attakullakulla without addressing the missing reward and 
Attakullakulla gave a vague promise that he would meet Byrd at Chota in twenty-six 
days and accompany him to Winchester “with all his Force.” Attakullakulla’s words 
worried Byrd because “Delays will frustrate Lord Loudouns Designs against the 
Ohio.”191 
No records attest to what Attakullakulla actually did during those twenty-six 
days. Some scholars suggest that he attempted to contact the French to see whether they 
could offer presents to the Cherokees without the risk of sending many young men to the 
harms way; perhaps he simply needed more time to convince the Cherokees to join the 
British expedition. Twenty days after the first meeting with Attakullakulla, on May 1, 
Byrd reported from Keowee that he only managed to recruit sixty Cherokee warriors to 
go with him—a number far below the five hundred men that Loudoun originally 
planned. Moreover, Attakullakulla said “neither he or his Men woud go to Virginia” and 
accused of Byrd telling him lies. When Byrd protested, Attakullakulla retracted his 
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position and said he would go to Virginia as soon as his wagon full of presents 
arrived.192 
Although Byrd called Attakullakulla’s vacillating words and refusal to go to 
Winchester “insolent,” the Cherokee chief had every reason to confirm the delivery of 
presents with his own eyes to make sure the British kept their word. After all, the British 
had failed to reward him for the expedition he undertook against the Savannahs. As a 
prestigious leader, Attakullakulla not only had to win the minds of young Cherokee 
warriors with presents but also had an obligation to look after their interests. Twenty 
days after Byrd left Keowee and headed to Virginia, Attakullakulla explained to Lachlan 
McIntosh, an officer at Fort Prince George, that he could not “Prevail upon his young 
men to stir” to go Winchester until they received presents.193 Every time the British 
messengers pressed Attakullakulla to hasten the Cherokee warriors to mobilize, he kept 
negotiating the terms, taking advantage of the British need for Indian warriors and 
demanding that presents be delivered without delay.194 Indeed, Forbes later reported to 
William Pitt that “threats we dare not use, least they change sides,” admitting that 
Cherokee warriors were vital to the British war effort because “our Enemies were kept in 
awe by the presence of so many Cherokees.”195 
The eagerness to recruit the Cherokee warriors made the British and colonial 
messengers so impatient that they took unconventional risks. For instance, after 
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experiencing such difficulties recruiting Cherokees warriors, Byrd gave a blank check to 
James Beamer, an indebted trader living in the Lower Cherokee town of Estatoe, hoping 
that the resident trader would encourage the Cherokees to join the expedition. Byrd 
suspected that Beamer instead dissuaded the Cherokees from going on the expedition 
because he lived “among the Cherokees upwards of thirty Years” and “is now so 
connected with that place that the Savages are quite at his Command.”196 Resident 
colonial traders had a powerful motive to discourage the Cherokees from going on a 
lengthy expedition that could provide justification not to pay debts owed the traders. The 
traders themselves would then accumulate debt to their own creditors in Charles 
Town.197 In a desperate attempt, Byrd took a great risk of trusting a trader of 
questionable motives but felt he had no other options at that point.198 “I wish you may 
not think me both mad & unreasonable,” Byrd informed Lyttelton with trepidation, “but 
you know what sort of People I have to deal with.”199 The British may have thought they 
occupied a superior position as patrons buying services from the Cherokees but, in 
reality, their military plan was dependent on native assistance. Attakullakulla probably 
sensed that he had leverage against the British in this situation and was unwilling to 
comply unless the presents were delivered, given their history of failure to pay on time. 
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These mismatched expectations placed on each other continued to ossify the Cherokee-
British relations over the terms of commitment to the expedition against Fort Duquesne. 
 
Gift Giving Blunders 
If the delays with delivery of presents started the Fort Duquesne expedition on a 
wrong foot, poorly executed gift giving protocols from the colonial officers and traders 
carrying out the orders on behalf of Forbes and Bouquet aggravated the Cherokee-
British relations further. In addition, by the time the presents arrived, the situation had 
changed on the Cherokee side as they no longer wanted to commit to the long arduous 
expedition that seemed to require a larger sacrifice than necessary. Thus, when the 
messengers arrived to accompany Attakullakulla and his men to Virginia, they did not 
receive the answers they expected to hear. Instead of patiently persuading the Cherokees 
to reconsider their position by properly presenting the gifts, the British messengers dealt 
with the Cherokees in a highhanded and offensive manner. 
When Virginia officer William Trent arrived at Fort Loudoun with the wagon 
loaded with gifts, “the head Warrior came to me & told me to give them the Goods” 
because “he wanted to sett off home early in the Morning.” Rather than complying with 
the warrior’s request, Trent attempted to chastise him by telling him that “it was just 
night, and rained hard; that it was too late to open them, but in the Morning they should 
have what was for them.” The Indians refused to back down to Trent’s lecturing and 
started “running with their Tammyhawks & Knives, ripped open the Bales, broke open 
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the Cases, and began to divide the Goods.”200 Trent admonished them for insulting him 
and behaving more like “Shawanese than Brothers and Cherokees,” and ordered his men 
to arms. The Cherokees responded in the same manner, running to their arms and 
confronting Trent’s men outside the fort. The Virginia officer threatened to order his 
men to fire and the Cherokees backed down and told him they would wait to collect the 
presents until the next morning. 
Trent may have had his way in this confrontation but his highhanded treatment of 
the Indians as misbehaving children only made them feel insulted and bullied. Worse, he 
might have antagonized his potential Indian allies by turning a gift-giving procedure 
meant to please the Cherokees into a tense, hostile moment that destroyed a chance to 
secure their commitment to the expedition. Trent, however, triumphantly reported to his 
superior that he delivered “the Present as I thought fit, which they took without giving 
me any further Trouble and they now seem all in good Temper.” Trent justified his 
action by describing the incident as a conundrum in which he could neither allow the 
Indians “to break up the Kings Stores and carry the Goods off before our Faces,” 
because that would have made the British a laughing stock, nor resort to “use of Force,” 
which would result in the Cherokees’ complete withdrawal from the expedition. He 
argued “the Loss of Four or Five Hundred Pounds worth of Goods” was better than “the 
Loss of not having them on ye Campaign, or perhaps turning them all to the French.” 
Trent believed he successfully “settled” the affair and “pleased” the Cherokees at the 
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same time.201 He could not have been more wrong in his self-congratulatory assessment 
as another messenger’s visit to the Cherokees a month later makes clear. 
After Trent’s delivery of presents, Forbes sent George Turner, a colonial trader, 
to Fort Loudoun in order to press the Cherokees to join the Fort Duquesne expedition. 
The expedition’s commander became more impatient and irritated that only a small 
number of Cherokees joined the British coalition force in Virginia while Attakullakulla 
and his men still had not departed from the Overhills. Turner, however, committed a 
diplomatic faux pas when he failed to present a belt of wampum with his talks. 
Attakullakulla immediately accused Turner for bringing “no Wampum,” a failure that 
overshadowed anything Turner said because while his talks were “often Lyes but their 
belts never lied.”202 Attakullakulla reprimanded Turner explaining that had he “brought a 
large Belt of Wampon,” the Cherokees should have believed him sooner. 
Fortunately for Turner, Paul Demere, the commanding officer of Fort Loudoun, 
interjected himself into the conversation and disputed with Attakullakulla over his 
promise to go to Virginia with Turner. After a sharp exchange, Attakullakulla dropped 
the dispute, explaining it away by saying that he and Demere “are Warriors” who loved 
to “scold now and then.”203 Nonetheless, Attakullakulla refused to follow Turner to 
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Virginia because the Cherokee conjurer—a person privy to the spiritual world and 
knowledgeable as well as on matters of medicine and healing—foresaw “a Danger of 
much Sickness & Death” that awaited them should the Cherokees undertake the 
expedition immediately.204 Dismissing Attakullakulla’s words as a blatant lie, Turner 
blamed Attakullakulla for his artful deception.205 “I have been so deceiv’d by Little 
Carpenter & all the rest of the Indians who promis’d to follow you, to Winchester,” 
Turner reported to Forbes, “I am afraid you’ll scarcely credit it.” 
When Turner accused Attakullakulla of deceiving him, the Cherokee leader stood 
firm and answered that he must heed the conjurer’s words.206 He further elaborated that 
the Cherokees did not want to go to war during “very hot Weather” and “did not love to 
lose their young men.” As a token of future commitment, Attakullakulla gave Turner a 
belt of wampum for Forbes and told him they might assist the British in the fall.207 The 
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conjurer’s omen may have been a convenient excuse for Attakullakulla, already wary of 
British intentions to avoid joining the expedition without further incentives. 
Looking from the frame of Cherokee-British relations built on gift-giving 
diplomacy, Trent’s ham-fisted distribution of presents only encouraged the Cherokee 
warriors to abandon fighting for the British, and Turner’s diplomatic faux pas provided a 
perfect pretext for Attakullakulla to rebuff the British pressure to join the expedition. At 
the Overhills, Turner’s basic mistake—bringing Forbes’s message empty-handed—
created the problem. The fact Attakullakulla quickly dropped his earlier argument with 
Demere by showing a sense of rapport and brotherhood as “warriors” suggests that he 
had no excuses to use against Demere for breaking the promise he made earlier. But 
Attakullakulla might have shrewdly exploited Turner’s failure to present a wampum belt 
as a legitimate excuse to ignore Forbes’s urgent message one more time and postpone 
the commitment to the expedition. Attakullakulla’s gesture of giving a belt of wampum 
to Turner and his suggestion that he might assist Forbes’s expedition in the fall might 
have been calculated to expose Turner’s folly. Lastly, the conjuror’s dream acted as the 
final nail in the coffin that effectively declared that the Cherokees would not fully 
mobilize their warriors for the Fort Duquesne expedition. Consequently, only a small 
Cherokee party of fifty men from the Lower villages embarked to Virginia on their own, 
and about eighty warriors accompanied Byrd. In the end, however, even they abandoned 
the British forces in less than two months, much to the ire of Forbes and Bouquet. 
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British-Colonial Fractures 
Forbes’s and Bouquet’s orders regarding the Cherokees often caused rifts with 
the provincial officers. Forbes swiftly accepted Bouquet’s proposal to be frugal with 
presents to the Indians without objections because he believed the presents actually 
“spoiled” them so much that they made “sordid and avaritious” demands to the 
British.208 Extremely vexed with the Cherokee warriors who appeared to make his task 
more difficult, Forbes lashed out against everyone, even those employed in Indian 
affairs. “The Indians I cannot mention to you with any manner of patience,” Forbes 
decried, “as I look upon them, their Interpreters, their Superintendents, and every 
creature any ways connected or attached to them, as the most imposing Rogues that I 
have ever had to deal with.”209 
Such a prejudiced attitude toward Indians blinded the British command to the 
proper course of action to contain violence when it broke out in Bedford County, 
Virginia and imperiled the Cherokee-British alliance. As soon as Turner sent Frobes the 
unwelcome news that Attakullakulla and his Cherokees would not join the Fort 
Duquesne expedition anytime soon, Byrd reported from Winchester that the Cherokees 
who had accompanied him since April started to return home without giving him any 
notice. Violence that broke out in Bedford Country agitated the Cherokee warriors and 
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they returned home outraged and disgusted. Although the exact timing of the very first 
incident remains unclear, the initial colonial reports solely blamed the Cherokees for the 
incidents in which white settlers shot and killed the Cherokees. But James Beamer’s son, 
Thomas Beamer, who accompanied one party of Cherokee allies, provided a detailed 
account of the incident attesting that Virginians of Dutch background launched a 
surprise attack and killed the Cherokees. The casualties among the slain Cherokees 
included a warrior who had scalped a French Indian. After receiving the report from his 
son, James Beamer criticized the Virginians for “Very Bad Conduct at this Critical 
Juncture, Even If the Indains [sic] Did Rob and Steal,” and plunging “the Whole 
Countrey In A Bloody Warr…”210 Even contemporary observer George Milligen, who 
wrote a brief history of South Carolina in 1763, did not shy away from condemning the 
Virginians and defending the Cherokees’ conduct.211 
Undoubtedly, the news of violence in Bedford Country became a catalyst for the 
Cherokees to abandon the British expedition and go home, as timing of both events 
coincided and the Cherokee leaders expressed disgust and anger over the Virginians who 
killed warriors on their way up to Fort Duquesne to fight for the British. British officers, 
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however, only concerned themselves with the Cherokees leaving the expedition and 
taking revenge against the Virginians in Bedford County instead of placating the 
Cherokees. Byrd appeared to grasp the implications the incident might have for those 
Cherokee warriors who had already marched ahead to join Forbes’s army near Virginia’s 
northern border: he warned Forbes that the Cherokee warriors might abandon the 
expedition, return home through Virginia, and exact revenge along the way. But Byrd 
suspected the Cherokees were themselves responsible for the violence and did not seem 
to have a clue why the warriors accompanying him suddenly became agitated. “The 
Indians here behave with the greatest Insolence,” Byrd wrote, bewildered, “I do not 
know what to think of them.”212 Since he heard the news of violence in Virginia, Byrd 
reported he only had eighty-seven Cherokees remaining with when he arrived in 
Bedford, Virginia, as thirty of them had gone home. Perhaps to save face, Byrd 
attempted to minimize this alarming development and assured Forbes that he would 
“keep the Indians in good Temper” because “if they stay they will be of great 
service.”213 By the time Byrd reached Fort Cumberland in Pennsylvania, he had “seventy 
five Indians & a handful of my Regiment; the rest dispers’d all over this part of the 
country.”214 
John Forbes and Henry Bouquet had to take quick action if they wanted to retain 
the Cherokees for the rest of the expedition. Neither of the two British commanders 
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followed such measures; on the contrary, they refused to investigate what actually 
happened in Bedford County, hastily accusing the Cherokees and, even worse, deciding 
to reduce the volume of gifts to be given to the Cherokees, arguing that good 
stewardship of resources required fewer gifts. The end result was clear: virtually all the 
Cherokees who planned to aid the British coalition force to Fort Duquesne called it quits 
and returned home. 
Furthermore, Forbes’s acerbic attitude towards the Indians caused unnecessary 
tensions with the Virginian officers George Washington and William Byrd. When Byrd 
relayed Cherokees’ messages to Forbes explaining to the Scottish commander that the 
Indian party travelling with him demanded Forbes’s army march on Braddock’s Road 
instead of a new road Forbes was constructing, the commander sarcastically mocked the 
Virginia Colonel to Bouquet: “This is a new System of military Discipline truly; and 
shows that my Good friend Byrd is either made the Cats Foot off himself, or he little 
knows me, if he imagines that Sixty Scoundrells are to direct me in my measures.”215 
Byrd’s letter showed that the Cherokees wanted to have their say on how the expedition 
should be operated, suggesting that the Cherokees probably viewed themselves as equal 
partners of the alliance, not mere mercenaries as the British wanted them to be. In fact, 
the Cherokees possessed superior knowledge of warpaths to Fort Duquesne and its 
surrounding geography than the British, which certainly entitled them to believe that the 
British army would follow their advice. As Bouquet reported to Forbes once, one 
Cherokee chief “took his knife and drew a map on the table from Winchester to Fort 
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Duquesne, with all the rivers and roads which lead there, entering into the smallest 
details on the nature of the ground,” which impressed the Swiss officer so much that he 
immediately gave presents to the chief.216 Forbes, however, clearly thought otherwise 
and regarded the Cherokees’ opinions as worthless. 
George Washington also attempted to persuade Forbes to take Braddock’s Road 
via Fort Cumberland as the Cherokees had advised. But Forbes refused, delaying their 
way to Fort Duquesne. Perhaps, aware of Forbes’s arrogance, Washington intended to 
sting his pride when he composed a letter warning that the Cherokees might view the 
Scottish commander and his troops “in a despicable light” because of “our bad Success 
and inactivity.”217 Washington also criticized Forbes behind his back, informing Virginia 
Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier of Forbes’s prejudice against Virginians’ 
opinions.218 When he heard the news of James Grant’s defeat near Fort Duquesne, 
Washington vindicated his position on taking Old Braddock’s Road and remained 
pessimistic of Forbes’s plans.219 Forbes, however, belittled Washington for criticizing 
his plan to bypass Fort Cumberland and take a different path to Fort Duquesne.220 Forbes 
identified Washington as “the leader and adviser of their foolish suggestions” who dared 
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to take “the lead in so ridiculous a way that I could by no means suffer it.”221 
Washington, of course, turned out to be wrong as the British took Fort Duquesne sooner 
than predicted. 
Bouquet also disagreed with Washington over what to do with the Cherokees. As 
Bouquet could not prevent the Cherokees from returning home, he suggested dispensing 
all of Indians from the expedition to Washington. “It is a great humiliation for us to be 
obliged to Suffer the repeated Insolence of Such Rascals,” Bouquet bristled, “I think it 
would be easier to make Indians of our White men, than to co[a]x that damned Tanny 
Race.”222 In reply, Washington politely disagreed with the Swiss-British officer’s 
dismissal of the Indians’ abilities in the woods. “I always send out some white people 
with the Indians,” Washington wrote, “tho’ I must confess that I think these Scalping 
Partys of Indians we send out will more effectually harass the Enemy (by keeping them 
under continuall alarms) than any Partys of white people can do.”223 Washington added 
that “if they were hearty in our Interest their Services would be infinitly valueable” 
because he could not “conceive the best white men to be equal to them in the Woods.” 
Washington also suggested the Cherokees did not abide by British orders because they 
were “too sensible of their high Importance to us” and used it as leverage until their 
demands were satisfied.224 
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The Ineptitude of Forbes and Bouquet and New Gift Giving Policy 
Meanwhile, as British commanders Forbes and Bouquet marched west through 
the woods of Pennsylvania they constantly received reports from these colonial officers, 
traders, and Indian agents on the latest news on the Cherokees. Unfortunately, both 
officers lacked knowledge of or experience with the affairs of the southeastern Indians, 
and neither had close relations with Edmond Atkin, the newly appointed Superintendent 
of Indian affairs in the southern colonies. Often, Forbes and Bouquet ignored advice 
from colonists or Indian agents and let their prejudice toward Indians affect their 
judgment. Rejecting informed advice from the colonial experts on Indian affairs, Forbes 
and Bouquet attempted to implement a policy of frugality when it came to Indian gift 
giving. Such a policy was fundamentally incompatible with the Indian practice of gift-
giving. 
Moreover, the irascible and arrogant personalities of Forbes and Bouquet played 
a large part in aggravating and ultimately terminating the fragile Cherokee-British 
military alliance. John Forbes’s prejudice and ignorance toward Indians surpassed that of 
other British officers. He often could not comprehend why the Cherokees either 
abandoned or postponed joining the expedition. Rather than analyzing various reports 
and intelligence he received from numerous British and colonial personnel, he let his 
temper dictate his own judgments. When the Cherokees started to leave the army, Forbes 
fumed that he could no longer keep the Cherokees with the British forces “owing to their 
natural fickle disposition which is not to be got the better by words nor presents.” He 
lashed out rather than trying to analyze the situation surrounding the Cherokees’ change 
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of behavior.225 One historian suggests that much of Forbes’ vitriol came from his failure 
to see Cherokees’ contributions or that they “had shifted circumstances to his [Forbes’s] 
advantage.”226 Forbes’s words, however, suggested that he was incapable of 
understanding or appreciating the values of Indian warriors. He continued to liken the 
Cherokees to fickle savages and animals who proved to be nothing but trouble to his 
expedition. For instance, Forbes informed Pitt that the Cherokees’ decision to return 
home stemmed from their “being but bad Judges of time,” possessing “fickleness of 
temper,” and displaying stupid animal behavior of “Sheep…Where one leaps, all the rest 
follow.”227 
Forbes also spared no vicious invectives against Indians regardless of their 
contribution to the British cause. Attakullakulla’s fame as the loyal friend of the British 
had no effect on Forbes as he called the Cherokee chief “a Dog.”228 Similarly, upon 
receiving Bouquet’s report on the death of Catwaba Captain Bullen, who garnered 
respect among provincial officers and British officers, Forbes only offered a lip service 
but implicitly slighted the slain Catawbas as useless Indians. “I am very sensible of the 
loss of Capt Bullen & Capt French at this period of time,” Forbes replied to Bouquet, 
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“Altho’ it is long ago since I held the Indians in the utmost Contempt except in small 
partys to commit murder by surprise.”229 
Recent studies discredit much of Forbes’s vitriol against the Cherokees in the 
Fort Duquesne expedition. For instance, Paul Kelton argues that the presence of 
Cherokees “sent an ominous message to France’s allies,” especially the Ohioans.230 
Much of the Cherokees’ contributions came from “hidden diplomacy” that helped to 
create “a formidable pro-British alliance among the indigenous peoples of eastern North 
America.”231 Ironically, while Forbes made no secret about his hatred toward Indians, he 
desperately wanted at least a few Indians among British troops. His dissonant desire for 
Cherokee warriors on one hand and his extreme prejudices against them on the other 
hand drove Forbes to a state of paranoia. He reacted to every piece of news related to the 
Cherokees “deserting” him with splenetic temper and cynicism. 
While Bouquet actually interacted with the Cherokees (unlike Forbes who was 
confined to a sick bed throughout the expedition), he too saw Indians as mischievous, 
fickle, greedy children.232 In addition to Jeffrey Amherst’s effort to cut back on the 
expenses of Indian gifts, Bouquet’s simplistic, one-dimensional view of Indians 
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prompted Bouquet to recommend that Forbes scrimp on the presents allocated to the 
Indian warriors. Bouquet’s proposal could not have come at a worse time as it coincided 
with the Virginians’ murder of Cherokees accompanying the expedition. Regardless of 
the Cherokees’ mounting anger, Bouquet proposed to end the practice whereby multiple 
colonial Indian agents gave presents to Indians at various locations. Instead, he 
recommended that one person be placed in charge of storing Indian gifts and distributing 
presents to Indians at a single location. His proposals, however, were formulated out of 
his distorted view of the Indians more than anything. “I do not know anything about the 
way Indians are managed,” Bouquet confessed, but “it seems obvious – judging by their 
greediness – that they would be led there more easily.”233 Being ignorant of Cherokee 
culture, Bouquet constantly failed to comprehend their intentions or correctly interpret 
their actions. At one point, Bouquet candidly admitted that he was “not familiar enough 
with their manners and customs…”234 
Yet Forbes readily agreed with Bouquet’s proposal, believing that he had treated 
and rewarded the Cherokees fairly. “Altho we had both the power and justice on our side 
to have retained those presents,” Forbes reported his superior General James 
Abercromby,  “yet we freely gave them in order to shew their Nation that every promise 
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made on our part would have been fulfilled, and any services done us would over and 
above met with suitable rewards…”235 Forbes’s self-righteous claim that he fairly 
managed Indian presents failed to resonate not only with the Cherokees but also with 
colonial officers and Indian agents. His words revealed a narrow, limited understanding 
of Indian gifts: as a payment for services that ought to reflect proportionate value. Forbes 
believed the Cherokees received excessive and extravagant presents but had done 
nothing for the British in return. He also completely ignored the murders in Virginia, 
believing it a separate issue and failing to understand that he could partially diffuse it 
through gift-giving. As Wauhatchee of the Lower Cherokees (Estatoe) protested the 
killings in Virginia to Lyttelton’s messenger, he promised that “everything will be made 
up on both sides” when he see “the Amunition and other things mentioned in our Talk 
this Day.”236 Oblivious to the fact that the Cherokees sought presents for the murder of 
their warriors in Virginia, Forbes refused to spare any additional goods. 
 
Duplicitous Interpreters and Cherokee Dissent 
Often, frustrated British and colonial officers blamed interpreters whenever the 
Indians acted against their wishes. These accusations served as convenient excuses to 
deny responsibility for failed tasks. William Trent, who had offended the Cherokee gift 
recipients, blamed “an Indian interpreter” for the incident that nearly resulted in 
bloodshed at Fort Loudoun. He claimed to have used “every Argument I could to 
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dissuade” the Indians from disorderly present distribution but “there was none but an 
Indian Interpreter, he only told them what he pleased of what I said to them.” Distrust of 
an Indian interpreter whom he believed might purposefully obstruct his message to the 
Cherokees, Trent requested that his superiors send an interpreter named “Smith or some 
other of the Interpreters here immediately.” Trent once again emphasized that he “could 
have stopped” the Cherokees from leaving if he only had had a trustworthy 
interpreter.237 
Two weeks after the first incident, Trent held a conference with the Cherokees 
when an Indian interpreter “Anthony” and “another Indian from Carlisle” arrived at Fort 
Loudoun. At the conference, the Cherokees threatened Trent that if he did not “make 
them a large Present to Carry home with them, they would Rob all the English Houses 
they met with in their way home.” In addition, they told Trent “some of their Young 
Men had been at the French Fort last Summer, that the French were good Men, and as 
the Creeks intended to join them, the Cherokees wou’d join them also, and make War 
upon the English.” Again, Trent assumed the Indians attempted to bully him. He 
reckoned the Indians’ new demand as a scheme “to intimidate me in order to get large 
Presents” and accused “Scoundrel Anthony” of creating “all this Confusion” and 
fomenting unrest among the Cherokees.238 What the Cherokees said and did after their 
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threats, however, reveal that Anthony had nothing do with their discontent and that they 
actually protested the Cherokee-British gift giving in ways that they found unacceptable: 
 
“…when the Indians found that I would not be Prevailed on to give them very large Presents to 
return home with, one of them pulled of his Shirt and throwed it to me. I took it up and jocosely 
thanked him, and told him I was a poor Man and wanted a Shirt, he told me that he did not give 
it to me, but the Coll. (meaning you) and desired me to get it washed and give it to you. Then a 
Number more brought their Bundles and throwed them down and told me to keep them and 
give them to you as you loved goods; this was owing to Anthony who told them you would give 
them nothing, that they might see what they had to Expect from you by the way he was 
Cloathed…”239 
 
These symbolic acts and words also suggested mounting frustration from the 
Cherokees over how the British regarded gift giving since the day Byrd visited the 
Lower Cherokee villages and met Attakullakulla. The British constantly disappointed the 
Cherokees when they talked of presents. The messengers brought no presents with them 
or no wampum belt to show their good faith, failed to deliver promised goods 
immediately, and displayed a stingy attitude when gifts were presented. These patterns 
of behavior from the British must have annoyed the Cherokees especially compared to 
the French who frequently made gifts without asking as much in return. 
Upon learning of the Cherokees’ reaction to the British refusal to give them more 
presents, Bouquet also blamed the translator Anthony (or “Antoine” in French) for the 
trouble. He hastily assembled the Indian chiefs with him in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and 
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“pointed out to them the infamy of the conduct of that rascal Antoine.” But the chiefs 
responded to Bouquet’s angry address with laughter, dismissed Anthony’s behavior, and 
told the exasperated Swiss officer that Anthony “must beware” of Bouquet.240 The 
chiefs’ reaction suggested that they might have already known about Anthony’s plan and 
even secretly admired him for attempting to exact more presents from the British; the 
chiefs seemed amused at Bouquet’s panic and frustration at the interpreter’s 
misdirection. Perhaps, the chiefs also wanted to evade further inquisitive questions from 
Bouquet by laughing off the incident as harmless. 
Regardless of what the chiefs actually thought about Anthony’s empty threats, 
blaming Indian interpreters became a common pattern for both British and colonial 
officers who could not direct Indian allies as they wished. None of them succeeded in 
persuading the Cherokees to stay to the end of the Fort Duquesne expedition because 
they never realized the crux of the problem lay with the miserly policy on Indian 
presents and the inherent unequal relations embodied in gift giving as the British 
attempted to dictate the terms to presumed inferiors. Although colonial officers and 
various Indian agents offered advice, the British officers in charge—Forbes and 
Bouquet—ultimately rejected these proven measures based on their experiences, insisted 
on reducing the cost of Indian presents, and blamed interpreters and Cherokee greediness 
for the tensions that arose as a result of their misguided policies. 
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Catawbas 
Scholars have largely ignored the Catawbas’ involvement in the Fort Duquesne 
expedition. Although the number of Catawba warriors may have been small compared to 
their Cherokee counterparts, they played a key role in persuading the Cherokees to join 
the British expedition, and provided vital contributions to the British effort to capture 
Fort Duquesne from the French. In the end, however, the Catawbas, who almost always 
fully supported the British, could not follow the demanding, arduous expedition to the 
end when they lost prominent headman Captain Bullen in the hands of Delawares and 
then suffered a deadly small pox outbreak. Despite their loyalty to the British, they 
earned no respect from the British officers. 
Unlike the Cherokees, the Catawbas had good reason to join the expedition. As 
Merrell’s work demonstrates, their longstanding trade relations with the British and 
dependence on South Carolina bred a political consensus among the Catawbas to 
accommodate British requests. In 1757, the Catawbas assured the South Carolinians that 
they would support the British plan to invade Fort Duquesne. They brought the scalp of 
a French Indian and nineteen deerskins as tokens of their pledge to support the British. 
The Catawbas believed that the British had “behaved Like brothers in helping us in our 
distress Both last year & this which preserved in a great measure ye lives of our wifes & 
children and Enabled us to Go to war against ye French,” and assured them that they 
would lend help “with the utmost of our power.” At the same time, however, they 
brought complaints regarding the site of a new English fort to be built in their territory 
and illegal sales of rum, hoping the British would rectify their vices within the Catawba 
  113 
communities.241 The Catawbas also pressured and persuaded the Cherokees to join the 
Fort Duquesne expedition when Hagler sent a talk to Attakullakulla in May 1757 urging 
the Cherokees to “Assist our Brothers the white People against the French and there 
Indians” to which the Cherokees at Chota responded “with approbation and apluases of 
them all.”242 
In the course of the Fort Duquesne expedition, Captain Bullen of the Catawbas 
assisted the British officers—Bouquet, in particular—in immeasurable ways. One time, 
he turned in a soldier to Bouquet who attempted to desert to the French.243 John Bow, a 
soldier belonging to the Pennsylvania Regiment, allegedly approached Bullen at a tavern 
and offered a bribe to defect to the French at Fort Duquesne. Bullen himself testified in 
the court martial that the prisoner told the Catawba chief that “he was sorry that he was 
going out to Fight the French as they were too strong for the English & that if Captn. 
Bullen would go off to the French with him he would have Lai’d Cloaths & his Hat full 
of Money….”244 Other witnesses also added that Bow attempted to persuade Bullen that 
“the English wrong’d the Indians out of their pay” and encouraged the Catawba warrior 
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to desert with “as many white Men & Indians.”245 Bow’s attempt to entice Captain 
Bullen by promising cloth and money indicated that resentment over gift-giving and 
payment might have spread to such a degree that even a colonial rank-and-file soldier 
could detect dissatisfaction among the Indians and use that fact as leverage. This 
incident also suggested that British officers remained more oblivious and insensitive to 
the issue surrounding the payment to the Indian warriors than colonial soldiers. 
Bouquet certainly acknowledged the vital contribution that the Catawbas and 
Captain Bullen made to the British interest. He even went on to describe Captain Bullen 
as his adopted son to Forbes.246 When most of the Cherokee warriors abandoned the 
British in Pennsylvania, Bouquet commended the Catawbas’ loyalty to the British 
declaring that “This last tribe will not leave us.”247 Later, the news of Captain Bullen’s 
death made Bouquet lament “This mishap, under the circumstances, is a very great 
loss.”248 With the death of Captain Bullen, the only Indian whom Bouquet trusted, his 
fondness for the Catawbas evaporated when the remaining Catawba warriors suddenly 
abandoned the expedition. Bouquet responded in shock and anger upon hearing the 
news: “The Catawbas have left us like scoundrels, after bringing us one scalp, which 
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was recognized by the Cherokees as an old scalp which they themselves gave them in 
the spring.”249 
Because several Cherokee parties from different villages joined the expedition 
and acted independently and Bouquet rarely made distinctions between them, it is 
unclear which group of Cherokees identified the scalp, but they might have misled 
Bouquet deliberately in order to drive a wedge between the British and the Catawbas. 
Anthony, accused of fomenting a dissent among the Cherokee parties by Trent and 
Bouquet, also allegedly told the Cherokee warriors earlier that “how well Captain bullen 
was used, and how Ill the Cherokees were used at Carlisle” by the British.250 Perhaps, 
the Cherokees might have wanted to sabotage the Catawba-British relations as retaliation 
against the British for refusal to give them additional presents.  
The Catawba warriors probably became disillusioned with risking their lives for 
the British and suffering disrespect in return. While Catawba headmen committed to the 
British cause, the young warriors seemed to think otherwise. Bouquet reported Captain 
Bullen, who commanded the Catawba war party, “received only scorn at Cumberland” 
from his own men, which indicated that the Catawba warriors no longer wanted to 
support the British expedition as their leaders had pledged.251 Their response also 
suggested the Cherokees fomenting a division between the Catawbas might have worked 
given the strong words of commitment from the Catawba headmen. 
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If the Cherokees had sown a division between Catawbas and British, the Catawba 
warriors might have resented both the Cherokees’ presence and their connections to the 
Delawares. The British invited the Delawares to hold Indian conference with the 
Cherokees, because Forbes and Bouquet hoped that the presence of Cherokees would 
help bring the Delawares to the British side.252  A few days later, however, the 
Delawares ambushed, killed, and scalped two Catawbas including Captain Bullen. 
Understandably, the Catawbas became furious with the Delawares but also with the 
British because they were “mad to entertain & give Presents not only to our Enemies, 
but their own.’”253 The Catawbas also probably resented the Cherokees for cementing 
ties with the Delawares who killed their leader. Distaste for the British and mistrust of 
the Cherokees convinced them to abandon the expedition.254  
When the Catawba warriors finally departed for home in July of 1758, Bouquet 
swiftly condemned them, fuming that “they have behav’d in the most shameful manner, 
and run away a parcel of thieves rather than Warriors without seeing me.” Bouquet also 
suggested to Forbes “it would be very necessary to send a message to their Nation to 
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complain of their Conduct, and know at once if they are Friends or Enemies.”255 Later, 
Bouquet’s sense of betrayal by the Catawbas led him to write to Amherst in the wake of 
Pontiac’s War that “they [the Catawbas] are no more a Nation; I would rather chuse the 
Liberty to kill any Savage that may come in our Way than to be perpetually doubtful 
whether they are Friends or Foes.”256 
Bullen’s funeral provided a clue to why the Catawbas abandoned the British. The 
Indian warriors and the British and colonial troops congregated together for the funeral. 
At the scene, Pennsylvanian army chaplain Thomas Barton eulogized Captain Bullen as 
“the famous Catawba Chief, always strictly attach’d to the British Interest” and 
described that “54 Indians of the Catawba, Tuscarora, & Ottawaw Nations” came to his 
funeral and lamented “the loss of their brave Captain Bullen.”257 One of the chiefs 
(whom Barton did not identify) delivered a speech in English that “Our Success has not 
been equal to our Zeal, & the Reason is, we had too far to travel to the Enemy; find our 
Provisions being generally spent before we could reach their Borders, we were oblig’d to 
return before we could kill or scalp.”258 This speech revealed the perilous expedition the 
southeastern Indians undertook, and provides some explanation to why both the 
Catawbas and Cherokees may have quit. Despite the speaker’s pledge to avenge the 
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death of Bullen by proceeding to Fort Duquesne, the Catawbas might have realized that 
this was not the best option. 
The death of Captain Bullen effectively ended the Fort Duquesne expedition for 
the Catawbas. They provided invaluable assistances for the British army as they scouted 
for enemies in the woods, escorted supply wagons, and discovered potential enemies 
within the British army. Captain Bullen acted as a lynchpin who held the Catawba 
warriors steadfast in the demanding expedition and was the only person who British and 
colonial officers like Bouquet and Washington could rely on despite their differences. 
With the charismatic figure lost, however, Bouquet no longer held the remaining 
Catawbas in high esteem as he hastened to denounce them as “scoundrels” and 
“savages” alongside the Cherokees. 
In short, the Catawbas paid dearly for their loyalty to the British. Not only did 
they lose their prominent headman, they gained neither respect from the British officers 
nor immediate presents for their service and sacrifice. The site of the new fort remained 
to be settled, and Carolinians and illegal traders still sold rum to intoxicate their youths. 
Disappointed, the rest of the Catawba warriors turned back after the death of Captain 
Bullen, carrying smallpox that would further decimate their population.259 
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The End of the Fort Duquesne Expedition 
While some Cherokees might have instigated the Catawbas to desert and return 
home together in July 1758, some remained with the British until August in hopes of 
exacting more presents from Bouquet.260 Even after losing almost every Cherokee 
warrior and scout, however, Bouquet remained stubborn and insisted on the strict 
rationing of presents to maintain the elusive notion of “fairness” that he held as 
synonymous with not yielding to the Indians’ demands. When the Cherokee party that 
accompanied Byrd demanded additional presents, Bouquet asked what they wanted and 
received “a List of Goods the most extravagant that ever was thought of.”261 Outraged, 
Bouquet declared, “I shall not change the policy on which we have acted up now” and 
treat them all the same as with the rest of the Indians.262 Bouquet’s obstinance, however, 
only encouraged the Cherokees to return home. Like his superior Forbes, Bouquet 
blamed various Indian agents for “many petty jealousies in the management of their 
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affairs” that risked “losing our Indians.”263 Unable to contain the deteriorating situation 
by himself, Bouquet hurriedly sent a letter to Washington to request help as the 
Virginian officer was known as “a better Judge of their humour, dispositions, and 
Circumstances.” Bouquet, however, stressed in the letter that the notion of fair 
distribution of presents must be strictly observed, essentially putting Washington in a 
difficult position to resolve the situation. 
Tired of the constant stream of Cherokees abandoning him, Bouquet finally 
decided to dispense with the Cherokees and gave them presents, hoping to prevent the 
Cherokees from taking revenge against the Virginians in Bedford County on their way 
home. The Cherokees nevertheless plundered the Virginian settlements. Virginia 
Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier reported to South Carolina Governor William 
Henry Lyttelton that the Cherokees “stole the Horses, Provisions, and whatever else they 
could lay their hands on, belonging to the poor Inhabitants settled near the Road” as on 
their way home because “they were not contented with what they had got.”264 Fauquier 
might have hoped to deflect any criticisms from South Carolina and the British 
commanders by stressing the Cherokees’ treacherous characters while exonerating the 
Virginian settlers for any blame they might receive for killing the Cherokee warriors, 
thus destroying the Cherokee-British relations. The South Carolinians, however, 
disagreed with the perspective of the Virginians. Five years later, George Milligen, a 
contemporary writer of South Carolina defended the acts of returning Cherokees and 
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264 Francis Fauquier to William Henry Lyttelton, October 13, 1758 Quoted from The Official Papers 
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blamed the Virginians of Bedford County for their senseless attacks against the 
Cherokee allies: “There is no Acquitting those People who attacked the Cherokees of 
Ingratitude: The Indians had been to war in their Defence, neglecting their Hunting 
Season, (to them their Harvest) and subjecting themselves to all the Inconveniencies and 
Dangers attending a long March of 1000 or 1200 Miles, out and Home.”265 
Hence, the British did not get anything in return for the presents they gave away 
because they missed the right timing: the British neither retained the Cherokee warriors 
nor they prevent the Cherokees from exacting revenge against the Virginians. Bouquet, 
however, rationalized this unhappy situation by disparaging the Cherokees as immature 
shirkers and dismissing them as cowards.266 Faced with the increasing number of 
Cherokees abandoning the expedition, Bouquet justified the unfavorable situation to 
Forbes as a blessing in disguise. He consoled the bed stricken commander that the 
French must be having exactly the same problem. “We have no regular attack to fear, 
and the French will find as many difficulties in keeping their Indians as we; and if we 
both lose them, the advantage surely remains on our side.”267 
Of all the British and colonial officers, British officer James Grant (who later 
became the commander of the 1761 Cherokee expedition) treated the Cherokees most 
according to Cherokee gift-giving practice. When he was given an assignment to deliver 
presents, at Fort Loudoun in Virginia, a party of the Cherokee warriors waited for Grant 
                                                
265 George Milligen, A Short Description, p.77 
266 The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown Camp, August 8, 1758, pp.338-339 
267 Ibid., Bouquet to Forbes, Carlisle, June 7, 1758, p.64 
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to arrive so that they could collect presents and return home.268 Although Forbes and 
Bouquet worried that the Cherokees might cause a trouble, Grant found nothing of the 
sort. When the Indians appeared impatient to “go off without waiting for their presents,” 
Grant immediately delivered the goods to them “in hopes to bring them into better 
temper and to prevent the consequences which might attend their bad humor in going 
home.” Grant’s swift gift giving seemed to have made the Indians “quite happy & 
pleased with getting possession of their Presents.” Soon, “the chief men” told Grant 
“they would hear every thing which I had to say to them, as we were Friends, Brothers.” 
Encouraged by the Indians’ response, Grant proposed to “the Whole Party to dine with 
me,” but the Indians went home “very quietly without waiting either for Talk or dinner” 
and “they had done no harm except carrying off a few horses.” Unlike other British or 
colonial messengers before him who resorted to the language of treacherous and greedy 
savages, Grant singled out “George the Indian” as “more to blame then the others” for 
carrying off the horses rather than calling out the entire group.269 Grant’s handling of the 
presents contrasted starkly with William Trent who attempted to chastise the Cherokees 
for similar behavior but his saving act may have become a bit too late.270 
Although Attakullakulla did everything he could to avoid participating in the Fort 
Duquesne expedition, in the winter of 1758, he eventually had to travel north meet 
Forbes and then Virginia Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier to resolve the crisis in 
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Bedford County and to prevent further violence between the Virginians and the returning 
Cherokees.271 On his way home, however, an angry Forbes, who received reports of the 
Cherokees’ conducts in Virginia on their way home, ordered his men to strip 
Attakullakulla’s arms and armor at Winchester, wounding the chief’s pride. Despite this 
humiliation, Attakullakulla told his people at a large meeting that “they were to Blame 
and not the White People and that all the Mischief that was done was owing to there own 
behavior” and those who commit “any more Mischief to the White People they should 
Immediately die for it.272 But the chief also made it clear that he only went to the 
northward “to make up differences between the People of Virginia & my People” and 
that his return “would be of more Service than my going to Warr.”273 
Attakullakulla’s defense suggested that he never formally recognized the British 
notion of military service for the presents delivered to him and his people.274 With the 
British takeover of Fort Duquesne completed in November 1758, however, disputing 
whether the Cherokees actually “deserted” or not became an afterthought. The real 
problem lay with the supposed Cherokee-British military alliance forged in the 
beginning. A series of mishaps over the promise, delivery, and distribution of presents 
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dissatisfied the Cherokees who had experienced the empty promises from the British 
before. On the other hand, delaying tactics, changing words, and wavering commitments 
frustrated the British. 
The British commanders of the expedition also killed any remaining possibilities 
of salvaging the alliance when they insisted on a new policy of frugality with regard to 
Indian presents, against the recommendations of those more familiar with Indian affairs. 
Their failure to see the presents as anything but direct payment for service only led them 
to believe the Cherokees repeatedly deceived them to extort more presents. Forbes and 
Bouquet also underestimated the impact of the violence in Bedford County on the 
Cherokees and did nothing to placate Cherokees’ anger. Instead, they demanded the 
Cherokees continue to march with the expedition forces. Only when the dissatisfied 
Cherokees started to abandon the British and head home did the British commanders 
reluctantly give orders to Grant to deliver presents to the warriors, out of fear that they 
might attack the Virginian settlements. Regardless, the Cherokees decided to take what 
they believed their missed payment for the expedition by plundering from the Virginians 
or restore balance for lost kinsmen. 
The colonial messengers working for the British army also mishandled the 
protocols of gift giving to the Cherokees, which further deteriorated the already frail 
Cherokee-British alliance founded upon suspicions and reluctance. Although provincial 
officers like Washington and Byrd fared better in dealing with the Indians, Turner and 
Trent made critical mistakes and blunders in their meetings with the Cherokees over 
delivering the presents and messages. Trent, in particular, greatly offended and 
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antagonized the Cherokees with his highhanded treatment and insulting words. The 
ultimate responsibility, however, lay with Forbes and Bouquet who misidentified the 
source of the Cherokee dissatisfaction. The British officers’ crude stereotyping and 
extreme prejudice against the Cherokees also led to unnecessary frictions with colonial 
officers, the Indian superintendents, and others. James Grant, who suffered an 
ignominious defeat at the hand of French, seemed to be the only British officer in the 
Fort Duquesne expedition displayed an apt ability to interact with the Indians.275 
The Fort Duquesne expedition ultimately ended with a triumphant victory for the 
British army and the coalition of provincial troops, but at the costly expense of poisoning 
the relations with the Cherokees. The prominent southeastern Indian nation certainly did 
not forget the offenses and insults they received from the British. Only little more than a 
year later, the Cherokees waged a war against the colonists that dragged the British army 
back to South Carolina. The British troops now had to fight their former allies and the 
leading British commander was none other than James Grant—the only British officer 
who had displayed any understanding of Cherokees. 
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CHAPTER V 
BRITISH TROOPS, CHARLES TOWN, AND THE ANGLO-CHEROKEE WAR, 
1760-61 
 
“Thus ended this Campaign which for Fatigue, difficult Ground & in most other Circumstances 
must be allow’d to have been the severest serv’d in America since the commencement of the 
War.”276 
—Christopher French, Journal of an Expedition to South Carolina, 1761 
 
Outbreak of the Anglo-Cherokee War 
With the anticlimactic conclusion of the Fort Duquesne expedition in the winter 
of 1758, Jeffrey Amherst, the new chief-in-command for the British army in North 
America, had no intention of sending British troops back to the Southeast since the 
French activities on the southwestern borders of the British colonies presented no 
immediate danger. Meanwhile, the Cherokees had learned once again from the Fort 
Duquesne expedition that the British disrespected them. Despite the heightened tensions 
among the Cherokees, troubles continued to brew at Fort Loudoun and Fort Prince 
George as the garrison soldiers and colonial traders committed petty crimes, eventually 
resulting in violence. Soon, the old business of accusations and counter-accusations, 
denials, lies, rumors, and panic returned among the Cherokees and the South Carolinians 
as a result. This time, however, the incident escalated into a war that lasted for nearly 
two years and dragged British troops back into the southeast. 
                                                
276 Christopher French, Journal of an Expedition to South Carolina, November 14, 1761 
(Washington, DC: The Library of Congress) 
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British troops’ involvement in the Anglo-Cherokee War entailed two 
campaigns—one waged by Colonel Archibald Montgomery in 1760 and the second by 
Lieutenant-Colonel James Grant in the following year.277 Of these two expeditions, only 
James Grant’s expedition has received close scrutiny from scholars.278 Although 
historians have written extensively on the two campaigns, they have highlighted cold-
blooded killings, body counts, military tactics, and the diplomatic ruses Grant and 
Attakullakulla used against one other.279 Such foci privilege the communications 
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between top officials (for instance, the diplomatic talks between Attakullakulla and 
Grant) and obfuscates day-to-day life, in which British soldiers and Indian warriors 
shared a host of common experiences that defined their relations. 
While scholars have used three surviving written records by British officers—
those of James Grant, Major Alexander Monypenny, and Captain Christopher French—
to reconstruct the narrative of the infamous scorched-earth campaign of 1761, they have 
not considered what the sources can reveal about everyday interaction between British 
troops, Indians, and enslaved Africans.280 The officers’ papers reveal a complicated 
picture of everyday informal exchanges—such as hunting, ceremonial rituals, drinking, 
stealing, and accidents—at various sites such as forest camps, forts, downtown Charles 
Town, and Cherokee villages, etc. These sources also allow us to expand our 
understanding of the social histories of both British rank-and-file and young Indian men 
in the regional space of the southeast in the eighteenth century.281 
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In-between the Fort Duquesne Expedition and the New War 
The sour ending of the Fort Duquesne expedition left the Cherokees and the 
South Carolinians at odds against each other. The final incident that provoked Cherokee 
anger occurred at Fort Prince George when the garrison officers sexually assaulted 
Cherokee women, and Cherokee factions responded by killing the responsible soldiers 
and officers. Governor William Henry Lyttelton reacted out of proportion when he 
seized the Cherokee peace delegations visiting Charles Town to diffuse the spiraling 
crisis. Having seized the Cherokee hostages in Charles Town, Lyttelton hastily 
assembled a thousand provincial troops, marched to Fort Prince George, and brashly 
insisted that the Cherokees turn over to him twenty-four of their men whom he claimed 
were responsible for murders of colonists since the winter of 1758, to face English 
justice. These terms outraged the Cherokees, including Attakullakulla who had advanced 
a pro-British policy for many years. With Lyttelton’s army at the doorstep of the Lower 
Cherokee country and the lives of hostages at stake, Attakullakulla had little choice but 
to acquiesce to Lyttelton’s unreasonable terms. Thinking he had secured a peace and 
subjugated the Cherokees, Lyttelton triumphantly returned to Charles Town, without 
realizing that he had tipped the delicate balance within the Cherokee leadership that had 
held them back from launching a full-scale war against the colonial soldiers and traders 
in their country. 
When Lyttelton learned of the siege of Fort Loudoun situated near Chota and the 
attacks near Fort Prince George, he knew South Carolina’s troops alone could not 
provide relief. Thus, Lyttelton hastily sent a letter to the commander-in-chief of the 
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British army in North America requesting reinforcement, to which Jeffrey Amherst 
responded with a swift condemnation of the Cherokees “for their perfidious Breach of 
the Treaty of Peace,” and ordered a detachment of British troops to be sent from New 
York to South Carolina.282 The officers in charge of the expedition were Archibald 
Montgomery and James Grant, both Highlanders who had quartered in Charles Town in 
1757 with Henry Bouquet’s Royal Americans. Although Lyttelton had initiated the war, 
he had no intention of seeing it through. He transferred himself to Jamaica and left the 
unfinished business to Lieutenant-Governor William Bull.283 
 
Montgomery’s Highlanders Return to South Carolina 
When Archibald Montgomery and James Grant returned to South Carolina with 
the Highlanders, they could not expect well-organized assistance from the South 
Carolinians because of the outbreak of small pox a few months prior to their arrival.284 
Eliza Lucas Pinckney described Charles Town colonists as being “continually insulted 
by the Indians on our back settlements.” Moreover, “a violent kind of small pox rages in 
Charles Town that almost puts a stop to all business.”285 She remained hopeful that 
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Montgomery’s Highlanders would “manage these savage Enemies” and swiftly save 
South Carolina from the crisis. Her predictions proved wishful thinking.  
Montgomery’s 1760 expedition produced voluminous war propaganda 
highlighting the body counts and the attrition inflicted against the Cherokees, which the 
South-Carolina Gazette published.286 For instance, after ambushing the Cherokee 
settlement of Estatoe, Montgomery’s letter to Bull reported that “almost all the Indians 
in and about the Houses were killed with Bayonets, a good Many Women and children 
were made Prisoners, some could not be saved.”287 Grant also emphasized the 
formidable power of the Highlanders against the outmatched Cherokees as he recounted 
the burning of Estatoe and Cowee (Sugar Town), adding that he “could not help pitying 
them a little.”288 Grant also emphasized the barbarity of Cherokees when he described 
the body of a tortured colonial man whose sufferings made Grant “no longer possible to 
think of mercy” as he justified the Highlanders’ slaughter of the Cherokees.289 
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On the other hand, Montgomery and Grant downplayed the casualties on their 
side as “very inconsiderable.”290 After the Highlanders ravaged the Lower Cherokee 
villages and returned to Fort Prince George, Montgomery announced “the Lower 
Cherokees who were the most Guilty have been sufficiently Corrected for their 
Insolence” and making peace immediately would be “the best thing which can happen to 
this Province.” In reality, Montgomery no longer wanted to continue the expedition 
because the Highlanders could not venture into the Middle settlements deep in the 
mountains. He confessed to Bull “’tis almost impossible to proceed over the Mountains, 
and indeed it does not appear to be necessary in the present situation of affairs there can 
be no great advantage in continuing A War…”291 To avoid embarrassment to the 
Commons House of Assembly, Bull informed the Highlander Colonel that he “edited 
out” Montgomery’s frank admission that the expedition could no longer continue.292 
Ultimately, Montgomery and the Highlanders returned to New York on September of 
that year, leaving only a few detachments of Highlanders to defend Fort Congarees and 
Fort Ninety Six. 
Montgomery’s abrupt return to New York caused an uproar in the Commons 
House of South Carolina as Fort Loudoun fell and the Cherokees executed twenty-five 
garrison men, three women, and all the officers except John Stuart, whose friendship 
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with Little Carpenter saved his life.293 Thus, Montgomery’s failure to save Fort Loudoun 
and bring the Cherokees to the peace table infuriated the South Carolinians. The angry 
members of the Commons House inquired whether Bull had prepared Montgomery with 
sufficient provisions and men. Bull denied any knowledge of what transpired between 
Lyttelton and Montgomery, averring “I do not recollect that Colonel Montgomery ever 
made to me a Demand of further Assistance of Men, or that he ever expressed any 
hesitation.”294 The legislature felt they had no alternative but to wait for the return of 
another detachment from New York until next year.295 
 
Quartering without Controversy? 
In January of 1761, the British expeditionary force of 1200 troops under the 
command of Colonel James Grant arrived in Charles Town from New York to continue 
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the invasion of Cherokee country that Montgomery had aborted a year earlier.296 Unlike 
Montgomery’s expedition that had stayed away from Charles Town because of the small 
pox outbreak, Grant’s troops were quartered in the colonial town of about 8,000 free and 
enslaved residents for over three months as they prepared provisions and planned 
logistics.297 
As Bouquet had in 1757, Grant began by trying to settle the quartering issue. 
Upon arrival, Major Alexander Monypenny found that the colonists “had no immediate 
view of a campaign, & yet the Barracks were in no condition to receive Troops, & 
neither Bedding, Firing, & nor Utencils provided.”298 Grant also observed that “The 
Barracks were much out of Repair” and the colonists had done nothing “for the 
Reception of the Troops.” Fortunately, Grant had no trouble procuring quarters and had 
no reason to complain because the colonists “have been pretty diligent since our 
arrival.”299 Undoubtedly, the looming fear of a Cherokee invasion altered the colonists’ 
behavior. Four years earlier no imminent danger threatened the colony. 
Within a month, Grant reported that the quartering issue had been resolved, and 
suggested that the colonists wasted little time in providing barracks in which the troops 
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could be “tolerably well accommodated.”300 The old and new barracks were located less 
than a mile away from the center of town, and British officers and the rank-and-file alike 
often roamed free in the town, either under the approval of their superiors or by 
transgressing military orders.301 Soldiers could be found strolling down the streets of 
Charles Town, “skulking” in alleys, perusing the market place, and drinking in local 
taverns.302 These movements created numerous opportunities for the soldiers to interact 
with the town’s inhabitants.  
Although Monypenny strictly enforced several measures to restrict the movement 
of the rank-and-file, many soldiers found their way to the center of Charles Town. 
Guards were posted at ten in the morning every day and paraded around the barracks to 
suppress desertions and enforce curfew.303 The soldiers could leave only if they had 
“Passports” from authorized officers.304 Such measures represented a response to 
soldiers’ frequently nighttime excursions to town. Indeed, on February 10, Monypenny 
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that is now part of the campus of College of Charleston.  
302 For British officers, they could access the downtown more easily as some of them billeted in the 
town rather than staying in the barracks while the British command imposed strict curfew on rank-and-file. 
The word “Skulking” was often used in the court martial records to describe soldiers accused of 
desertions. 
303 Alexander Monypenny, Order Book of the Grant Expedition, January 14, 1761. Printed in Journal 
of Cherokee Studies (1977): 302-319. An officer of a Company visited the barrack rooms after tattoo, 
which beat at nine, to check for missing soldiers and “to order evr’y man who is absent, to be confin’d; & 
it is expected the officer will frequently repeat this Role Calling, to prevent the Mens going into Town in 
the night.” 
304 Ibid., January 15, 1761 “Captains & commanding officers of Companys to give Passports to 
officers, Servants, & men they have occasion to send to Town in the Night,” Monypenny ordered, “to 
prevent their being taken up & confin’d by the Patroles of the Main Guard, who have orders to confine 
ever’y Soldier they meet in the night, without a Passport.” 
  136 
issued another order, suggesting that officers had enforced the measures loosely, and that 
soldiers had succeeded in accessing the streets of Charles Town at night. “The Officers 
are to endeavor to oblige their men strictly to obey the order of the 14th January, 
particularly as to not going into Town after Retreat,” Monypenny warned, “The 
Irregularitys occasion’d by a neglect of this order, are too obvious.”305 
Despite the officers’ repeated attempts to impose a curfew, the British rank-and-
file stepped outside the confined spaces of the barracks and ventured into the public 
spaces of Charles Town.306 Soldiers’ thirst for alcohol often motivated them to take such 
risky actions. For instance, an accused deserter, James Burleigh, was found wandering 
drunk “in the Streets in Charlestown.” When a soldier apprehended Burleigh for a 
second time after he escaped “from the Sentry at Guard” at the barracks, Burleigh was 
found with “a Shirt belonging to another Man of the same Room.” According to another 
witness, Burleigh acknowledged that he took the shirt and “sold it in the Town” but 
added that “he was drunk or he would have not done it.”307 When the Court asked why 
he fled for the second time from the barracks, Burleigh said that he feared punishment 
and contemplated going to “the Governors Lady to beg her to intercede for him.”308 Not 
only did Burleigh’s case demonstrate British troops’ engagement in informal economic 
exchanges at the local market to obtain liquor, but his belief that he could appeal to “the 
                                                
305 Ibid., February 10, 1761 
306 Ibid., February 11, 1761, For instance, Monypenny ordered: “A Return of the number of Deserters 
lost by each Corps. since they landed in South Carolina, to be given in immediately to the Adjutant of the 
Day,” and noted that “The Three men of the Royal, try’d for Desertion are for given by Colonel Grant, & 
are to be Reas’d to join their this Evening, at Retreat Beating.” 
307 WO 34/47, General Court Martial Proceedings, February 9, 1761 (Kew: National Archives) 
308 Ibid. 
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Governor’s Lady” to save him from the trouble also reflects his sense that he—a 
quartered soldier—possessed enough presence in Charles Town to ask for help from the 
local community’s patron.  
Although British officers might have found the quartering conditions tolerable 
compared to four years earlier, many members of the rank-and-file nonetheless 
attempted to desert. The British soldiers in the Cherokee expeditionary force consisted of 
English, Scottish, and Irish who had served in northern campaigns. Court martial 
testimonies that took place in Charles Town in 1761 indicate that soldiers with previous 
campaign experience in the north often got sick in the southern climate. When Edward 
Campbell faced a court martial for his desertion in the summer of 1760, he defended 
himself by blaming fellow deserter Cornelius Donovan for talking him into it, and then 
claiming that “a Fever and Ague which Continued for three months” had prevented his 
return and impaired his ability to understand the Articles of War.309 A few deserters’ 
testimonies clearly indicated that they disliked campaigning in the southern colony. 
Accused deserter James Fitch defended himself by saying that he heard “a Report that 
Men of the Royal was to be drafted into the South Carolina Independent Companies,” so 
he “endeavor’d as soon as he could to Joyn the Best of the Regiment to the Northward.” 
Unfortunately, he got ill “which continued Eleven Weeks and prevented him” from 
joining the desired regiment of the north.310 
                                                
309 Ibid. When Campbell applied to Lieutenants Cooke and Burton to attest for his character, they 
both testified that they knew Campbell since the “Siege of Louisbourgh” and since “the regiment left 
Limerick (of Ireland).” 
310 Ibid. 
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In contrast to the rank-and-file, officers lodged in residential houses, mirroring 
the pattern of Bouquet’s quartering in 1757. Monypenny noted that “about half the 
Officers are in barracks, the other half are Billetted in Town, by the Consent of the 
Landlords, the Province promising to pay them (whose Credit is not very high).”311 
These landlords who had credit problems might have been eager to take the opportunity 
to billet British officers to solve their financial problems, which eased the burden on 
Grant to find quarters for his officers.312 British officers also freely went out to the center 
of Charles Town and attended social entertainment at a local playhouse in the 
evenings.313 Charles Town offered plenty of entertainment for a transient population like 
the British troops.314 For example, local tavern-owner John Gordon frequently advertised 
plays and shows to entice customers to his tavern and colonial government officials 
entertained the British officers in the Council Chamber of the State House.315 
                                                
311 Add. Ms. 83699, (London: British Library), Monypenny to William Amherst, January 17, 1761; 
Alexander Monypenny, Order Book of the Grant Expedition, January 20, 1761 “A list of the officers 
names billeted in Town, with their Land-lord’s names,” Monypenny ordered, “to be given in to the Adjt of 
the Day Retreat beating this Evening.” 
312 See Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, March 17, 1762, ff. 27-40. Samuel Groves, 
James Linguard, Felix Long, James Ladson, and James Reid received credit for lodging officers. 
313 Order Book of the Grant Expedition, March 14, 1761 A lost item notice posted indicates that 
British officers watched performances at a play house: “Lost last night out of the Green Room at the Play 
House, a Silver Baskett Hilted Sword, the maker’s name Tapp in the Strand,” Moynpenny notified, “If any 
Gentleman has taken it by mistake, he is desired to send it to the Adjutant of the 2d Division of 
Independts. If any Person has found the above Sword, or will discover the Person who has it, by applying 
as above shall receive a Guinea Reward.” 
314 George Milligen, A Short Description, p.25 Charles-Town sported “a genteel Playhouse, where a 
very tolerable Set of Actors, called the American Company of Comedians, frequently exhibit; and often 
Concerts of vocal and instrumental Music, generally performed by Gentlemen.” 
315 George Milligen found the council-chamber of the State House most dissatisfying because it 
“appears rather crouded and disgusting, than ornamented and pleasing, by the great Profusion of carved 
Work in it.” George Milligen, A Short Description, p.35; According to South Carolina Gazette, British 
officers “were very politely complimented and agreeably entertained, by the officers of the army, with a 
comedy and a farce, in the council chamber.” South Carolina Gazette, March 21, 1761 
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The British troops formally shared space inside church on Sundays with civilians 
of Charles Town as they sat alongside one another and listened to sermons. Religion 
culturally connected the colonists to both Bouquet’s Royal Americans and Grant’s 
Highlanders. William Hutson, a dissenting minister of the Anglican Church, noted the 
presence of British troops in his diary in March 1758, writing that he had to use “some 
military terms, & to carry on something on an Allegory of that kind” in order to “speak 
practically to the poor soldiers.”316 Troops’ attendance at Sabbath in St. Michaels or St. 
Phillips might have provided them with opportunities to interact with the town’s 
inhabitants and even to find some solace when a minister like Hutson, “concerned for the 
poor Soldiers,” attended to their spiritual needs.317 
British troops also occupied public spaces and interacted with the local 
inhabitants freely during everyday social and economic activities. Soldiers purchased 
provisions at the market under the supervision of officers.318 Occasional funerals of 
British officers also provided a break from the daily life of military drills for the rank-
and-file, allowing them to leave the barracks for a few hours. On February 7, 
Monypenny issued an order to assemble the troops “near Major Hamilton’s lodgings, to 
                                                
316 William Hutson, March 5, 1758 “Having Occasion to use [indecipherable] some military terms, & 
to carry on something on an Allegory of that kind—was led into the Appointment to speak practically to 
the poor Soldiers, several of whom were present—found myself very desireous that some [spiritual?] 
Good might be done among them & was enabled to pray for it.” Quoted from Daniel Tortora, "A Faithful 
Ambassador": The Diary of Rev. William Hutson, Pastor of the Independent Meeting in Charleston, 1757-
1761, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Oct., 2006), pp. 272-309.  
317 Ibid., March 12, 1758. Hutson’s preaching to the troops continued the next Sunday. “My Heart, 
these two Sabbaths past has been particular concerned for the poor Soldiers. O that some Good might be 
done among them!” 
318 Order Book of the Grant Expedition, January 14, 1761 Monypenny ordered “no Soldier to go into 
Town, till after Morning Role Calling, or Exercise, except when sent for Provisions, or to the Market, 
which is to be done regularly by a non Commission officer going with, & bring back their Men.” 
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attend the Funeral of Ensign Elrington of Brigadier General Whitmore’s Regiment” in 
order to “pay the military Honours,” and then the men marched to church the next 
day.319 Thus, funerals provided rare authorized opportunities in which the British troops 
could share the public spaces of Charles Town.320 
The affairs of the British monarchy also provided special occasions for the 
British rank-and-file and colonists to participate together in public ceremonies as the 
subjects of the British Crown. When “the melancholly News of Death of the late King” 
George II reached the southern province from New York on January 30, the British 
troops attended Sunday services at a local church.321 Following the end of mourning for 
George II, the proclamation of George III on February 7 occasioned a massive public 
ceremony that involved the British regulars, provincial troops, free inhabitants, and 
slaves on Broad Street. They occupied the physical space of downtown Charles Town 
together to create a temporary communal identity as the King’s Subjects. The Cherokee 
prisoners relocated to the new guard house at one of the corners of town square must 
have also witnessed the strange spectacle unfolding before their eyes as the “the regulars 
and militia march’d by divisons to the bay, and drew up there, and the procession went 
off to Granville’s bastion…followed by a general volley of small arms, and 3 
huzza’s.”322 As Brendan McConville and Robert Olwell suggest in their studies, this 
                                                
319 Ibid., February 7, 1761 
320 Ibid., February 19, 1761. A second funeral in Charles Town happened on February 19 as “The 
Officers are desired to assembly precisely at 4 OClock this afternoon at the same house Ensn. Elrington 
died at, to attend the funeral of Lieut. Elliott of the Marines.” 
321 Ibid., January 31, 1761, “The Men to go to church as usual.” 
322 See also His Majesty’s Council Journals of South Carolina, February 6, 1761. The Council 
Journal of South Carolina also provided almost an identical account though it specifically identified the 
  141 
public celebration of the British monarchy showed the strong royalism in the southern 
colony that contributed to a sense of community encompassing all the British subjects 
despite the ethnic and racial diversity of the congregants.323 
 
British Officers’ Relations with Women 
As in Bouquet’s quartering in 1757, colonial women continued to assume the 
role of social conduit between provincial and British officers during the Anglo-Cherokee 
War. During Grant’s Cherokee expedition, South Carolina provincial officer John 
Moultrie fraternized with Grant and Monypenny at Fort Ninety Six.324 Moultrie’s letters 
to prospective marriage partner Eleanor Austin in Charles Town reveal that British 
officers built social connections with colonial women, which could then become useful 
in building personal ties with colonial officers. “If it was not for my pleasant & much 
loved friend Moneypenny I don’t know what I shou’d do to get accounts of you, you 
ought to regard him, for he very s[e]riously loves us,” Moultrie wrote to Austin, “he 
                                                                                                                                           
British regiments in the ceremony: “His Honour then walked in Procession down Broad Street 
accompanied by the Members of Assembly, Colonel Grant the Captains of His Majesty’s Ships and all the 
other officers Civil and Military, and many of the principal Inhabitants and Planters, the Sword of State 
being carried before him by Daniel Doyley Esqr. Provost Marshal. The Proclamation was made a second 
time in the great Square at the State House; The same was repeated at the Main Guard Houses, whence the 
Procession moved on toward Granville’s on [?] Bastion when the King’s troops commanded by Col. Grant 
being drawn up in Broad Street, wheeled the right by Divisions, and formed on the Bay, on the right of all 
of the Independents, Second Division of Ditto, the Battalion Companies of the 17th the Royals, First 
Division of the Independents, Second Division of Ditto, the Battalion Companies of 17th & 22d. and on the 
left of all the Light Infantry of the 22d to the left of the Regulars, was drawn up the Charles Town 
regiment of Militia, which had been under arms from 9 o’clock.” 
323 See Robert OlWell, Masters, Slaves, & Subjects (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); 
On royalism in colonial America, see The King's Three Faces: the Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-
1776, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c2006) 
324 Moultrie later eloped with Eleanor Austin as her father opposed the marriage. Moultrie’s Scottish 
family background may have made him easier to befriend Monypenny and Grant who both came from 
Scotland. 
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enquires of every oppertunity from Town how you are, & constantly lets me know & 
wishes us well.”325 Colonial officers like Moultrie also might have exaggerated their 
friendship with British officers to impress Austin to promote their social connections 
with the British officers to boast their social standing to people. After destroying the 
Cherokee villages and encamping at Fort Prince George, Moultrie boasted to Austin 
,“Every night Col Grant, Sir Harry Seton, our pleasant friend Moneypenny, my self & 
sometimes one or two more meet & sit till eleven & we never miss bringing you into the 
company…”326 
Some British officers engaged in sexual relations with women of African descent 
while quartered in Charles Town. William Amherst, brother of the commander-in-chief, 
sent a letter to Grant suggesting Major Alexander Monypenny’s penchant for having sex 
with black women: 
 
The few Anecdotes you gave me regarding Monypenny confirm me in the opinion I had always 
conceived of his consummate slyness in all his dealings with the fair sex. he did not use to carry 
on his business with the blacks so secretly in this part of the world. I suppose he did not think 
them entitled to the same regard for reputation, or he might have another view in it, of raising 
his own, for what will not a white woman expect (& she will readily by to have her expectations 
answer’d) from a Man, who is known to satisfy every week, no less than half a dozen blacks? 
This is a part of his history, which perhaps you have not heard, but it is pretty well known to 
have happen’d at Albany.327 
 
No outgoing letters from South Carolina mention what Amherst called “the few 
Anecdotes,” but the letter suggests that Monypenny kept black mistresses, possibly 
                                                
325 John Moultrie to Eleanor Austin, April 29, 1761 (Charleston: Typescripts; South Carolina 
Historical Society) 
326 John Moultrie to Eleanor Austin, September 1, 1761 
327 Ballindallloch Papers, Box 33, William Amherst to James Grant, May 13, 1761 (Edinburgh: 
National Records of Scotland) 
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publicly, to satisfy his sexual urges. Although Monypenny allegedly already had sexual 
relations with black women in Albany openly, it appears he became more discreet with 
his sexual activity in black majority Charles Town. Amherst’s comments on 
Monypenny’s alleged sexual behavior with black women suggested British officers’ 
sexual activities in America with African women were tolerated, although they provided 
fuel for private gossip among their peers. It also exhibited a few elite British officers’ 
view of colonial white women through the lenses of race and gender when he 
commented “a white woman” would be attracted to a sexually virile man such as 
Monypenny who had ability to satisfy at least half a dozen black women every week. As 
Kathleen Brown argues in her study of sexuality and power in colonial Virginia, elite 
male planters celebrated male virility and believed that women’s desire for sexual 
pleasure exceeded those of men. In addition, sex with African women signified “an 
expression of gender, racial, and class dominance” in a colonial slave society. Amherst’s 
gossip over Monypenny’s sexual activity in Albany and Charles Town suggests that at 
least a few elite British officers assimilated into a colonial slave society and adopted 
colonial planters’ attitudes toward sex and women.328 
It is worth noting that no direct evidence suggests British officers had sexual 
relations or expressed sexual desire toward Indian women in contrast to colonial officers. 
                                                
328 Kathleen M. Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p.332. On the subject sex, race, and gender in colonial 
America, see also Susan Dwyer Amusssen, Carribean Exchange: Slavery and the Transformation of 
English Society, 1640-1700 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), Paul Finkleman, 
“Crimes of Love, Misdemeanors of Passion: The Regulation of Race and Sex in the Colonial South,” in 
eds. Catherine Clinton and Michelle Gillespie, The Devil’s Lane: Sex and Race in the Early South, pp. 
124-138. Jennifer Spear, Race, Sex, and Social order in Early New Orleans (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008) 
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For instance, while William Byrd stayed in Keowee, he included a salacious writing 
about the Cherokee women in his letter to Forbes, unaware of the Scottish Brigadier-
General’s extreme disdain for Indians. “The Squaws are the only good things to be met 
with here, & I can not break them of anointing themselves with Bears-Grease, & 
depriving themselves of the greatest Ornament of Nature,” wrote Byrd, “As I am now 
intirely out of the Christian World, you must expect me to converse about nothing but 
Savages, therefore lest the Topic shoud be as disagreeable to you as their Society is to 
me.” Byrd’s sexually suggestive comments on the Cherokee women reflected colonists’ 
relatively lenient view and the fact that sexual unions between colonial officers and 
traders and Indian women at forts located in Indian country were the norm in colonial 
America.329 British officers like Forbes might have bristled at such comments from Byrd 
since he who primarily viewed Indians either as enemies to be destroyed or useless, 
greedy mercenaries that wasted the British army’s resources.330 
Similarly, John Moultrie, South Carolina provincial officer, who participated in 
the Anglo-Cherokee Wars, wrote several love letters to the woman he was courting in 
Charles Town. Moultrie’s descriptions of the Cherokee women contained sexual 
innuendos when he wrote: “I hope you will not be angry or jealous of me for making 
free with the Cherokee squaws…it was being pretty free to drive them naked out of their 
                                                
329 A few notable individuals worth mentioning are Lachlan McIntosh, the officer and later the 
commander of Fort Prince George, had an Indian wife and child. Lachlan McGillivray is also a prominent 
trader with Scottish background who married with a Creek woman. 
330 Headquarters Papers related to John Forbes’s Expedition to Fort Duquesne, Byrd to John 
Forbes, April 30, 1758 (Small Collections, University of Virginia) 
  145 
beds to hide in the woods & mountains.”331 British officers, however, did not resort to 
such sexually explicit language when referring to Indian women other than “squaw” or 
the prisoners and captives of war.332 This suggests that British officers excluded Indian 
women from the discourse of Indian affairs, focusing instead on the subjects of Indian 
warriors and their martial abilities, unlike their colonial counterparts. 
 
Indian Visitors to Charles Town 
While Grant and his British troops were quartered in Charles Town, they 
received Indian visitors to forge alliances against the Cherokees. Catawbas, Creeks, 
Choctaws, and Chickasaws visited Charles Town in the spring of 1761 to affirm 
diplomatic ties with the British. British troops’ exchanges with Indians in Charles Town 
consisted of communal diplomatic rituals meant to bind British troops, northern Indians, 
and southeastern Indians who shared a common goal of fighting against the Cherokees. 
For southeastern Indians like the Creeks and Chickasaws, historical animosity and 
rivalries offered an opportunity weaken the Cherokees’ power and influence in the 
region. The fact that these encounters occurred in the urban setting of Charles Town and 
in the presence of English colonists made these encounters rather unique compared to 
meetings at remote forts.333 These meetings in Charles Town meant that northern 
                                                
331 John Moultrie to Eleanor Austin, July 10, 1761 (Charleston, SC: South Carolina Historical 
Society) 
332 See Chapter Six on how British troops treated the Cherokee women prisoners in Grant’s 
expedition. 
333 Capt. French and British rank-and-file, who usually interacted with Indians in Indian territory or 
in forts in New York. For instance, see French’s journal entry on January 12, 1758 (Microfilm, Library of 
Congress) 
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Indians, British troops, and southeastern Indians forged military ties mediated by the 
Carolinians and the British officers. As demonstrated in the Fort Duquesne expedition, 
when the Catawba warriors became furious with the British because they made a 
diplomatic overture to Delawares who later killed Captain Bullen, the British could not 
afford to have divisions among the Indian warriors during an expedition. 
When Hagler visited Charles Town with his people in February 1761, the 
Catawbas “Done’d the War Dance” while the British officers “smaok’d the Calumet 
with them.”334 By adopting and performing Indian diplomatic rituals, British officers 
(and, perhaps, the rank-and-file) had a chance to familiarize themselves with the 
Catawbas.335 After the meeting with the British soldiers, Bull then arranged a special 
meeting in the Council Chamber in order to “prevent any jealousies between the 
Mohawks and the Catawbas for the future” because both sides accused against each 
other of kidnapping, imprisoning, and not returning their prisoners six years ago.336 At 
the meeting, Hagler and Silver Heels settled the dispute and affirmed their friendship 
and alliance with the British, which pleased Bull as he closed the meeting saying both 
                                                
334 Ibid., February 24, 1761 
335 White settlers in the backcountry frequently shot Indians indiscriminately because they could not 
tell friendly Indians apart from hostile ones. See below for the hunting accident involving Peter the 
Mohawk. In Montgomery’s 1760 expedition, Grant instructed that “The Catabaw Indians are always to be 
known, by a Piece of Tartan on their Heads The Troops to be informed of this that they may not any time 
take them for Enemy Indians a few more Catabaws are expected who have not yet got this Badge.” James 
Grant of Ballindalloch papers, Army Career Series, Box 32, May 21, 1760 
336 His Majesty’s Council Journals of South Carolina, March 2, 1761 (Columbia, S.C.: microfilm at 
SCDAH) The Council Minutes noted that Hagler “brought upwards of forty men women & childen with 
them, and now attended in order to be heard concerning the six Mohawks…” 
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the Mohawks and the Catawbas have “cleared up whatever seemed to be dark between 
them and…that they will go with one heart & hand to against the Cherokees.”337 
British troops also performed a military ceremony to Indian visitors to serve the 
interest of the colonists. In the midst of British preparation against the Cherokees, the 
Creeks visited Charles Town to file a complaint against colonial traders operating in the 
Creek country.338 Bull received the Wolf King in the Council Chamber, thanked him for 
“friendship and protection to many of the English Traders” under the threats of “your 
mad young people” who intended to harm the traders. Bull requested that the Wolf King 
continue to provide protection to the colonial traders but also threatened him referencing 
how the Choctaws became economically destitute after “they quarreled with the 
English” and mentioning “the “poverty and distress of the Cherokees, since they broke 
out with the English.”  He told the Wolf King that “the Great King’s warriors” arrived in 
Charles Town to punish the Cherokees and then added: “Think on those things how 
different from them is your situation, while you live in friendship with the English, who 
now do, and who only can supply you with cloathing and all other necessaries.”339 In 
response to Bull’s threats, the Wolf King clarified that the recent murder of traders were 
the acts of “mad young men” contrary to “the will of wise men” and expressed his regret 
about “many white men & children being killed by the Cherokees.” The Wolf King, 
                                                
337 Ibid., March 4, 1761 
338 Ibid., January 16, 1761, “Some of the Headmen of the Creek Nation of Indians, had taken offence, 
on account of some bad treatment they had met with upon their coming to Augusta, from some of the 
Inhabitants thereabout, particularly the Wolf King, who hitherto been a good friend to the English.” 
Consequently, the Board of the Council recommended that “the Wolf King should be invited to come to 
Charles Town in order to make matters straight with him, and advised His Honour to send an invitation to 
the Wolf to come hither before his return to the Nation, for that purpose accordingly.” 
339 Ibid., February 11, 1761 
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however, might have told Bull what he wanted to hear to maintain the trade relations 
with South Carolina. 
A week later, perhaps in order to demonstrate to the Wolf King the formidable 
power of “the Great King’s warriors” sent to Charles Town to invade the Cherokees, the 
British army performed an elaborately scripted ceremonial reception for the Creek Wolf 
King. “[A]t the Governor’s Request We had a Field Day to please him,” Monypenny 
wrote, “It was in an open Plain, & we fir’d four Rounds in different Ways.”340 
Monypenny intended “to show our Numbers to Advantage,” but the effort of the British 
troops backfired. After the ceremony ended, according to Christopher French, the Wolf 
King responded that “he was much pleas'd wth. our appearance, & say'd we loaded very 
fast, but was surpris'd we did not fire as soon as we loaded.”341 Monypenny likewise 
chafed at the Wolf King’s critique: 
 
He said (or is said, to have said, (I have no great Faith in Indian Interpreters) that, we were a 
fine Sight, very fit for Towns, not so much, for the Woods. That we kept too close together, & 
he hop’d we were not to fire in such large Bodys against the Cherokees; Was pleas’d with the 
Petticoats of French’s Company, Said Cap Rickman [?] was a Man & a Half, & ask’d whether 
he went to War a Foot, or a Horseback.342 
 
Monypenny clearly intended to awe the Wolf King in order to send a message 
about the consequences if they joined the French or attacked the colonists as Bull told 
him earlier in the council chamber. The Wolf King’s quips to the British troops, 
                                                
340 Add. Ms. 83699, February 17, 1761, (London: British Library), See also Christopher French, 
Journal, February 17, 1761 “The whole Army was under Arms, & about Twelve o'Clock the Wolf King & 
his attendts. came to the Field, & walk'd along our Front & Rear with the Governor,” French wrote, “we 
afterwards fir’d, & then march'd past him by Files.” 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
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however, suggested that he would be neither bullied by Bull’s threats nor “the Great 
King’s warriors.” Monypenny’s reactions also suggested that he not only felt humiliated 
in front of the Creek Indians but also the colonists as he readily blamed the Indian 
interpreter to discredit the Wolf King’s criticism. Considering Monypenny had mocked 
the Wolf King as “a merry Monarch, & generally drunk before Noon” when he saw the 
Creek visitor in Charles Town, he probably could not take in such a criticism that 
slighted the King’s Troops.343 
British troops not only interacted with their Indian visitors and allies but also 
terrorized the Cherokee hostages imprisoned in Charles Town. Only a few days after his 
disembarkation in Charles Town, Colonel Grant went to see Lieutenant Governor Bull in 
person and requested that Bull provide “a proper lodging” and keep “well entertained” 
the Mohawk warriors who sailed with British troops.344 While the Mohawks presumably 
stayed comfortably in Charles Town thanks to Grant’s request, the Cherokee women 
prisoners confined at a guard house only a block across from the barracks suffered from 
maltreatment and a lack of clothing.345 Indeed, their appalling conditions prompted 
Lieutenant Governor Bull to go the Council and its board members agreed to purchase 
the clothing at “the expense of the Public.”346 A month later, Grant formally requested 
                                                
343 Ibid., Monypenny, however, soon learned from Lieutenant-Governor William Bull that the Wolf 
King was “a Man of Consequence in his Nation” and to be “treated with Respect” on account of his “great 
Service to the English Traders in the lower Creek Settlements” in the previous year. 
344 His Majesty’s Council Journals of South Carolina, January 8, 1761 (Columbia, S.C.: microfilm at 
SCDAH). See also Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, March 17, 1762, f.33. Felix Long 
received the credit of £77 for “Lodging of the Mohawk Indians.” 
345 These were presumably the Cherokee hostages Lyttelton seized in the winter of 1759. 
346 His Majesty’s Council Journals of South Carolina, January 8, 1761, Bull notified the Council to 
provide clothing to the “almost naked” prisoners and “preserve them from the inclemency of the weather.” 
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that Bull relocate the Cherokee prisoners because “great abuses were daily committed by 
the soldiers on Duty at the Main Guard, upon the Cherokee women prisoners in part of 
the said Guard-House, and of such a nature, as was not in his power effectualy to 
remedy.”347 When Grant suggested relocating the Cherokee prisoners “to some other 
proper place,” the Council agreed to move them to “the armory house for that purpose, 
and advised such reparations to be made therein, as was necessary for the security and 
accommodation of the Prisoners.”348 Grant’s request that Bull relocate the Cherokee 
women to a location farther from the barracks, rather than trying to issue an order to 
prevent soldiers from raping the women, also suggests the Colonel’s inability to curb his 
soldiers, providing further evidence of troops’ freedom in the colonial town. No white 
inhabitants filed any complaints of sexually abused colonial women. On the contrary, the 
newspaper praised the troops and their decorum during their stay, suggesting that the 
British troops in Charles Town might have preyed on the most vulnerable Indian women 
instead of colonial women.349 
Records of theft and robbery involving troops and Indians suggest a context of 
illicit informal exchanges, but also the limits of diplomacy. A striking incident involved 
the Wolf King and a British rank-and-file soldier. When the Creek Wolf King lodged in 
Charles Town, one of the British soldiers slipped past the barracks guards and found his 
way to the streets of Charles Town at night. Upon encountering an Indian wearing 
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seemingly valuable headgear, the soldier took the chief’s gold-laced hat. Wolf King 
apparently appealed to Lieutenant Governor Bull who in turn complained to Colonel 
Grant. The British commander immediately instructed his subordinate Monypenny to 
issue an order to search for and apprehend the offender. Both Grant and Moneypenny 
clearly understood the gravity of this incident, and that they could not afford to offend 
the Wolf King and the Creeks whom they believed to be—“a nation of Indians always in 
the English Interest.”350 
This particular incident reveals how British soldiers and Indians shared public 
space in Charles Town. Their interactions extended beyond the more common images of 
British commanders and Indian headmen holding formal meeting or fighting common 
enemies together as war allies in the field. The particular setting in which this incident 
occurred also reveals the importance of the geography of occupied Charles Town. The 
relatively close distance between the barracks and the center of town meant that any 
British soldier willing to break curfew could slip into the streets of Charles Town at 
night (usually to get a drink or sell items to obtain cash) and run into Indians. The fact 
that the British soldier could rob a high profile Indian visitor like the Wolf King at such 
a time and place also indicates the degrees of freedom and comfort with Indian visitors 
strolling around the colonial town without either supervision or protective escort. 
  
                                                
350 Order Book of the Grant Expedition, February 10, 1761, p.310. According to Monypenny’s order 
book, tattoo (a signal on a drum, bugle, or trumpet at night, for soldiers to return to their quarters) sounded 
at nine. 
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British Troops and Enslaved Africans in Charles Town 
The first encounters between the British troops and enslaved Africans of South 
Carolina happened during Montgomery’s short, ill-fated first Cherokee expedition of 
1760. When Montgomery’s Highlanders disembarked at Monk’s Corner, the small pox 
had struck South Carolina and the colonists refused to send out their slave runners to 
contact the troops out of fear that their slaves might get infected too. Montgomery 
reported to Amherst that “the People in the country afraid of the disorder Spreading 
Amongst their Negros are unwilling to have Any communication with the Town or the 
People that come from it.”351 It is unclear whether “the disorder” Montgomery 
mentioned referred to the small pox that would kill off slaves or the possibility of 
insurrection against their masters as the slaves take advantage the disarray in Charles 
Town hit by the epidemic. Neither Montgomery nor Grant showed sympathy for the 
colonists, however; instead, the British officers complained of the colonists and their 
selfish interest in protecting their slaves and neglecting the British troops who had 
travelled a great distance to relieve them. Grant attempted to convince the South 
Carolinians that they had nothing to fear from the British troops who “could have no 
Infection of small Pox,” but to no avail.352 
The Cherokee Wars allowed enslaved Africans who participated in the conflict a 
window of opportunity to gain their freedom as they petitioned to the Commons House 
of Assembly of South Carolina. Montgomery’s 1760 expedition saw a number of 
                                                
351 WO 34/47, Archibald Montgomery to Jeffrey Amherst, April 12, 1760 (Kew: National Archives) 
352 WO 34/37, James Grant to Jeffery Amherst, April 17, 1760 (Kew: National Archives) 
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enslaved Africans petitioning for freedom, citing their military service against the 
Cherokees. Because South Carolina prohibited blacks from bearing arms after the Stono 
Rebellion of 1739, enslaved Africans acted in war primarily as “pioneers.”353 As Peter 
Wood notes, these pioneers “increasingly took over their responsibilities as ‘pathfinders’ 
in the southern wilderness.”354 A contemporary observer William De Brahm explained 
that African pioneers “cut down small Trees in the Way of the Carriages, to forward and 
guide through unfrequented Forrests, assist with their Boats and Hands to set them over 
Streams, River, and Creeks.”355 Lastly, pioneers carried letters and transported goods 
between Charles Town and the forts in Indian countries.356 These African pioneers 
mostly toiled as plantation slaves or transported people and goods in peacetime but they 
provided vital support to the Cherokee expeditions as the British army actively recruited 
them. 
Although the fear of slave insurrections lingered in the minds of many white 
South Carolinians in the wake of the Cherokee War, the imminent threat of Cherokee 
attack forced the colonists to arm a small number of slaves.357 Indeed, the South 
                                                
353 Peter Wood, Black Majority (New York: Norton, 1974), p.95. Peter Wood note in Black Majority 
that the term “Pioneers” applied to black workers a half century earlier of the American Revolution era 
whom he declared as South Carolina’s “first real ‘Afro-Americans.’” More specifically, the term applied 
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354 Ibid., p.117 
355 Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North America Louis De Vorsey, Jr., ed., 
Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North America (Columbia, S.C.: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1971), p.78 
356 For instance, see the entry on Journals of Commons House of Assembly, January 19, 1758. 
Lieutenant Outerbridge submitted an account to the Commons House asking the reimbursement for 
“supplying the Negroes who carry’d Indian Presents to Fort Moore…” p. 274 
357 Brumwell, Redcoats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.76 British army stayed 
from recruiting “racially mixed population” of its American colonies. Recruiting instructions under 
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Carolina government provided armed black soldiers, in addition to pioneers, to 
Montgomery’s expedition in 1760. Lieutenant Governor Bull informed Grant that he 
gave orders “to have half our Militia with a number of Negroes good Gunmen, and 
faithful to their Masters equal to the third of whites, should be ready to take the 
Field.”358 Bull’s decision to enlist African-Americans into the militia must have been not 
easy considering that only ten days earlier he had sent a report to Montgomery 
describing Tacky’s Rebellion in Jamaica.359 
By serving in South Carolina’s provincial army, enslaved Africans seized rare 
opportunities to claim freedom. Although only a small number of slaves who risked their 
lives earned that ultimate prize, the willingness of the South Carolinian elites to grant 
freedom to any slaves or to circumvent the ban on arming slaves suggests how much 
they feared the Cherokees. In 1761, Joe Fleming, “a Mullatto Man” and “the Property of 
William Killingsworth of Berkley County Planter” submitted a petition to the South 
Carolina Commons House of Assembly claiming that he “duly Inlisted in his Company 
of Rangers and was upon the late Expedition to the Cherokee Nation Commanded by the 
                                                                                                                                           
William Shirley in 1755 warned against enlisting blacks, mulattoes, and Indians. Brumwell notes that the 
British Army had a tradition of recruiting black men and boys as drummers and regimental musicians, it 
made no effort to enlist them as private soldiers despite the ample evidence that both free and enslaves 
blacks shouldered arms in provincial regiments and ranging companies. Brumwell’s general observation 
comes from the secondary source based on the northern campaign in New York. See also S. A. Padeni, 
“Forgotten Soldiers: The Role of Blacks in New York’s Northern Campaigns,” Bulletin of Fort 
Tiacoronga Musuem Vol. 16, No.2 (1999): 152-69, Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999) 
358 Ballindallloch Papers, Box 32, William Bull to James Grant, Charles Town, June 2, 1760 
(Edinburgh: National Records of Scotland); James Grant’s Orderly Book, April 9, 1760 (Edinburgh: 
National Archives of Scotland) Grant recorded of “The Pioneers & Hatchet men with 10 men per 
Company” in his orderly book. 
359 Ibid., May 23, 1760 (Edinburgh: National Records of Scotland) “We have just recd. an Account of 
an Insurrection of the Negroes at Jamaica who killed a good number of white People before they were 
subdued,” Bull wrote, “the Principal offender was taken.” 
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honorable Colonel Montgomery.” “Two Credible witnesses” supported Fleming’s claim 
that he “did kill and Scalp one Cherokee Indian for which said Mullato prays some 
Allowance from this House.”360 The committee of the Commons House accepted the 
“Certificate of the Affidavits” submitted by Fleming and freed him “at the Expence of 
this Province & that his master be paid Five hundred Current money for the same.” The 
committee reached the decision upon the calculation that Fleming’s example might act 
“as an encouragement to such Slave or Slaves” so that they “may here after behave well 
in a Military service.”361 
Abram, a prominent black messenger who frequently appeared in the South 
Carolina Gazette traversing between Charles Town and the Cherokee Country, also won 
freedom. Unusually, Bull recommended to the Commons House that it consider 
awarding Abram his freedom in June 1760.362 Almost a year later, a special committee 
appointed by the Commons House granted freedom to Abram citing “the Singular 
Services done by the said Negro to this Province in carrying Expresses to & from 
Charles Town to the Garrisons of Fort Loudoun & Fort Prince George in the Cherokee 
Country amidst a Variety of Dangers & difficultys.” The committee publicly declared 
that the likes of Abram “will excite other Negro Slaves on proper Occasions to 
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undertake the like Dangers & necessary service for the Province in hopes of meeting 
with the like reward & that therefore the same ought cheerfully to be complied with.”363 
Enslaved Africans continued to contribute to Grant’s expedition militarily but 
their relations with the British army started in Charles Town. Although free and enslaved 
blacks worked and even fought with Grant’s troops, they received no better treatment 
from the King’s Troops for their service. When all the British troops disembarked in 
Charles Town and quartered in January of 1761, Grant and Monypenny quickly ordered 
provisions to feed the army but they found the cattle too “poor & weak” to use as edible 
meat. 364 Quarter Master David Wilson gave “Condemned” provisions in the store to 
“Negroes and other persons, who coud eat such rotton Provisions” in order to avoid 
paying fines for dumping the spoiled food “over the wharf.”365 This incident 
demonstrated British troops’ casual economic exchanges with the town’s poor and 
enslaved, but also their disregard for such individuals. While colonial official might 
value certain individual’s contribution to the war effort, it is not clear that British 
officers shared such regard. They certainly did not extend it to the town’s black 
population in general, whatever their potential military contribution. 
Nevertheless, British officers did expend considerable effort recruiting “Negroe 
Pioneers” to prepare for the expedition. They believed Africans had a special ability to 
work in grueling heat. “They will be very useful in making roads or Posts,” Monypenny 
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informed the commander-in-chief’s brother, “especially as they can work in the Sun.”366 
The plan to recruit African pioneers, however, met with some reluctance from local 
planters. Monypenny noted that Bull advertised in an effort to recruit pioneers but he 
received no responses. Just like four years before, the local planters hesitated to lend 
their slaves to the British army, lest they run away or get killed by the Cherokees. 
Monypenny, however, did not give up his effort and sent “a Paper round to the principal 
Planters to subscribe to furnish one, or two, each.”367 Two weeks later, Monypenny 
reported progress: Grant and the provincial officers carried the subscription around to 
persuade the planters and procured “50 Negroe Pioneers.”368 These hard-won pioneers 
proved essential to the British troops as they marched through woods and over rivers, 
streams, and creeks. The British army’s effort to recruit African pioneers in Charles 
Town presented a paradox: British officers competed against local planters and even 
coerced them for the access to African pioneers but at the same time befriended the 
planters to acquire planter social and economic networks instrumental to their own 
aspirations to purchase and manage plantations, as Bouquet did and Grant would do later 
as the Governor of East Florida.369 
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British Troops Leave Charles Town 
In late March, the British army and the provincial troops departed Charles Town 
to invade the Cherokee Country, ending nearly three months of quartering. The army 
consisted of some 1200 British regulars, 1000 South Carolina provincials, 80 “Negro 
pioneers,” joined later by Catawba and Upper and Lower Chickasaw warriors. After 
destroying the Lower and Middle Cherokee settlements and spending months through 
the fall of 1761 finalizing a peace treaty, Grant and his troops marched back to Charles 
Town in December, boarded transports, and sailed away toward the West Indies on 
Christmas Day. Although a few detachments remained in “the richest City in the 
Southern District of North America,” no significant presence of British troops could be 
felt in Charles Town until 1780 when an occupying force arrived during the American 
Revolutionary War. 
Grant’s quartering in Charles Town in 1761 shows that British troops actively 
engaged in numerous social and economic exchanges as they had during Bouquet’s visit 
in 1757. A couple of notable differences existed, though. The absence of a vocal 
quartering dispute between the British commander and the members of the Commons 
House of South Carolina, and the apparent lack of ethnic tension between the troops and 
the inhabitants of Charles Town contrasted with Bouquet’s quartering four years before. 
British soldiers engaged in social and economic exchanges with the free and enslaved 
inhabitants of Charles Town, as well as with the Indian visitors. The troops often shared 
public spaces together to socialize and perform military rites as the British subjects or 
the diplomats receiving the Indian visitors. Some of these exchanges were informal and 
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criminal in nature, ranging from robbery to desertion to raping the imprisoned Cherokee 
women in Charles Town.  
The context of Grant’s quartering, however, significantly differed from 
Bouquet’s because of the imminent Cherokee threat that amplified the fears of slave 
revolt. The colonial elites could not afford to dispute with Grant when their property and 
lives were at stake. They provided whatever assistance (if not coerced by British 
officers) required to Grant and entertained his officers. South Carolina Gazette’s news 
column on the departure of Grant’s army to the Cherokee country probably accurately 
reflected the colonists’ attitude: “The behaviour of these troops during their stay in 
Charles-Town has given the greatest satisfaction to the inhabitants”370 Unlike Bouquet’s 
penchant for hyperbole, the British officers did not complain or criticize elite South 
Carolinians during their stay in Charles Town. As they marched toward Fort Prince 
George, however, they soon found disagreements with the colonial elites Charles Town 
and the provincial officers accompanying them over the course of the Cherokee 
expedition. 
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  160 
CHAPTER VI 
DAILY INTERACTIONS IN THE CHEROKEE COUNTRY  
 
As Grant’s expedition force departed Charles Town and marched toward 
Cherokee country, British troops engaged in different kinds of interactions with the 
participants in the war. Sometime these interactions revolved around intense combat and 
arduous marches over the mountains as Grant’s troops and its Indian allies raided and 
burned the Middle Cherokee settlements. British troops, however, spent the majority of 
their time in the woods, camps, and paths engaging in everyday interactions dealing with 
unforeseen accidents involving the Indian warriors accompanying them while not 
fighting or pursuing the enemies. These daily exposures to the behaviors of the Indians 
and sharing spaces with them gradually changed British officers’ attitude toward 
southeastern Indians in a positive manner over time and the Indian warriors appeared to 
have reciprocated the sentiment to the British troops. 
 
Disagreements over the Cherokee Expedition 
Despite the similarities between Britons and colonists as the subjects of the 
British Crown working to further the interests of British empire, when it came to Indian 
policies, they differed. As outsiders with no permanent ties to the land or to long-term 
affairs in the southeast, British officers more often could see events from Indian 
perspectives. Excluding the irascible officers such as Jeffrey Amherst, John Forbes, and 
Henry Bouquet who excoriated Indians and frequently expressed their desire to 
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exterminate “savages,”371 the British officers involved in the 1760 and 1761 Cherokee 
expeditions sometimes surprisingly defended the Cherokees and condemned the South 
Carolinians. 
For the British officers, the Cherokee expedition represented an unnecessary 
diversion from the main theater of war unfolding in the north. As historian John Oliphant 
writes, the commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst saw the new trouble in South Carolina 
as “an irritating distraction from the imminent drive on Montreal.”372 Another reason the 
British officers might have disliked their assignments in “the southern provinces” had to 
do with the lack of opportunity to socialize and network with their peers that could 
hamper their personal ambitions. For instance, when James Grant arrived in Charles 
Town in 1757, he wanted to go to New York as soon as possible where he could have a 
better chance of promotion within the British army. “I do not like to be left here with 
Regr. upon the footing of Charles-Town Guards,” Grant wrote to his family member in 
Lethen, Scotland, “I chuse to be a little nearer the Army, we have no sort of 
communication with them at present, and ‘tis not the plan to come here to be idle.” He 
asked for a favor to General Abercromby to “contrive business” or “some scheme” to 
bring him near the Headquarters of the British army in New York.373 The British officers 
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who received the assignment to South Carolina believed they had nothing to gain in 
terms of their military reputation in the British army since it did not constitute a 
cornerstone of the British initiative against the French in North America. 
Moreover, as one historian of the British soldiers in the Seven Years’ War noted, 
British troops “bore the brunt of the actual fighting” and the Cherokee expeditions were 
no exception as they had to fight enemies provoked by the colonists.374 The British 
troops returned to the Southeast only because they had to clean up the mess the colonists 
created. Hence, the British officers’ reluctance to fight the Cherokees and their 
disdainful attitude towards the South Carolinians created a different dynamic among the 
participants of the war. British officers’ apathy toward the Southeast led them to be more 
critical of the South Carolinians in assessing which side was more responsible for 
causing the Anglo-Cherokee war. 
As the commander of 1760 Cherokee expedition, Archibald Montgomery had no 
qualms about ordering his men to “put the Indians to Death” or calling Indians “savages” 
and “Rogues” but he questioned the colonists’ claims about the Cherokees. “[T]hey are 
for putting all the Cherokees to Deaths, or Making Slaves of them,” Montgomery 
reported, “but I fancy they have sometimes been hardly dealt by, and if they could tell 
their own story I doubt Much if they are so much to blame as has been Represented by 
the People of this Province.”375 A year later, Montgomery’s replacement James Grant 
also echoed the sentiment. He conjectured that most of the Cherokees “are sory for what 
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has happened” and “will be glad to come into Terms” as soon as the British troops 
march into their country.376 While scholars disagree on whether Grant really desired a 
quick peace treaty given how ruthlessly he applied scorched-earth warfare on the 
Cherokees, one cannot dispute that a faction emerged among the South Carolinian elites 
who vocally and publicly criticized Grant for arranging a peace treaty with the 
Cherokees that did not meet the colonists’ demands.377 
Not only did the British officers in charge of the Cherokee expeditions criticize 
the South Carolinians, but the subordinate officers serving in the campaigns also 
displayed a similar attitude. Major Alexander Monypenny disapproved of Lachlan 
McIntosh, the commander of Fort Prince George, who gave presents to Attakullakulla 
for returning a hundred English hostages because “the Capitulation of Fort Loudoun, & 
other violences committed by them, are too flagrant to be easily forgiven...”378 
Nevertheless, Monypenny believed that the colonists had exaggerated the crisis in order 
to bring in the Kings’ Troops. “Notwithstanding the great Cry of Violences from the 
Indians,” Monypenny wrote, “scarcely an Act of Hostility can be prov’d.”379 These 
remarks from the British officers leading the expedition suggested that they reluctant 
fought on behalf of the South Carolinians. 
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British Officers’ Attitude toward Indian Warriors 
Grant’s 1761 expedition differed significantly from Montgomery’s attempt a year 
before because the new army included Mohawks, Stockbridges, Chickasaws, and 
Catawbas. Consequently, everyday interaction occurred between the British troops and 
their Indian allies. The British officers attempted to exert control over the Indian 
warriors but often failed as the Indians often ignored and acted independently from the 
British which frustrated Grant and Monypenny. The two officers also often expressed 
disgust or fascination with what they perceived as the Indian warriors’ savagery. 
However, repeated everyday interactions enabled the British officers to change their 
preconceptions of the southeastern Indians by the end of the Cherokee expedition. 
British officers generally made disparaging comments about southeastern Indian 
warriors.380 For instance, while the South Carolinians valued the Catawbas’ loyalty to 
the English and their martial skills, Monypenny and Grant shared no enthusiasm for the 
Indian warriors of the Carolina piedmont. 381 When the Catawbas joined the British 
troops at Saluda Town, both Monypenny and Grant expressed disgust toward them for 
their destitute appearances and lack of arms. “18 of 40 Catabaws join’d us,” Monypenny 
wrote tersely, “They are Drunken Beggars.”382 Grant also informed Bull in Charles 
Town that, “Those cursed Catabaws came in with Colo. Ayrs the night before we 
marched destitute of many things.” Grant had to obtain arms from a provincial officer 
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and ordered the Indian Corps’ leader Captain Quentin Kennedy to “buy Paint, Knives, & 
ca.”383 As Bull’s reply to Grant indicated, however, the Catawbas might have 
deliberately showed up without arms in order to obtain guns and other new arms since 
they knew the British could not just turn them away.384 
Of the three British officers who left written records in the Cherokee expedition 
of 1761, Christopher French remained sanguine toward the Indians he encountered in the 
Southeast. Captain French, a newcomer to the southern colony, showed an untiring 
interest in describing Indians’ visits to Charles Town. As a seasoned British officer from 
Ireland, French had traveled extensively throughout British North America since his 
arrival in 1756 and participated in the grueling Siege of Louisbourg. He had seen Indians 
before his arrival in Charles Town. While stationed at Fort Horkimer, New York, in 
1758, French met Indians and already showed an obsessive interest in their practice of 
scalping and other forms of wartime violence.385 No wonder, then, that he seemed 
mostly curious about the Indians whose presence dominated the political and economic 
affairs in the Southeast.386 
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French was one of few British officers who voluntarily shared space with Indians 
by frequently engaging in informal social exchanges in the woods, Indian encampments, 
and Indian country. French also claimed to have some knowledge in interpretation skills 
when he supposedly assisted the communication between the Chickasaws and the 
Seneca with the help of a Chickasaw interpreter “in order to create a good understanding 
between them.”387 French’s rank as a captain (low compared to Lt. Col. Grant and Major 
Monypenny), basic interpretation skills, and his curiosity toward Indians might have 
allowed him to spend more time with Indians than any other British officer as he hunted, 
traveled, dined, and conversed with young Indians warriors, and chiefs. 
Unlike French, Grant and Monypenny became more frustrated over time with the 
Indian warriors because they could not control them exactly as they wished. For 
instance, after burning the Cherokee towns of Etchoe, Tasse, and Keweasee, the twenty 
Lower Chickasaw warriors declined to accompany Grant’s forces because they became 
“tired of the service, or thinking we should get into a scrape” and went home.388 In the 
same manner, the Catawbas refused to accompany the British troops any further and 
went to Charles Town to collect their presents for the service they had provided. As 
happened in the Fort Duquesne expedition, Grant could not do anything to retain them. 
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On another occasion, as the British troops entered the Middle settlements, Grant 
required more intelligence in order to surprise the enemies. A week later, Grant sent out 
two Indian Scouts “with directions to bring in a Prisoner if possible” but the Chickasaws, 
Mohawks, and Catawbas all brought scalps instead of prisoners. Disappointed, Grant 
wrote, “they could not get 2 Prisoner without risking too much by that means we could 
get no Intelligence of the Cherokees...”389 
British officers also failed to provide protection to Cherokee prisoners from the 
Catawbas or the Chickasaw that they captured, which suggested the British army’s 
impotence to impose strict orders on Indian warriors. British troops often interrogated 
the captured Cherokee women to obtain intelligence. For instance, upon arriving at the 
Cherokee settlement of Ayoree, French and his troops captured a Cherokee woman. 
French claimed that he and his men “gave her some provisions, and convey’d her 
privately out of camp lest she should be scalp’d by our Indians, who wanted much to do 
it.” When another Cherokee woman was brought out of camp, however, the Indian 
warriors “got hold of her soon kill’d & scalp’d her, they then threw her Body into the 
River.” Although French claimed that the British troops attempted to save the Cherokee 
women prisoners by moving them out of camp and therefore out of sight from the 
Catawbas or the Chickasaws, they stopped at short of providing protection to these 
prisoners. On the contrary, French merely mused over a Cherokee woman about to be 
killed by the Indian warriors, commenting that “that the sqwa [squaw] we brought to 
                                                
389 James Grant, Journal of the Cherokees Expedition from Fort Prince George, June 21, 1761  
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camp smiled at us even when she must have expected to be put to Death every 
Instant.”390  
Stephen Brumwell argues that British troops condoned a series of killings of the 
old and the Cherokee women, which showed “an apparent hardening of attitudes towards 
Indian non-combatants” and “suggest sympathy for these pathetic victims, but also 
indicate an unwillingness to protect them.”391 Thus, Brumwell argues, the British army 
violated the norms of violence and transgressed the self-proclaimed performing honours 
of war. Brumwell might have been right with his thesis concerning the British soldiers’ 
unwillingness to protect the war prisoners, but he overlooks how little control the British 
army had over its Indian allies. The Indian warriors killing the defenseless the Cherokee 
prisoner reflected that the British troops neither had power nor leverage to intervene and 
stop them. 
 
Silver Heels Incident 
Another incident that demonstrated the British officers’ lack of power and 
knowledge to intervene in Indian affairs involved allied Mohawk warrior Silver Heels. 
On the way to Congarees, at Eutaw Spring, James Grant reported that “Silver Heels our 
favorite Indian who behaved extremely well on board & Charles Town was guilty of a 
great piece of Barbarity.” Silver Heels, a Mohawk who had joined the British in their 
expedition against the Cherokees, had “cut with his Tomyhawk a man & two Women, 
                                                
390 French, June 12, 1761. Alexander Monypenny’s diary, unfortunately, breaks off on May 31. Also, 
see Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), p.97. Cherokee 
women became vulnerable to the invading forces because they were farmers and less mobile. 
391 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 187-188 
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same Indians, who live in a Plantation and are the only people of their Nation the 
Northern Indians have left.”392 Grant thought it best to execute Silver Heels but he 
washed his hands of the matter and let the Mohawks resolve the incident. “I could have 
wished that Silver Heels had been put to Death, when he committed this Act of cruelty,” 
Grant confided to his superior, “but did not chuse to have it done afterwards.”393 Grant’s 
carefully crafted words to Amherst implied that he had a full control and authority over 
the accompanying Indian warriors.394 Thus, when Grant wrote to Amherst that he “did 
not chuse to have it done afterwards,” he implied that he possessed the power to impose 
corporal punishment. Grant, however, wrote a different report to Bull in Charles Town: 
“The Barbarity of Silver Heels has given me great Uneasiness – I wish he had 
been put to death at the time that it happened. The other Indians intended afterwards to 
kill but it was then too late & I directed Captn. Kennedy to prevent it. One does not realy 
know how to Act with such Savages, If I had a greater number of them, He should 
suffer, or had a Solders done the same thing, he should not have lived an hour.”395 
As suggested in the correspondence with the Lieutenant Governor of South 
Carolina, even if Grant really wanted to punish Silver Heels, it would have been an 
unpractical option for several reasons. Such action would have surely angered the other 
                                                
392 War Office 34/47, James Grant to Jeffrey Amherst, April 25, 1761 (Microfilm, The National 
Archive of UK, Kew); His Majesty’s Council Journals of South Carolina, March 4, 1761 (Columbia, S.C.: 
SCDAH) Before the incident, Silver Heels talked with Hagler representing the Mohawks’ interest in the 
Council Chamber of Charles Town though he clarified “I am not a Headman; nor am I come hither to treat 
of matters of that kind, but to go to war.” 
393 Ibid. 
394 John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, pp.140-168. We need to be 
careful not to accept Grant’s words to his superior at face value as Oliphant argues that Grant withheld 
some information from Amherst in his reports to achieve his own objective of securing a peace treaty with 
the Cherokees as quickly as possible.  
395 Ballindalloch Box 33, James Grant to William Bull, April 17, 1761 
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five Mohawks who had their own justice system dealing with manslaughter; moreover, 
the Mohawks fought alongside British troops as allies, and therefore Silver Heels was 
not subject to British court martial law. Lastly, Grant was in desperate need of Indian 
warriors to provide vital assistance to the Cherokee expedition to such a degree that he 
could not afford to lose even one. First and foremost, however, Grant probably had no 
ability to control them as he himself implied when he wrote, “One does not realy know 
how to Act” with Indians. 
Monypenny’s account of the same incident involving Silver Heels mostly agreed 
with Grant’s. Monypenny, however, filled in a missing detail for the possible motive, 
attributing Silver Heels’s violence to “a fit of Drunkenness.”396 Evidently, Monypenny 
also believed British troops should carry out the execution. “We wish’d, he had been 
shot, when he committed this outrage,” Monypenny wrote, “but his Brethen offering to 
kill him next Day, Coll. Grant thought it too late, & forbad it.”397 Monypenny also 
deferred it to his superior’s decision and washed his hands of the matter, without 
protesting Grant’s decision or disapproving it. Curiously, Christopher French, who was 
obsessed with describing killings by Indians in graphic manner, did not record the 
incident or provide a follow-up to the story. 
Despite all the talks of capital punishment from Grant and Monypenny, however, 
Silver Heels lived and continued to accompany the British troops.398 Silver Heels’s 
                                                
396 Diary of Alexander Monypenny, April 15, 1761, p.322 
397 Ibid. 
398 References to Silver Heels can be also found in the correspondence between Jeffrey Amherst, 
Thomas Gage, and Sir William Johnson in 1763 and afterwards, working as a messenger for the British 
army. 
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incident occurred on the night of April 13 according to Monypenny’s account but he 
appeared in French’s diary three weeks later socializing with the Chickasaws.399 
Monypenny also later noted the presence of Silver Heels in July.400 Silver Heels’s escape 
from the proposed death penalty suggests the degree to which the accompanying 
Mohawks acted independently from British commanders. After hearing Silver Heels’s 
defense, his fellow Seneca Indians might have decided that Silver Heels’s action did not 
deserve a punishment by death and ignored British officers’ demands. 
 
Understanding Indians? 
Despite the varying degrees of their attitudes and opinions on Indians, all British 
officers agreed on one thing: they identified Indian violence as particularly inhumane 
and cruel. French obsessively recorded the violence with which Indian warriors 
dismembered their enemies’ bodies. For instance, after three hours of fighting in the 
field against the Cherokees on June 10, the British troops halted and set up a camp to 
tend their wounded. Here, French offered a graphic account of how a Catawba killed a 
Cherokee warrior: “[A] Cherokee warrior was brought in” to the camp and “(unlucky for 
him) was met by a Relation of a Catawba Indian who was kill’d in the Action, who 
knock’d him down wth. a war club Tomahawk’d & scalp’d him, then blew out his 
Brains, cut open his Breast, & Belly, & cut off his privy parts, & other ways mangled 
                                                
399 French, Journal, May 6, 1761 Despite the language barrier between War Tomahawk and Silver 
Heel, French claimed that he and his fellow officer Hodgkinson successfully mediated the communication 
between the two chiefs with the help of a Chickasaw interpreter “in order to create a good understanding 
between them.” 
400 Add. Ms. 83699, Monypenny to William Amherst, July 10, 1761 (London: British Library) 
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him a most shocking manner.”401 About two weeks later, French described another grim 
execution of an “old Cherokee” by “our Indians” as they ran “a large stick down his 
Throat stuck an Arrow into back of his sides, one into his neck & left a Tomahawk 
sticking in the Head.”402 
Later, amidst the burning and pillaging of Cherokee towns, French managed to 
find time to explore an Indian burial site and, possibly, attempt a grave robbery. “[O]n 
our return we were shown a great Rock by that River side under which our Guide told 
us,” French wrote, “a great Warrior was buried sitting, wth. laced cloaths on, & a 
conjuring Box by him.” French admitted that “we had a Curiosity to see him, but when 
we had open'd the entrance the stench added to our hurry to return prevented our going 
any farther.”403 French’s attempt to open the grave of the Cherokee warrior demonstrated 
his disregard for the Indian burial site, which he had no qualms about opening to satisfy 
his curiosity to see a supposedly magical item. His act contrasted starkly with his 
treatment of the bodies of dead British soldiers, which he burned or threw into a river to 
prevent Indians from scalping.404 
French’s portrayal of the Catawbas primarily in the frame of violence inflicted on 
the Cherokees and his attempt rob the burial site suggest a British view of Native 
Americans in the eighteenth century that emphasized their savagery and exoticness and 
                                                
401 Ibid., June 10, 1761 
402 Ibid., June 28, 1761, Monypenny to [William Amherst?], June 1, 1761 Monypenny too observed 
this latest killing by a Catawba warrior but with less fascination: “Here our Indians committed another act 
of cruelty in killing another old man...” 
403 Ibid., June 27, 1761 
404 See the journal of entries June 11 and June 18, 1761 in French’s Journal of an Expedition to South 
Carolina  
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influenced his choice of events to record. As Merrell conjectures, the Catawbas honed 
their martial skills because of the open paths to the Iroquois and the Cherokees. Kinship 
and social obligations among Indians in eastern North America required that they avenge 
the community’s war losses.405 Unaware of these social and cultural contexts, French 
clung to his preconceived image of the Indian savagery even though he engaged with 
them daily throughout the Cherokee expedition. Still, his fascination with supposed 
Indian barbarity did not preclude him from building a sense of rapport with the 
Catawbas with whom he fought. 
After the campaign ended in late July and the Cherokees and British settled peace 
terms, French and Kennedy travelled as the British army’s envoys to the Catawbas, 
presumably to thank them for their service to the expedition.406 The two British officers 
met with Hagler the next day and celebrated their friendship by sharing rum and food. 
The Catawbas’ hospitality also appeared to move French. “[W]e observed they shew'd us 
all the Civility in their Power,” French wrote, “all the People of their Castle, old & 
young came & shook hands with us, at night we had a Bear Skin & two Blanketts 
furnish'd us.”407 Although French might have been an exception, his case suggests that 
British soldiers who interacted with Indians on a daily basis could, like colonists familiar 
with the Indian affairs, learn to get along with Indians. Grant’s Cherokee expedition 
certainly provided opportunities for British soldiers where they could learn about the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Southeast. 
                                                
405 James Merrell, The Indians’ New World,  pp.119-121 
406 French., November 3, 1761 
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Although Grant and Monypenny often expressed their disappointment and 
disdain towards Indians, they acknowledged the contributions southeastern Indians 
made—particularly the Upper Chickasaws toward the end of the major campaigns 
against the Cherokees. Grant declared the Chickasaws as “quite a Different Species of 
People from any other Indians I ever met with” and confessed that he “never could bear 
an Indian before” but he had become “realy fond of those Chickesaws.”408 The Upper 
Chickasaws impressed Grant, who saw their discipline and austerity in terms of 
European military values: 
 
[T]hey have been sober and regular, they have obeyed every order as much as any Soldier in 
Camp, they never asked for anything, when other Indians Complained of short allowance of 
Provisions in the Cherokee Country; they said that they enough, and that Warriors should not 
eat much; when they went to War I realy believe I might have ordered them to observe a Fast 
Day or two if it had been thought Necessary.409 
 
Monypenny had derided Indian warriors in the expedition but, like Grant, praised 
the Upper Chickasaws without reservation. Monypenny wrote in astonishment that the 
Chickasaws “are different from any Indians, I ever saw” because they were “never sulky, 
always [put] a smile on their Faces, & do what they are desir’d, entering into our 
Views.” 
                                                
408 James Grant of Ballindalloch Papers, Box 29, Grant to Bull, July 15, 1761 [Microfilm: The David 
Library of the American Revolution] 
409 Ibid. 
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 The Chickasaws also voluntarily gave money to support the British troops’ 
wives and children, which earned gratitude from Monypenny.410 Monypenny reported 
that the Chickasaws did “a very charitable thing to our Soldiers Wives & Children, in 
giving four pence half penny dayly to each of them, above the Number allow’d King’s 
Provision.”411 The Chickasaws’ act of generosity particularly touched the soldiers of the 
22nd Regiment who received the payment.412 At least twenty-five soldiers’ wives were 
quartered in the barracks in Charles Town and each wife had two or three children.413 
The soldiers’ wives left at Charles Town received relief from the Commons House 
because of their abject poverty, and this caught the attention of the colonists. The 
Commons House approved the proposal to allow the women and their children to pay “a 
sum of 2/6 per Diem” because they were “not Intitled to His Majestys Allowance during 
the absence of the Army from Charles Town.”414 Colonial government had supported 
                                                
410 It is unclear how many women accompanied the expedition but it is likely most of the women 
were left in Charles Town. 
411 Add. Ms. 83699, (London: British Library), Monypenny to [William Amherst?], September 1, 
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soldiers’ wives being barred from following their husbands in campaigns in North 
America.415 
No wonder, then, that the soldiers of 22nd regiment expressed a gratitude to the 
Upper Chickasaws who paid four pence and half penny per day to their wives and 
children given their pay in the army. It is unclear how the Chickasaws learned about the 
plight of the soldiers’ wives and children because Grant and Monypenny forbade women 
to follow the army. They probably obtained the information directly from the soldiers, 
which suggests that the Chickasaws and the British troops communicated beyond the 
subjects limited to military operations. Perhaps both sides developed enough brotherly 
feeling for one another that enabled the Chickasaw warriors to sympathize with the 
British troops’ family members.  
 
Hunting 
As British troops and Indian warriors marched toward Cherokee country, 
accompanying them as well as the captive Cherokees in tow, Grant’s expedition boasted 
a special unit that physically integrated British troops and Indian warriors. This unit, 
called the Indian Corps, was commanded by British Captain Quentin Kennedy of the 
British and James Colbert, a white man, fighting with the Chickasaws. 416 When 
                                                
415 For instance, during Braddock’s expedition when Pennsylvania’s assembly voted to provide a 
financial relief to the wives left out of the expedition. 
416 Fabel, Colonial Challenges, p.77 Robin Fabel writes that Amherst scorned “I have no opinion of 
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Monypenny ordered Kennedy to form “The Indians into one Body,” Monypenny 
counted 18 Catawbas, “(9 Chickesaws, the finest Indians I ever saw), 6 Mohawks, and 
15 Stockbridges,” and more than 30 English and Scottish volunteers.417 The British 
soldiers and the Indians shared spaces and spent time together in the woods and 
mountains at Fort Prince George, at camping sites, and in Cherokee villages. They 
hunted together, explored the Cherokee country, and shared meals together at camping 
sites. The Chickasaw and Catawba warriors also scouted ahead for Grant’s army, hunted 
down the fleeing Cherokees, and burned down Cherokee villages. 
Hunting constituted an important activity that brought British troops and Indians 
together in the woods of southeastern North America. Sometimes Indians hunted alone, 
but that carried the risk of white settlers indiscriminately shooting them out of fear and 
suspicion. On May 24, Monypenny gave account of a hunting accident involving a 
Mohawk who accompanied British troops, which he called “a very unlucky 
Accident.”418 In contrast to Monypenny’s somewhat partial tone toward Peter, Grant 
offered a more stern account when he reported the incident to Amherst. He placed blame 
solely on Peter for going out alone “contrary to orders” and “his Misfortune was owing 
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to himself, for I allow none of them to go into the Woods, but when they have white men 
along with them.”419 
Although Grant supposedly “ordered” that Indians must hunt together with 
British troops to prevent white settlers from shooting the Indian allies indiscriminately, it 
is unlikely that young Indian warriors would have followed such instructions.420 Not 
only did many Indians resist British claims to authority, Peter also may have believed 
that the presence of British soldiers would have compromised his ability to track and kill 
a deer. For instance, French told an anecdote that revealed British troops’ lack of hunting 
skills in the American woods. French went out hunting with twelve of his men “for fear 
of meeting any Cherokees” but the party soon got lost and wandered in the woods even 
though he had a compass. French’s hunting party also did not have “the good Fortune to 
kill any Thing.”421 
 
African Pioneers in Grant’s Expedition 
Suffice it to say that British soldiers needed Indians whether in hunting or 
fighting against the enemies, but African pioneers also aided Grant’s army in significant 
ways. As French recorded the progress of the expedition’s march to Fort Ninety Six, he 
made an unusual passing reference to “blacks” working for the British army. Because of 
rough terrain and abundant creeks and rivers on the path, the troops employed 
“Pioneers” to build bridges and pave roads. As French wrote in his diary, the British 
                                                
419 War Office 34/37, James Grant to Jeffrey Amherst, June 2, 1761 
420 Alexander Monypenny, Diary, May 6, 1761 
421 French, May 25, 1761. On the same date of entry, Monypenny simple wrote, “Halted.” 
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army “mended the Road w. the black Pioneers as we march'd.”422 Grant also requested 
from Lieutenant Governor Bull camp kettles for the pioneers, which suggest that he 
valued the tasks pioneers carried out in the expedition enough to attend their needs and 
relay their requests to the Lieutenant Governor.423 As Bull accepted Grant’s request, he 
hoped that the pioneers “behave with much diligence expertness & order as to give you 
Satisfaction,” suggesting that both colonial elites and British officers understood that the 
presence of African pioneers was critical to the success of expedition as the army 
ventured into the Cherokee country.424 
Although the British officers did not give voices to the African pioneers in their 
written records during the expedition, they must have communicated with the British 
troops, exchanging information about the surrounding geography as they built bridges 
and paved roads while venturing deep into the Cherokee country. Christopher French 
relayed a similar reference on the local knowledge of African-descended people the 
following year, when the British sailed to conquer French Dominique in 1762. French 
wrote that British troops took “negro men & women Prisoners” and grilled them for 
geographic information.425 
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425 Christopher French, Journal of a Voyage from Charles Town South Carolina to Dominique in the 
West Indies, Volume 1 Part 2 February 4, 1762 (Microfilm; Library of Congress, Washington D.C.) 
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In addition to working for the British army as pioneers clearing paths, enslaved 
Africans worked as wagoners carrying provisions to the troops on the campaign trail. 
Monypenny found “Some Negroe Slaves” among the Provincial Rangers whom Grant 
reviewed at Fort Ninety Six.426 Once Grant’s troops entered the abandoned Cherokee 
settlements and applied “scorched-earth” tactics, black pioneers assisted the fatigued 
British troops in torching Cherokee villages and corn fields. In his pocketbook journal, 
Grant recorded “Some corn was destroyed by the Rangers & Negroe Pioneers” since 
“the Troops were realy not fit to act” while he “reduced the Duty as much as possible to 
recover & set them to rights with two or three nights sleep.”427 Some pioneers also 
repaired the forts when they did not accompany the army and were left behind.428 
 
Charles Town without British Troops 
With the British and provincial troops gone to the Cherokee country, Charles 
Town’s colonists became anxious and fearful that a slave insurrection might occur. The 
Cherokee prisoners (one man and two women) locked up in the armory house escaped, 
probably taking the advantage of Charles Town’s absence of patrol force. This incident 
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sparked a commotion among the inhabitants of Charles Town that revealed the degree to 
which fear over slave insurrections persisted during the Seven Years’ War. Reaction to 
the Cherokees’ escape also demonstrated that the presence of British troops in Charles 
Town had indeed provided a psychological comfort to the colonists. Although the 
incident started off with the Cherokees, the colonial elites quickly bolstered the town’s 
security to suppress any suspicious behaviors among slaves. 
The colonists initially suspected the Creeks visiting in Charles Town of helping 
the Cherokees to escape.429 In response to this accusation, the Creek headmen 
immediately denied “having the least knowledge of the escape of the said prisoners” and 
promised to either capture them or bring their scalps.430 Bull then expressed a concern to 
the Council that the lack of “guard or watch in the town since the departure of the 
regular forces” could bring “many evil consequences” and noted that “several gentlemen 
had voluntarily undertaken to perform watch duty by turns.” The colonists searched for 
runaway slaves and detained “thirteen negroes” and arrested one slave “who insulted the 
guard” after a pursuit. In addition, the colonists spotted two slaves on horseback late at 
night without their passes. One of the slaves ran away but “the other was apprehended 
and secured in the Guard House, a bayonet was found on him.”431 Ironically, only a 
couple of days after the colonists’ outrageous accusation against the Creeks and cracking 
down on the slaves, they captured the fugitive Cherokees and brought them back to 
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Charles Town who “were again secured in the former place of confinement.”432 This 
incident demonstrated that the colonists’ constant fear over Charles Town’s black 
population amplified during the Cherokee wars as they connected seemingly disparate 
incidents as evidence of a conspiracy. The escape of Cherokee prisoners not only 
prompted the colonists to bolster the patrol over the black population, but also hastily 
accused the visiting Creeks as accomplices, indicating the level of their paranoia.  
The long absence of British and provincial troops in Charles Town for nearly five 
months might have encouraged slaves to run away. Even after the heightened security 
and crackdown on Charles Town’s resident slaves, Grant also lost his slaves while 
encamped at Fort Prince George with his troops. Henry Laurens, a prominent South 
Carolina planter apologized to Grant in November of 1761: “I am ashamed to inform 
you that three of the four Negroes which you caused to be put under the care of the 
Provincial Qu[arter] Guard have escaped.”433 This incident revealed that slaves 
continued to run away from Charles Town as slave patrols weakened while the colonists’ 
attention was focused on the war effort. The Anglo-Cherokee War opened a greater 
window of opportunity for the resident slaves to run away, while some participated in 
the war as the pioneers hoping to obtain freedom. 
*** 
The Cherokee expedition of 1761 was far more complex than a simple story of 
British troops marching into the Cherokee country and laying waste to their cornfields. 
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The Highlander officers of the British army, Montgomery and Grant, became the 
reluctant commanders of the Cherokee expedition, although neither exhibited much 
desire to commit to the interests of South Carolina. From the British officers’ 
perspective, the colonists shared responsibility for causing an unneeded conflict that 
wasted the time and resources of the British army. At a personal level, James Grant 
deemed the Cherokee expeditions in the Southeast a distraction to earn him a fast 
promotion in the ranks of the British army. 
Daily interactions that took place between the British soldiers and the Indian 
warriors who joined Grant’s expedition provide an interesting counterpoint to Forbes’s 
Fort Duquesne expedition fraught with condemnations against the Indian warriors by the 
British officers. The Chickasaws, Catawbas, and Mohawks accompanying the British 
troops provided vital contributions to the British war effort but also various daily 
incidents or accidents also revealed the nature of Indian-British relations in the war. 
British officers wished to exert authority over the Indian warriors but often failed, as the 
Indians freely ignored the British army regulations. It was not a coincidence that the 
British officers praised the Upper Chickasaws who obeyed their orders without 
complaints and stayed with the British troops till the end, while excoriating the 
Catawbas and the Lower Chickasaws who abandoned the expedition in the midway. 
While it is difficult to ascertain how the Indian warriors viewed the British troops, the 
varying actions from the Catawbas and the Upper Chickasaws suggest that they created a 
sense of fraternity as they welcomed British officers visiting their country or paid money 
to the British soldiers’ wives and children. 
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African pioneers also contributed to Grant’s Cherokee expedition immeasurably 
as they mended roads, built bridges, repaired forts, transported wagons, and burned the 
Cherokee cornfields. Some of these pioneers might have persuaded their masters to let 
them join the British army, hoping that lending their skills to the British troops would 
win their freedom eventually. Ironically, as the African pioneers played an instrumental 
role for Grant’s expedition, the slaves who remained in Charles Town used the lax 
security and patrols to runaway for their freedom as the 1500 acres of Cherokee villages 
and cornfields burned. 
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????????????
CONCLUSION: BRITISH TROOPS, EMPIRE, AND THE SOUTHEAST 
 
As King’s Troops representing the British monarch, the British troops in the 
Southeast disrupted but also assimilated into the social relations of the Southeast built on 
colonial notions of race, ethnicity, and class. Recruited from the British domains in 
Europe and the British Isles and North America, these troops projected a distinctive 
martial identity to the indigenous, creole, and enslaved peoples of North America. 
Although officers attempted to assert authority over colonial men in the name of His 
Majesty’s Troops, they met with stiff resistance and opposition from the colonists. 
Consequently, the British troops came to terms with the workings of the Southeast. Only 
after the Cherokee War erupted in 1760 did colonists readily comply with the demands 
of British officers, as long as they repelled the Cherokee attacks on the colonial forts. 
High-ranking British officers wielded power and authority that challenged that of the 
colonial elites but brought different interests and attitudes. In particular, the British 
officers did not support the colonists’ aggressive Indian policies against the Cherokees 
and showed great reluctance to fight on behalf of ungrateful colonists unwilling to 
provide provisions and shelters for the King’s Troops. But when it came to expanding 
their economic fortunes in North America in addition to their army salary, the British 
officers actively learned from and emulated the leading planters of Charles Town. 
While British junior officers and rank-and-file possessed modest socioeconomic 
status that did not allow them to partake in the Southeast’s plantation economy or 
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rapidly climb up the social ladders within the British army, they nevertheless contributed 
to the urban economy of Charles Town and had destabilizing effects on the colonial 
Southeast through their social interactions with its inhabitants. Henry Bouquet’s and 
Archibald Montgomery’s account books reveal extensive economic activity when the 
troops were quartered in Charles Town, showing transactions involving arms repairs, 
transportation, clothing, and provisioning.434 Renting rooms and billeting quarters for 
officers proved most profitable to those inhabitants with extra rooms in their homes. 
While the Royal American or Highlander rank-and-file stayed in rundown barracks, they 
nevertheless spurred economic activity in Charles Town. The artisans and workshop 
owners producing provisions for the troops, such as candles, pepper, beds, hay, and 
sheets, applied for public credit after supplying the contracted goods to the British army. 
In addition, Bouquet’s disdainful description of his troops’ sorry state of drunkenness 
and the court martial records of intoxicated offenses suggested the rank-and-file’s thirst 
for alcohol created a sizeable demand for liquor. 
The quartering of Bouquet’s Royal Americans and Scottish Highlanders from the 
summer of 1757 to the spring of 1758 represents a misunderstood moment in colonial 
history. Because of the vocal debates over fiscal and constitutional issues among the 
Anglo-Americans with the advent of the Quartering Act of 1765, historians, too, have 
overlooked how British troops’ occupation of the urban spaces in Charles Town affected 
social relations implicating race, class, ethnicity, and gender that ultimately shaped the 
                                                
434 For instance, see Bouquet’s Account [B.M., Add, MSS. 21633, f.6-8] and Montgomery’s ledgers 
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course of the quartering dispute. British troops’ quartering in Charles Town revealed an 
abundance of intercultural relations only possible in the Southeast. Such interactions 
went beyond British regulars and provincial soldiers bickering over differential 
treatment, disagreeing over tactics, or disputing the defraying of military expenses and 
quartering. While quartered in Charles Town for months in 1757 and 1761, the British 
troops participated in formal and informal exchanges (including those of a criminal 
nature such as robbing, stealing, and assaulting) with the colonists, southeastern Indians 
(Cherokees, Creeks, and Catawbas), and free and enslaved Africans. 
Of course, British soldiers were not passive recipients of the Southeast’s political 
economy and culture. The British officers and rank-and-file also maintained a sense of 
superiority over the provincials. They often showed condescension toward the southern 
colony and its inhabitants for their perceived backwardness. Nearly all British officers at 
times criticized the provincial soldiers’ lack of discipline and the civilian colonists’ self-
interestedness.435 They also acted as agents of change in the Southeast as they brought 
their own cultural baggage and experiences from Europe, Britain, and the northern 
colonies. For instance, Bouquet and the European officers belonging to the Royal 
American regiment contributed to the fortification of Fort Johnson and Port Royal 
thanks to their engineering expertise. Bouquet instructed the South Carolinians how to 
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construct barracks. The British soldiers not only transmitted knowledge related to 
military operations but also acted as conduits of information, bringing news from all 
over the Atlantic world and sending information about the Southeast back to the British 
army’s headquarters in New York, and their families in Scotland, England, Ireland, and 
Continental Europe. 
Situated in the unfamiliar surroundings in the Southeast, British troops initiated, 
often out of necessity, extensive intercultural and social relations with their Catawba, 
Creek, and Chickasaw allies. These exchanges between British troops and Indians took 
place in the streets, markets, barracks, and public buildings of Charles Town. They 
shared vital information with one another about their joint plans to subdue the Cherokees 
and they affirmed their bonds of alliance through participating in various diplomatic and 
military rituals. For instance, British regulars’ firing of rounds to impress the Creek Wolf 
King exposed the weakness of British troops and their tactics in the warfare against the 
Cherokees. In addition, these interactions revealed British officers’ desire to establish 
Indian-British relations in terms of respect and deference in which the British positioned 
themselves as superior and the Indians inferior. But the Wolf King’s quip regarding 
British troops’ inefficiency and ineptitude demonstrated that the Indians did not care at 
all about British presumptions, which insulted the pride of British officers. 
The generalization of the British-Provincial officers’ attitude toward Indians 
based on the campaigns in the Ohio Country needs a careful reassessment. For instance, 
Fred Anderson writes that George Washington “shunned” Indians as allies because, as a 
land speculator, he wanted to remove the Indian presence from the Ohio Valley, and also 
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because he could not move beyond his humiliating defeat at the hands of Indians at 
Monongahela.436 Anderson also characterizes Washington’s attitude towards the 
Cherokees as an unflattering one.437 In the context of the Fort Duquesne expedition in 
which the Cherokees played a vital role, however, the situation was reversed. 
Washington pressured Forbes to take immediate action, suggesting that if he did not the 
Cherokees might look down on him as a coward, stinging the Scottish Brigadier-
General’s haughty pride. Washington also disagreed with Bouquet over the usefulness of 
the Cherokees, insisting that “Scalping Partys” of Cherokees would be more effective in 
harassing the enemies than “any Partys of white people can do.”438 
In the Southeast, British troops’ relations with Native Americans extended far 
beyond fighting together in the Cherokee Country. The Fort Duquesne Expedition of 
1758 revealed the significant role the Cherokees and Catawbas played in the coalition of 
British and colonial armies. Gift-giving practices between the Cherokees and the British 
affected not only the expedition but also the ensuing Anglo-Cherokee War in 1760. As 
Gregory Dowd shows, both the Cherokees and British understood the reciprocal 
expectations related to gift-giving practices but “the definition of the bond embodied by 
the gift” had significant cultural differences, which soured the Cherokee-British relations 
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437 Ibid., p. 204 “Although Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie made efforts to supplement Washington’s 
forces with Catawba and made efforts to supplement Washington’s forces with Catawba and Cherokee 
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438 Washington to Bouquet , July 16, 1758, The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series 5, 
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during the Fort Duquesne expedition.439 This study confirms much of Dowd’s argument 
that the British officers in charge of gift-giving to the Cherokees—John Forbes and 
Henry Bouquet—not only disdained the Cherokees but also believed they must correct 
“the insolent behaviors” of Cherokees, which meant putting an end to generous gifts. 
Slavery and the plantation economy of the Southeast had a long lasting impact on 
the British officers’ future careers, social mobility, and economic fortunes. Although the 
presence of significant numbers of British troops in Charles Town ended with the 
conclusion of the Cherokee expedition of 1761, social ties and networks British officers 
had built with the colonial elites remained in effect as they continued via correspondence 
and business transactions. Both the top ranking British officers, Col. Henry Bouquet and 
Lt. Col. James Grant, who once visited Charles Town, maintained social and economic 
connections with the inhabitants of Charles Town. They continued to correspond with 
their proxies and friends after their departures in 1758 and 1761, respectively. 
For the officers of status and connections within the British army like Bouquet 
and Grant, the Southeast presented an ideal opportunity to expand their wealth, 
following the examples of local elite planters. The plantation economy of the Southeast 
quickly tempted British officers with social connections and economic means to try out 
their luck in rice and indigo plantations. Despite the short duration of their military 
assignments in South Carolina, Bouquet and Grant capitalized on their social status and 
networks within the British army to establish connections with the local elites of Charles 
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Town. With the help of established local planters and merchants, British officers readily 
used their monetary credit from North America, Europe, and Britain to acquire slaves, 
plantations, and hire managers to run their properties, while they campaigned elsewhere. 
James Grant perhaps best represents a British officer consumed by the power of 
slavery and the plantation economy in the Southeast. Grant briefly went back to Britain 
in 1762 but soon returned to North America as the Governor of East Florida--a newly 
created British territory acquired from Spain by the Treaty of 1763. During his eight-
year tenure as the Governor of East Florida from 1763 to 1771 in St. Augustine, Grant 
sought to transform Florida into a colony of South Carolina, an idea John Barnwell had 
presented to the Board of Trade some fifty years before. He immediately made use of 
connections with the planters and merchants in South Carolina he befriended. Indeed, 
Grant appointed numerous South Carolinians to key offices in East Florida and 
“imported” people from South Carolina and Georgia to populate the colony.440 
Consequently, many South Carolinians filled important official positions in East Florida. 
John Savage, James Moultrie, John Moultrie (who expressed his fondness and friendship 
with Grant during the Cherokee expeditions), John Holmes, John Ainslie, and William 
Drayton filled councils and courts of the new colony.441 
Grant also continued to build on the relationship he established with John Stuart 
during the Cherokee expedition. Stuart became the new Indian Superintendent of the 
southern colonies following the death of Edmond Atkin in 1762. This collaboration 
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proved crucial for Grant who had to manage East Florida’s relations with the Seminoles, 
Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and others in the region. In addition, Grant also used his 
Highlander connections to speculate on East Florida’s land, trying to resell it to people 
on the other side of the Atlantic. He asked Lord Adam Gordon—a fellow Highlander 
who visited St. Augustine—to advertise the prospect of East Florida by organizing the 
East Florida Society of London; this ambitious colonization effort failed, however. 
During his eight years of tenure as the Governor of East Florida, Grant further 
strengthened ties with South Carolina as he visited Charles Town regularly to see his 
friends and became a member of the St. Andrew’s Society.442 
Henry Bouquet’s Walnut Hill plantation near Charles Town also illustrates the 
arrogant Swiss-British officer succumbing to the pervasive power of the plantation 
economy in the Southeast. After his departure from Charles Town after quarreling with 
South Carolina’s legislature in 1758, he continued correspondence with his property 
managers. During his short nine-month stay, however, Bouquet relied on his Swiss 
connections in the British army—Colonels James Prevost and Frederick Haldimand—
and the local Swiss resident Andrew Fesch, his brother Rodolph, and his wife Sophia. In 
1761, Sophia Fesch reported to Bouquet that his plantation had a good prospect of 
making a handsome profit. “I shall only tell you that the weather is at its best and that the 
plantation has never been so flourishing,” Sophia wrote, “everything is in order, all is 
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quiet, and we hope to have a good harvest.”443 Soon, however, a dispute between 
Bouquet’s managers threatened the fate of his plantations as powerful South Carolinian 
merchants like Benjamin Rattray and Robert Raper used their connections in London to 
ruin Bouquet’s property.444 In a desperate attempt to stop the confiscation of his indebted 
property from his creditors, Bouquet begged “the said lands and Negroes” not to be 
taken away from his managers in Charles Town.445 By January 1763, however, 
Bouquet’s plantation was completely liquidated. This event also forced Sophia Fesch, 
now a widow after her husband’s death, to leave South Carolina and depart to Italy--“the 
only refuge” for her. She became disgusted with her misfortune in South Carolina: “I 
leave this wretched world, which, I confess to you, will be without regret,” wrote the 
exasperated Swiss widow, “I have suffered too much in it.”446 
Rodolph Fesch, a brother of Andrew Fesch, arrived in Charles Town from the 
West Indies to console the grief-stricken widow and recommended to Bouquet that he 
pay one last visit to Charles Town to close the business of his liquidated plantation. “Is 
not the investment you have in this province worth the trouble for you to make a trip 
here?” Fesch wrote, “It seems so to me, and if you were here for a couple of months you 
could arrange your affairs and give your orders, so that your interests would suffer small 
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loss.”447 This suggests that Bouquet had indeed invested a considerable sum of capital in 
South Carolina. Bouquet never returned to Charles Town nor replied to Sophia and 
Rodolph. He died as a bitter man in the Ohio Country in 1764, fighting and cursing the 
Indians there till his death in the wake of Pontiac’s War. Ultimately, Bouquet’s actions 
spoke louder than his scathing words against the southern colonists; in fact, privately, he 
strived to become one of the local planters. 
British officers not only recognized the usefulness of slaves for their tasks but 
also clearly understood the social implications of slavery and race in the Southeast, often 
taking advantage of the context to strengthen the condemnations of ungrateful colonists 
knowing the power race held for colonists. The British forces in Charles Town employed 
a considerable number of enslaved Africans for the fortification works and for the 
Cherokee expedition as pioneers, which opened up a possibility for those slaves to 
petition for freedom. The British officers railed against at the planters for their 
unwillingness to provide their slaves for the British army. In the eyes of British officers, 
the African pioneers’ skills were invaluable for the success of expedition and their labor 
crucial to complete the fortification projects. As much as the Commons House of 
Assembly’s parsimony over providing money for provisions and quarters for the troops 
irritated the British officers, the planters’ unwillingness to loan their slaves for the 
British army angered them. Equally, Bouquet also found the colonists’ treatment of 
King’s Troops unacceptable when they offended his sensibility by providing his troops 
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with fewer blankets than they did for their “negro slaves.” Although Bouquet disdained 
his rank-and-file soldiers for their drunkenness and wretchedness, he found it useful to 
appropriate the language of race and slavery to condemn the colonists in his report to 
Loudoun. Similarly, Grant and Monypenny complained to their superiors and friends in 
New York about planters hiding their slaves in order to dodge the British army’s efforts 
to conscript them. 
The Royal Americans and Scottish Highlanders quartered in Charles Town in 
1757 also brought simmering ethnic tensions between Scottish and German colonists to 
the surface. Ethnic tensions between Scots and the German-speaking “Dutch” also 
shaped the British troops’ experiences in the Southeast. The German-speaking 
background of Bouquet and his Royal American regiment met both formal and informal 
opposition from Charles Town’s elites and middling sorts. Charles Town’s elites, large 
numbers of whom claimed Scottish descent, resented Bouquet and his coterie buying 
properties, as well as the Swiss Colonel’s decision to remove the newly arrived 
Highlanders and instead garrison the town with the German-speaking Royal Americans. 
The workshop owners dependent on the labor of European indentured servants resented 
Bouquet’s Royal Americans because their own German-speaking servants ran away to 
join Bouquet’s regiment. The Commission of the Lower House of Assembly also singled 
out “Dutch” soldiers from Bouquet’s Royal Americans for stealing wood. Lastly, those 
soldiers accused and convicted of drunkenness, desertion, and assaults who appear in the 
court martial records all hailed from Bouquet’s Royal American regiment. No single 
case of a Highlander facing such accusations appear in the court martial records, which 
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suggests that the inhabitants of Charles Town might have harbored more animosity 
towards German-speaking soldiers and more often reported their delinquent behavior to 
the authorities. 
British troops’ interactions with colonial, Indian, and African women in the 
Southeast exhibited both mutually beneficial and exploitative relations. Although high-
ranking British officers looked down on the prospect of marrying colonial women, some 
British officers did so anyway. They also socialized with elite colonial women as they 
attended entertainments in playhouses and dined together in private houses. British rank-
and-file soldiers sequestered in terrible, rundown barracks had fewer opportunities to 
have social interactions with colonial white women. They sometimes sexually assaulted 
colonial women and may have frequented brothels. Members of the British rank-and-file 
also sexually exploited and raped Cherokee women imprisoned in the town’s jail. British 
officer Alexander Monypenny openly had sexual relations with African mistresses, 
making himself a subject of gossip among his peers, but such behaviors did not affect his 
reputation as a competent officer. In fact, Grant praised Monypenny for his diligence and 
expertise in the Cherokee expedition of 1761.448 
For southeastern Indians, the British troops were a mixed blessing. In the eyes of 
the Cherokees, the British troops were no better than the colonists. John Forbes and 
Henry Bouquet disrespected the Cherokee warriors’ service in the Fort Duquesne 
expedition by their stingy gift giving. Archibald Montgomery and James Grant 
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devastated their land and brought suffering to their people. Still, two Highland officers 
generally sympathized with the Cherokees’ cause against the South Carolinians and 
worked to negotiate peace terms acceptable to the Cherokees, because their disdain for 
the South Carolinians rivaled their disdain for the Cherokees. On the other hand, the 
Catawbas received promises of a new fort under the British protection and a resident 
trader in their country for assisting the British against the Cherokees, but they paid a 
steep price. The outbreak of small pox during the Fort Duquesne expedition and the 
colonists’ unwillingness to keep their end of bargain and make additional gifts left them 
shortchanged. The Chickasaws, who participated in Grant’s expedition of 1761, earned a 
genuine respect for their martial skills, discipline, and their gifts to the soldiers’ wives 
and children from the Highland officer, and they also received generous gifts for their 
service. Nevertheless, their long-term survival in the southeast among the Creeks and 
other Indian nations nearby remained uncertain as neither the British troops nor colonial 
soldiers could protect them without a British fort erected in their country. Still, the 
southeastern Indians’ geopolitical balance of powers remained relatively intact by the 
conclusion of the Seven Years’ War. With the official exit of French presence from the 
Southeast, however, they would soon face tremendous upheaval. 
Some enslaved Africans of South Carolina saw possibilities to gain their freedom 
by siding with the British army against the Cherokees. Although the British army 
probably did not treat the African pioneers any better than they did the Catawba and 
Chickasaw warriors in the expeditions, Grant and Monypenny found them important 
enough to circulate recruitment advertisements in Charles Town and request additional 
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supplies and provisions for them. British officers like Bouquet and Grant, however, were 
happy to enslave more Africans as they purchased “negros” from local slave traders to 
run their own plantations near Charles Town and St. Augustine. 
British troops’ experience in the southern colonies yields a different picture of 
intercultural relations than in the northern colonies where scholars and historians have 
focused. The pivotal battles around the Ohio Country, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Canada have attracted the lion’s share of historians’ attention to the northern theaters. To 
be sure, these places provided plentiful opportunities for intercultural exchanges with the 
Six Nations, Shawnees, Delawares, Ohioans, and many others. In the Southeast, 
however, the presence of a plantation economy, racial slavery, and the geopolitical 
dynamics of southeastern Indian nations provided a different context for British troops 
than their counterparts faced in the north. 
For British officers, the absence of highly valuable strategic towns or forts to 
conquer against the French empire in the Southeast deprived them of the chances to 
pursue military glory and fame. As a result, Bouquet spent the idle nine months in South 
Carolina disputing with the Commons House of Assembly over quartering the British 
troops, acting as the military advisor and administrator in “the southern provinces,” and 
purchasing plantations and slaves. A few years later, Archibald Montgomery and James 
Grant reluctantly led the British troops in the Cherokee Wars of 1760 and 1761 in which 
they disagreed with the South Carolinians’ policies against the Cherokees. These 
disagreements, however, ultimately mattered little as the British officers followed the 
orders of the North American commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst, whose power was 
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also limited by colonial politics and opposition. Thus, British officers with social status 
and economic means in Charles Town sought to make their unwanted assignment to the 
region into a profitable opportunity as they courted local planters and purchased slaves 
and plantations. 
Some subaltern British officers involved in the Southeast during the Seven 
Years’ War extended their military careers to the American Revolutionary War. 
Christopher French represented one of these subaltern British officers climbing the 
career ladder of the British army during the Seven Years’ War and the War of American 
Independence. After the Cherokee expedition of 1761, French sailed through the West 
Indies to participate in the British expeditions against French Dominique and Havana. In 
1764, French returned to the mainland as he embarked on an expedition along the 
Mississippi River from Louisiana. His illustrious career as the Captain of the 17th and 
22nd Regiment apparently earned him a promotion to colonel. To be sure, not all British 
soldiers had such success either in military or civilian careers. Rodolph Fesch, the 
brother of Andrew Fesch, expressed his frustration to Bouquet after two years of service 
in the West Indies because he earned no promotion beyond captain: “This profession is 
not worth a damn to anyone who has no influence in the proper places.”449 
Although we do not have ample evidence of how the British rank-and-file under 
the command of Bouquet and Grant viewed the various inhabitants of the Southeast, 
they nevertheless made exchanges with the inhabitants of Charles Town as they 
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frequently shared public spaces. Despite relative isolation and the curtailed mobility 
once quartered in barracks, the British rank-and-file continued to interact with colonists 
and enslaved Africans in Charles Town through informal social and economic exchanges 
as the soldiers bartered, deserted, got drunk, shared public spaces in church and the 
town’s square, and committed crimes among inhabitants. They also interacted 
extensively with the southeastern Indians during the Cherokee and Fort Duquesne 
expeditions. 
The mobility of the King’s Troops and the global scale of warfare in the 
eighteenth century allowed them to assume their role as the foremost and formidable 
imperial agents for the British Empire. Although unity against the French and her Indian 
allies helped to maintain a shared political identity as the King’s subjects and some 
cultural cohesiveness as Britons among the colonists, British troops in the Southeast 
maintained their distinct identity as cultural outsiders. When British soldiers had first-
hand contacts with the southeastern Indians and did not rely on the filtered information 
via colonial Indian agents, they could develop sympathetic attitudes toward the Indian 
perspectives that served the British interest better than did the parochial interests of 
colonists, as in the Cherokee Wars of 1760-61. 
While British soldiers often judged the inhabitants of the Southeast based on 
their notions of race, class, and gender to maintain their identity as King’s Troops, these 
differences did not preclude their pursuit of economic interests with the local planters or 
their sharing of social and physical spaces with Indians and enslaved Africans. 
Furthermore, these examples drawn from the “southern frontier” complicate the question 
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of whether the British empire integrated or disintegrated in the aftermath of the Seven 
Years’ War. While the British army’s protection from possible slave insurrections and 
contributions to the local economy strengthened the bonds among British subjects across 
the Atlantic, disagreement over the policies toward the Native Americans in the region 
proved divisive.  
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